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The thesis attempts to isolate ways in which the political and economic changes 
wrought by the northern Vietnamese state between 1945 and 1995 have influenced trends 
in northern Vietnamese mortality and fertility over the same period. The thesis also 
attempts to show how the demographic trends, and political and economic changes, have 
influenced the demography of northern Vietnamese families-in particular the 
demography of succession and of co-residence. 
Between 1945 and the early 1980s the northern Vietnamese state pursued a 
communist development strategy while fighting major wars. The economic institutions 
introduced by the government were subverted on a large scale and were highly inefficient. 
Neverthelss, from about the 1950s, mass campaigns and a system of locally-funded 
rural health centres brought about a rapid decline in mortality. Fertility began to decline 
slowly in the 1960s. Reasons for the decline included reduced infant mortality, wartime 
disruption, rising education costs, and, in the cities, the introduction of old-age support 
schemes. War deaths only partly undid the effects of the mortality decline and sustained 
high fertility, so that the population continued to grow rapidly, and the mean number of 
_ surviving children per woman reached historically unprecedented levels. 
During the 1980s, the Vietnamese state began to abandon its communist 
development strategy, in response to successive economic crises and to spontaneous 
grass roots innovations. Economic reform disrupted the health system, which had 
already been weakened through lack of investment; mortality nevertheless declined 
slightly through the 1980s. The fertility decline continued, hastened by economic 
expansion and the government's birth control program. 
Northern Vietnam's demographic trends have meant that unprecendentedly high 
proportions of families have been able to conform to northern Vietnam's patrilineal 
succession rules. Demographic change has thus undermined the government's attempt to 
propogate new succession rules less biased against women. In contrast, and despite 
perceptions to the contrary, household size and structure have not changed markedly 
between 1945 and 1995. The relative stability in co-residence patterns has been a result of 
offsetting effects between mortality decline, fertility decline, and government policy. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1. Aims and scope of the thesis 
The year 1945 began in northern Vietnam with a great famine and ended with a 
revolution. The following year the French returned to Vietnam, precipitating an eight-year 
colonial war. While fighting the war, the Vietnamese resistance government carried out 
huge and effective health and education campaigns, as well as land reforms. Victory 
against the French came in 1954, but increasingly violent land reform campaigns caused 
further bloodshed and disruption until 1956. Only two years later, the government 
embarked on a strategy of rapid industrialization and collectivization of agriculture. 
Hostilities against southern Vietnamese and American forces escalated through the early 
1960s, until by 1965 Vietnam was at war. Reunification in 1975 was followed by the 
near collapse of the economy, and the disintegration of the country's economic 
institutions. Over the 1980s the government abandoned its socialist development strategy, 
piece by piece. By the mid- l 990s both northern and southern Vietnam appeared to be set 
to experience a period of rapid growth similar to that which had already been 
transforming most of East and Southeast Asia. 
Research into how northern Vietnam's dramatic, and often tragic, post-1945 
political and economic history influenced northern Vietnamese families has barely begun. 
This thesis attempts to contribute towards the demographic part of the story by 
investigating ways in which the development of the modem northern Vietnamese state 
and political economy influenced demographic rates and the demography of northern 
Vietnamese families. 
Two pioners of the explanation of demographic processes in terms of the historical 
development of large-scale political and economic structures have been Greenhalgh 
(1989, 1990) and McNicoll (1980, 1995). Both writers accept that the causal links 
between decisions made by national leaders and demographic events within families can 
be weak and indirect. Both argue, however, that by examining large-scale structures, it is 
possible to explain and give coherence to many of the features of local environments 
which demographers use in their arguments but normally treat as givens-features such 
as landholding patterns or the character of family planning programs. Neither Greenhalgh 
nor McNicoll argues that a top-down political economy approach is the only legitimate 
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way of examining demographic phenomena; they argue only that this approach has been 
neglected. 
Greenhalgh and McNicoll have mainly been concerned with explaining fertility 
trends. However, their approach can also be applied to explaining mortality and 
nuptuality trends, and the demography of families, as this thesis does. The 
methodological approach to family demography adopted in the thesis is macro-
simulation, partly because this was the most practical method with the resources at hand, 
and partly because for the potential of macro-simulation methods to combine some of the 
transparency of analytic methods with some of the realism of micro-simulation methods 
(Ryder 1987: 348-9). 
1.2. Chapter outline 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of political and institutional developments between 
1945 and 1995. Later chapters refer back to the account given in this chapter. If Chapter 2 
contains one recurring idea, it is that official policy in northern Vietnam has been 
significantly modified, and sometimes even led by, spontaneous innovations at the local 
level. 
Chapter 3 is more conventionally demographic, giving an overview of changes to 
mortality and fertility. Brief comments are made on links between institutional change 
and mortality decline, but explanation of fertility decline is postponed to Chapter 4. By 
estimating levels and age-distributions of mortality and fertility between 1900 and 2000, a 
'reconstruction' of the net reproduction rate and mean numbers of surviving children is 
carried out. The likely demographic effects of the famine and wars are examined in detail. 
Drawing on Chapters 2 and 3, Chapter 4 examines the effects on fertility in 
northern Vietnam of explicit government policies such as the birth control program, and 
of implicit policies, such as the subsidies for childrearing. A comparison is made with 
China, which has had similar institutions to northern Vietnam, but very different fertility 
trends. 
Having explored the influence of political and economic change on mortality and 
fertility trends, the thesis examines the influence of these changes and trends on the 
demography of northern Vietnamese families. Chapter 5 discusses a neglected topic 
within family demography: the effect of the demographic transition on succession. Using 
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a simple model first developed by Wrigley (1978) the chapter illustrates how northern 
Vietnam's demographic transition allowed an unprecedented number of families to 
conform to traditional succession rules at a time when the government was attempting to 
propagate new ones. 
Chapter 6 discusses a more prominent topic within family demography: co-
residential households. Like Chapter 4, it examines the effects of political and 
demographic change on families' ability to conform to existing conventions. These 
effects appear to be smaller than might be expected. 
In the concluding chapter, material from earlier chapters is summarised, but from 
new perspectives. The influence of the northern Vietnamese state on mortality and 
fertility is discussed under the headings of warfare, urban versus rural socialism, and the 
planned economy. A comparison is then made between changes in the demography of 
succession and changes in the demography of co-residence. 
1.3. Sources and data 
The principal source of ideas and information for the thesis has been secondary 
literature. International literature on the state and on state-society relations has been useful 
for providing comparisons with Vietnam. Particularly useful has been literature on China, 
as represented by Parish and Whyte (1978), Stacey (1983), Whyte and Parish (1984), 
Shue (1988), Selden (1988), Greenhalgh (1988, 1989, 1993, 1994) or Kelliher (1992). 
Kornai's (1992) magnum opus on communist economies has been invaluable. 
Although most of the Vietnamese research on Vietnamese politics and economics 
published in English is shallow and propagandist, the research published in Vietnamese 
sometimes contains useful details, and can be surprisingly critical of past mistakes. Good 
examples are Nguyen Luc et al. (1990), and Cao Van Luong (1995). 
I have used a small proportion of the large foreign literature on Vietnam's wars, 
and a large proportion of the smaller foreign literature on its politics and economics. 
Work by the economist Adam Fforde and the political scientist Benedict Kerkvliet has 
been particularly valuable (Fforde and Paine 1987; Fforde 1989; Fforde and de Vylder 
1996; Kerkvliet 1995, 1995a; Kerkvliet and Selden 1995). Fforde, and more recently 
Kerkvliet, have been the leading exponents of the bottom-up model of economic and 
political change adopted in this thesis. 
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An important limitation of existing Vietnamese or foreign research on Vietnam is 
the scarcity of descriptions of the day-to-day operation of public institutions such as 
agricultural co-operatives, schools, and clinics, whether past or present. Ongoing research 
is slowly overcoming this problem, but it has meant that a great deal of the time spent on 
this thesis has been devoted to answering mundane questions which for most countries 
are easily answered, such as whether schools have always charged fees. 
Vietnamese economic or administrative statistics present their own difficulties. 
Basic statistics on topics such as government expenditures during the 1960s and 1970s 
are simply not available. Many statistics, such as those on urbanization, lack definitions 
and are therefore uninterpretable. Many statistics, such as production data, are also likely 
to have been doctored by the people providing them. Soviet planners are reputed to have 
developed 'lie coefficients' for the production statistics of different regions. The solution 
usually adopted by researchers studying Vietnam is to include a passage in the 
introduction pointing out the unreliability of the official statistics, and then in the 
remainder of the work to quote the statistics to several significant figures and construct 
explanations for reported levels and trends without further comment. I have tried as far as 
possible to construct arguments from the small amounts of non-statistical information 
. available, and when citing economic or administrative statistics to affix appropriate 
disclaimers. 
Perhaps the most serious limitation of existing research on northern Vietnam, for 
the purposes of this thesis, is the lack of good sociological or ethnographic studies of 
Vietnamese families. The discipline of sociology was banned under the communist 
academic system and has only recently been re-introduced. Most of the empirical 
sociological research which has so far been carried out by Vietnamese researchers has 
consisted of surveys modelled on a very mediocre study conducted by two visiting 
French sociologists in 1979 (Houtart and Lemercinier 1984 ). Vietnamese sociology is, 
however, rapidly improving. Vietnamese ethnographers have confined their research to 
ethnic minorities. 
As of mid-1996, and with the exception of Hy Van Luong (1989), there are to my 
knowledge no good published sociological or ethnographic studies of northern 
Vietnamese families by foreign-based authors. A handful of ethnographic studies have 
been carried out in southern Vietnam, but as will be seen in later chapters, the family 
system of the South is different in important ways from that of the North, making it 
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difficult to generalize from the southern studies. The few published colonial or post-
colonial studies either limit themselves to kinship terminology or rely on highly 
speculative interpretations of dynastic laws or folk stories. The occasional unpublished 
item such as Hirschman and Vu ( 1994) circulates around the Vietnamese studies 
community, however, and it appears that more will be published in the next few years. 
In contrast, there is already a reasonable amount of high quality demographic data 
available, thanks to the 1989 Census and the 1994 Intercensal Demographic Survey. 
Early in the thesis research I decided to use only published data, rather than to acquire the 
original data sets. This was to be way of keeping the research within manageable limits. 
The reliance on published data led, however, to a number of problems. Separate measures 
for northern and southern Vietnam were rarely given in published tables. In most cases 
the appropriate measures could be calculated by taking population-weighted means, but 
sometimes it was necessary to make do with figures referring to all of Vietnam. Once I 
had begun the family demography component of the research it became apparent that 
many of the necessary measures, such as complete parity distributions, have not been 
published-although they ought to have been. 
Aside from the census in 1989, censuses were also conducted in northern Vietnam 
during the years 1979, 1974, and 1960. The Australian National University has a copy of 
the 1979 Census report; I found a report from the 1960 Census in Hanoi, but could not 
find one from the 1974 Census. Northern Vietnam's vital registration system was 
established in the late 1950s. Results obtained through this system are corrected through 
annual surveys of up to 20 per cent of the population. Vietnamese statisticians have told 
me that data from this system is some of the least unreliable data available on any subject 
in Vietnam. I have only used vital registration data published in secondary sources, but it 
is likely that future work on the historical demography of northern Vietnam would greatly 
benefit from the use of unpublished provincial data. 
My ability to interpret the secondary material was enhanced by a five-month visit to 
Vietnam between April and September 1994, and a one-month visit in September 1995. I 
studied Vietnamese for a year before going to Vietnam the first time, and my skills 
improved while I was there, but I did not become fluent. During both visits I lived with a 
Vietnamese family in Hanoi, which, thanks to much patient explaining on their part, was 
easily the most enlightening aspect of my time in Vietnam. I was affiliated with the 
Institute of Sociology in Hanoi, and had instructive conversations with staff there, as well 
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as with staff at the Centre for Women's Studies; the National Committee for Population 
and Family Planning; the Centre for Gender, Family and Environment in Development; 
and the General Statistical Office. 
Despite initial assurances, it was not, however, possible for me to organize visits to 
the countryside of more than one day through the Institute of Sociology. I made private 
arrangements to visit a few villages near Hanoi, but nevertheless my exposure to rural 
Vietnam was very limited. In the company of members of my host family in Hanoi, I 
spent about six weeks in total travelling around much of northern and southern Vietnam. 
In most cases we had no choice but to stay in the provincial capitals. Other foreign 
graduate students who did not have close relationships with non-governmental 
organizations or with large ongoing projects had the same difficulties gaining access to 
rural areas as me. 
1.4. A note on usages 
In this chapter, and throughout the rest of the thesis, the term 'northern Vietnam' 
refers to the territory above the 17th parallel, occupied, between 1954 and 1975, by the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam. After 1975 a province called Binh Tri Thien was 
created, straddling the 17th parallel. During the 1980s, Binh Tri Thien was split into three 
provinces called Quang Binh, Quang Tri, and Thua Thien Hue, with the border between 
Quang Binh and Quang Tri lying close to the 17th parallel. When calculating statistics for 
post-1975 northern Vietnam, I have defined northern Vietnam as Quang Binh and 
provinces to the north. When using tabulations referring to Binh Tri Thien province, I 
have obtained an estimate for the area which became Quang Binh province by 
multiplying the Binh Tri Thien figure by the ratio of the 1989 population of Quang Binh 
to the 1989 population of Quang Binh, Quang Tri, and Thua Thien Hue. A similar 
procedure was used for data referring to 'North Central Vietnam', a region comprised of 
Thanh Hoa, Nghe Tinh, Quang Binh, Quang Tri, and Thua Thien Hue provinces. 
When citing Vietnamese authors in the text I have used full names-for example 
'Nguy en Khac Vien '-because some authors are commonly referred to by their family 
names (the first name) and some by their personal names (the last name), creating 
potential for confusion. The only exception to this practice is when there are several 
authors and the first author is a Western author. 
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Finally, I have referred to what the Western media call the 'Vietnam War', and the 
Vietnamese media call the 'American War' as the '1965-7 5 war'. The term 'Vietnam 
War' reflects the American rather than the Vietnamese perspective, while the term 
'American War' concedes too much to the official northern Vietnamese version of 
history, in which the many southern Vietnamese who were genuinely opposed to the 
northern regime are dismissed as 'puppet troops'. 
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Chapter 2. The state and socio-economic development 
1945-1995 
2.1. Introduction 
Between 1945 and 1995 the northern Vietnamese population experienced socialism, 
market reform, and two major wars. The country won its wars, at great cost. The 
successes of socialism and market reform have been far more mixed: socialist institutions 
proved incapable of delivering sustained rapid growth, and were progressively 
undermined by their members; meanwhile the same institutions mobilized scarce 
resources relatively efficiently to deliver rapid progress in education and health. Market 
reform has had the opposite effect, delivering rapid economic growth at the expense, in 
the short term, of further improvements in social services. Throughout the period the 
government launched initiatives to alter gender relations, the family, and the distribution 
and growth rate of the population, with mixed success. 
2.2. The August Revolution and the Resistance War 1945-1954 
2.2.1. Events 
In March 1945 the Japanese ceased their collaboration with the French, and installed 
a government run nominally by Vietnamese. The new government was too weak, 
however, to deal with the economic crises besetting the country, including a famine in the 
North which ultimately killed at least one million people from a population of 13 million. 
The Viet Minh in early 1945 was not notably stronger than several other anti-colonial 
groups, and had only a few thousand members. It was the best organized group, 
however, and its leaders reacted fastest and most decisively to the new conditions. They 
issued calls to oppose the Japanese-sponsored government only days after it had been 
established, and organized their own anti-famine measures. These actions greatly 
increased their popularity. In August, great numbers responded to Ho Chi Minh's 
announcement of a general insurrection, and on 25 August, the government resigned. On 
2 September 1945 Ho Chi Minh read a Declaration of Independence and established the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam. 
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There followed a year of uneasy co-existence between the new government and the 
French. Shortly after the Declaration of Independence, Guomindang, British, and then 
French troops arrived to re-occupy northern Vietnam. The Vietnamese government 
entered into negotiations with the French over the future of the country; at the same time it 
administered the country, held elections, assembled a united front government, and, in 
November 1946, promulgated a new constitution. 
In December 1946, however, open warfare broke out, and the Vietnamese leaders 
retreated to prepared bases in the mountains. For the next seven years, the Vietnamese 
resistance government held most of the mountainous areas, while the French held much 
of the Red River Delta; although the resistance government managed to establish 
'liberation committees' in many Delta villages. The war was extremely fierce, and, 
including both soldiers and civilians, up to half a million Vietnamese died in the fighting 
(Hirschman, Preston, and Vu 1995: 783). 
2.2.2. The resistance government 
In 1954 the communist-controlled government led the population to defeat the 
French, having, in the meantime, laid the foundations for the post-1954 northern 
. Vietnamese state. Just as remarkable as the defeat of the French military was the ascent of 
the communists from a small opposition group to masters of a modem state. They 
achieved the impossible through co-operation from members of all indigenous 
organizations and social classes, who responded to the government's promises, whether 
for national independence or for a new society. Upper class Vietnamese were generally 
more enthusiastic about independence than about redistribution, so the communists 
operated a united front policy, postponing redistributive measures as long as possible. 
The government apparatus consisted of administrative committees at the province, 
district, and village levels, elected under universal suffrage. These committees were 
supervised by the Party's People's Committees of equivalent level. All males over the 
age of 16 were subject to conscription into the army, in which females were also 
encouraged to participate (Vu Van Hoan 1974: 68; Post 1989, Vol. 1: 152). 
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2.2.3. Economic and social policies 
The war effort and government administration were funded by a tax system which 
took in both liberated and French-held areas, though people in French-held areas paid a 
lower rate since they were already taxed by the French. Until 1951 taxes only covered one 
quarter of expenditures, and the government was forced to make up the difference by 
printing money, generating massive inflation. A reformed tax system, plus aid from the 
socialist countries, allowed the government to rectify government finances so completely 
that, in 1953, it achieved a 16 per cent budget surplus (Post 1989 Vol 1: 181-2). 
In line with its united front policy, the government sought little direct control over 
the economy. Its most far-reaching measure was land reform. Land holdings under the 
French had became increasingly unequal, with, in rough terms, the poorest 60 per cent of 
the population controlling only 15 per cent of privately held land, although most of this 60 
per cent did have access to the village communal land, which made up about one quarter 
of all arable land (Moise 1983: 151). Shortly after the August Revolution, the government 
called for rent reductions, but did not mobilize peasants to enforce the reductions, so little 
happened. Through the course of the war, however, the government took a progressively 
harder line, to maintain the loyalty of the poor. Cadres were instructed to expropriate only 
communal land and land belonging to the French and French collaborators. Arable land 
was so scarce in northern Vietnam, however, that these sources were exhausted well 
before all poor peasants had received land, and tension between the united front policy 
and the desire for redistribution grew progressively stronger. The government held off 
from establishing independent land reform committes and launching the 'official' land 
reform until 1953 (Moise 1983). 
Education and health campaigns were far less socially divisive than land reform, so 
the government was able to commit itself to them whole-heartedly. There was a great deal 
to be done, as popular education and public health had been sorely neglected under the 
French. The government launched huge literacy and health education drives, implemented 
largely by volunteers. Millions of Vietnamese of all ages were exposed to the rudiments 
of reading, writing, and hygiene, and basic schools and health centres were established in 
many villages. 
Among the ten basic promises made by the Indochinese Communist Party at its 
founding in 1930 was the promise to create 'equality between man and woman' (Ho Chi 
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Minh 1977 [ 1930]: 41 ). The communists had also committed themselves to making the 
Vietnamese family more egalitarian. These concerns had three principal sources. First 
was a broad concern with equality shared by some non-communist sections of the 
Vietnamese anti-colonialist movement. Second was the Marxist analysis of gender and 
family, which saw inequality as manifestations of feudalism and capitalism. Third was 
the pragmatic need to mobilize women in the resistance struggle (Ginsburgs 1975: 613; 
Marr 1981: ch. 5). 
The northern Vietnamese government, like all socialist governments, introduced 
legislation attempting to alter gender relations and the family. The 1946 Constitution 
established the equality of men and women before the law. This was followed by labour 
laws which established the principle of equal pay for equal work and set up guidelines for 
maternity leave and the provision of creches. Two edicts passed in 1950 declared that all 
members of the family were equal, and made it legal for children to marry without 
permission from their parents and to own property separately from their parents. These 
edicts also legalized divorce, and set a minimum marriage age of 18 years for women and 
21 years for men. The land reform legislation specified that women had the same rights 
to redistributed land as men (Vu Quy Vy 1974: 168-70; Ginsburgs 1975: 621-9). 
With the important exception of the strictures in the land reform legislation, little of 
this legislation appears to have been implemented. War made promises of maternity leave 
or creches impossible to fulfill, and Vietnamese communists, like their Chinese 
counterparts, appear to have been reluctant to enforce regulations involving the internal 
affairs of the family in the midst of the resistance struggle. Land reform jeopardized the 
support of landlords; family reform jeopardized the support of male household heads, a 
much larger group (Ginsburgs 1975: 18; Stacey 1983: 165). 
The goal of widening women's occupational opportunities, in contrast, dovetailed 
with the goal of mobilizing the population to fight the French. Cadres encouraged women 
to take over jobs vacated by men or to join the army themselves. These roles were not 
unprecedented, since Vietnamese women had always been active in agriculture and 
marketing, and, in a few celebrated cases, had even fought in wars against foreign 
invaders. Nor were the roles necessarily permanent, as many women lost their new jobs 
when the men returned from the war. Nevertheless, the expansion of women's 
responsibilities was sufficiently great and sufficiently novel for Women's Union 
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representatives to claim that it led to women acquiring substantially greater influence over 
village and family affairs (Ginsburgs 1975: 621-2). 
2.3. Socialism 1954-1979 
2.3.1. Events 
Victory at Dien Bien Phu provided the Vietnamese delegation at the 1954 Geneva 
Conference with sufficient bargaining strength to secure an independent state; realpolitik 
from Vietnam's erstwhile allies led to the partitioning of the country into North and 
South. In 1956, the Diem government in the South announced that it would not 
participate in the nationwide elections agreed to under the Geneva Accords, and the 
reunification of Vietnam was deferred for the immediate future. Meanwhile, the 
government in the North had abandoned its united front stance, and announced to the 
world that it was, or was in the process of becoming, a socialist state. 
In the first few years following the Geneva Conference, the top leadership in the 
North was split over the relative merits of supporting the communist guerrillas in the 
South and concentrating on socialist construction in the North. By 1959, however, 
Diem's increasingly harsh repression of opposition groups in the South had persuaded 
the entire northern leadership to support armed struggle. Through the early 1960s both the 
North and the United States sent progressively more supplies and troops to support their 
allies in southern Vietnam, until by 1965 the hostilities developed into full-scale war. The 
last American soldiers left Vietnam eight years later, and the war ended in 1975 (Sagar 
1991: xvi-xx). With ordinary soldiers, guerrillas, and cadres combined, there were several 
hundred thousand northerners in the South at any one time between 1965 and 1975 
(Kolko 1985: 186-7). Recent estimates of military deaths made by Hirschman, Preston, 
and Vu (1995: Table 7) imply that all Vietnam suffered approximately a million deaths. 
The population of Vietnam was about 35 million in 1965 and 48 million in 1975 
(Vietnam 199la: Table 1.1). 
American bombing campaigns against northern Vietnam began in 1965 and 
continued until 1973. Although the bombs were aimed at infrastructure, military 
installations, and industries, many hit suburbs or villages. According to one Vietnamese 
report, 4 000 of northern Vietnam's 5 800 villages were hit during the war (Beresford 
1988: 38). 
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North and South Vietnam were formally reunified in 1976, and the northern 
development strategy was applied to the entire country. In 1978, Vietnam sent troops into 
Cambodia. China had become increasingly irritated at Vietnam's close relationship to the 
Soviet Union, and responded to the ousting of Pol Pot by cutting off aid and then, in 
1979, invading-only to be repelled promptly by the Vietnamese. 
2.3.2. The state 
The Geneva settlement gave Northern Vietnam's leaders an opportunity to attempt 
to construct a Marxist-Leninist state, of which the foremost contemporary prototype was 
the Soviet Union. To do so, however, they were forced to make some concessions to the 
economic backwardness of the country. 
The political institutions of socialist northern Vietnam which were constructed 
during the 1940s and 1950s, and which saw little modification until the mid- l 980s, were 
made up of government apparatus proper plus the Party apparatus. The Party played the 
'leading role': it was responsible for setting policy and for ensuring that policy was 
implemented correctly by government institutions. Each level of the Party hierarchy 
monitored the corresponding level of the government hierarchy. Party cadres had the right 
to intervene in government affairs when necessary, and the right to oversee appointments, 
which ensured that ambitious officials tried to at least appear to be enthusiastically 
implementing Party directives. Lower levels of the Party and government elected the 
higher levels, with the National Assembly being elected by universal suffrage. These 
elections had little practical significance, however, since the Party selected all candidates, 
and ensured that the number of candidates was little higher than the number of posts. The 
main ways in which the leadership ascertained the opinions of ordinary citizens or low-
level officials was through authorized channels in the Party and mass organizations, as 
well as through periodic surveys or appeals for public comment. Party and government 
were effectively only partly distinct, since individuals could belong to both the Party and 
the government, and officials would often move between Party and government positions 
at different times in their careers (Beresford 1988: 79-85; Kornai 1992: 36-8). 
Within the state there were four main levels able to make budgets, and, to varying 
extents, raise their own revenue. These levels were, one, the central authorities in Hanoi; 
two, provinces and municipalities; three, districts, precincts, and townships; and four, 
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communes and urban wards. At the time of the 1960 Census Northern Vietnam had 32 
provincial-level units, each with about five to ten district-level units (Vietnam 1962: Table 
9B). Rural districts contained 20 to 40 communes of about 5000 people, which usually 
consisted of villages of 1000 to 2000 people, which themselves often consisted of several 
hamlets. Urban townships were divided up in a similar way, the smallest units being 
neighbourhood solidarity cells, consisting of 12 to 20 households (Thrift and Forbes 
1986: 60). 
The northern Vietnamese state during this period can also be seen as containing two 
tiers of socialism, or two sub-systems within the national system. The first sub-system 
followed the classic communist model as developed by the Soviet Union. Activities 
within this sub-sytem were supervised by a centralized bureaucracy and paid for out of 
the state budget. The sub-system was made up of the state-owned enterprises, the army, 
hospitals, universities, most urban service and welfare institutions, and the upper levels of 
administration. Although state farms and some rural cadres belonged within this sub-
system, most of its activities were carried out in urban areas, and most urban dwellers 
belonged to it, so it can be called, for convenience, urban socialism. 
According to administrative statistics, the urban population of northern Vietnam 
. was 1.4 million, or 9 per cent of the total population, in 1960, and 2. 7 million, or 11 per 
cent of the total population, in 1975 (Fforde and Paine 1987: Table 8). Because these 
statistics, like most published statistics in Vietnam, do not explain what definitions are 
used, they are not particularly useful. The 1960, 1979, and 1989 Census tabulations are 
more instructive. 
According to the 1960 Census, the urban population of northern Vietnam was 
about 900 000, or six per cent of the total population (Vietnam 1962: Table 9A). The 
definition of urban used to calculate this figure includes small towns (thi xa) down to the 
size of about 4000 people, but excludes the rural areas of Hanoi and Haiphong 
'municipalities' (thanh pho) and of so-called'towns' (thi xa and thi tran). In statistical 
publications, the terms 'municipality' and 'town' usually refer not to the urban areas 
themselves but to the administrative units to which they belong. The 'suburbs' outside the 
urban concentrations but inside the 'municipalities' or 'towns' consist of villages and 
paddy fields indistinguishable from those of the rest of the countryside. The same 
classifications, and the same potential for confusion, exists within Chinese urban 
statistics, particularly after 1980. 
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All statistics on Vietnamese urban areas must be scrutinized to see what definition 
is being used. For instance, the chart in Thrift and Forbes (1986: Figure 6.1) on urban 
growth in northern Vietnam is based on a definition of urban which includes the 
populations of the so-called 'suburbs', although Thrift and Forbes elsewhere (for 
instance, Table 6.1) draw attention to the definitional complexities. Using the figure of six 
per cent, northern Vietnam's proportion urban in 1960 was about the same as that of 
Bangladesh and one-third that of China1 (World Bank 1991: Table 31). Using what 
appears to be a definition which includes the 'suburbs', Thrift and Forbes put the urban 
population of southern Vietnam in 1960 at 2.8 million, or 20 per cent or the total 
population. 
Information on urban areas in the 1979 Census Report (Vietnam 1983: Table 3) 
consists of a table showing municipalities and townships with populations over 20 000, 
the figure of 20 000 including the populations of 'suburbs'. For each of these 
municipalities and towns the urban population and the 'suburban' population are given. 
Adding up the urban populations gives a total of 2.4 millian urban dwellers in northern 
Vietnam, or eight per cent of the population. This figure understates the actual proportion 
urban, probably by about two per cent, because it does not include the populations of 
urban areas in 'towns' with populations of less than 20 000. It appears, then, that the 
proportion of the northern Vietnamese population living in urban areas increased by 50 
per cent or more during the 1960s and 1970s, though from a very low base. The northern 
Vietnamese pattern was very different from that of China during the same period, where 
the proportion urban remained relatively constant at about 20 per cent (Banister 1987: 
Table 9.6). In southern Vietnam, the cities may have held about half the population by 
1975, after which the proportion fell sharply. 
The tabulations given in the 1989 Census report are more helpful than those in the 
1979 report. They indicate that in 1989 the urban population of northern Vietnam, 
excluding the 'suburbs', was about 4.1 million, or 13 per cent of the total population. The 
equivalent figures for southern Vietnam were 8.1 million and 25 per cent (Vietnam 1991: 
Tables l. lA, 1. lB). 
In spite of the low level of urbanization in northern Vietnam, its leaders greatly 
preferred urban socialism. Urban socialism resembled the dominant style of organization 
1The Chinese figure does not include 'suburbs'. 
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in the most advanced socialist nations, and was associated with centralism, heavy 
industry, and science and technology. State enterprises were the highest property form, 
belonging, according to the 1959 Constitution (Article 12), to 'the whole people.' Urban 
socialism had top priority for state resources: industry, until 1970, received several times 
the investment of agriculture. The system required a large bureaucracy, however, and 
northern Vietnam did not have the resources or trained staff to extend the system to all 
production and services, or the whole population. 
As a temporary expedient, while the country developed its material and cultural 
base, a second socialist sub-system was used for organizing agricultural production and 
rural services. Rural socialism consisted of thousands of cells formed by communes and 
the co-operatives they controlled. Although communes and co-operatives were subject to 
commands from the central bureaucracy, they also had a great deal of de jure and de facto 
autonomy, because each commune drew most of its funds from agricultural co-
operatives under its jurisdiction, and was responsible for organizing its own social 
services. Co-operatives, which the Constitution defined as belonging to their members 
(Article 13), were a lower property form than ownership by the whole people, but an 
improvement on family production. Agricultural production would eventually be carried 
out entirely by state fanns, which were organized like standard state enterprises. Progress 
towards this goal was, however, slow: by 1975 the percentage of the agricultural labour 
force working on state farms was still less than two (Fforde and Paine 1987: Appendix 
Table 72). For most of the 90 per cent of northern Vietnam's population living in rural 
areas, rural socialism was the form of socialism with which they had most contact. 
Northern Vietnam's urban socialism was in many ways simply a stronger version 
of the statist development model practised in most developing countries at that time. 
Rural socialism was found in all communist countries: in the Soviet Union in 1975, 15.5 
million households belonged to agricultural co-operatives (Kerblay 1980: 78); in China, 
the proportion of the population which experienced rural socialism was approximately 
similar to that of northern Vietnam. Compared with the rural institutions existing in non-
communist countries, however, rural socalism was highly unusual. No other non-
communist institutions involved such substantial state penetration of economic and social 
life, combined with substantial scope for self-government and relative autonomy from the 
central authorities. 
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The substantial degree of penetration that existed indicated that the northern 
Vietnamese state was strong, which was what Marxist-Leninist doctrine suggested it 
should be. According to Marx's original theory of history, socialist revolutions would 
occur spontaneously in nations where the forces of production were sufficiently 
developed. Marxist-Leninism added the possibility that revolution and socialist 
transformation might also occur in economically backward countries-not 
spontaneously, but through the leadership of a revolutionary elite. This had been the 
lesson of the Russian Revolution. Vietnam's forces of production were among the least 
developed in the world, so that, according to the theory, the Vietnamese people were 
particularly in need of guidance by the revolutionary elite. The elite proposed to educate 
the masses to the point where they would be competent to take control of society, but 
envisaged that this would take some time. In the interim, a centralized Leninist state 
would be needed to protect and continue the revolution, as Ho Chi Minh (1977 [1959]: 
224) makes clear in the third sentence of his explanation of the concept of 'democratic 
centralism': 
Our State ensures the fullest development of democracy, because it is a 
people's State. Only through the fullest development of democracy can all 
forces of the people be mobilized to take the revolution forward. At the same 
time the highest centralism must be ensured to lead the people in building 
socialism. 
Once installed in power, the northern Vietnamese elite set about ensuring that there 
would be no internal organized opposition to their rule. Rival anti-colonial groups were 
broken up, and their leaders executed or imprisoned. With the partial exception of 
religious groups, no organization of any kind was permitted to exist outside the 
jurisdiction of the state (Marr 1987). Politically ambitious individuals could choose 
between joining the Party, the government, or the various state-controlled mass 
organizations. The state controlled the media, and education and research institutions, and 
had no compunction about using any of these as propaganda instruments, since Marxist 
doctrine held that a free press or freedom of expression were bourgeois illusions.1 Land 
twhich did not. however, stop the law makers from guaranteeing freedom of expression in the 1959 
Constitution (Article 25). 
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reform had broken the power of the rural elite, unlike in countries such as India or the 
Philippines, where the elite were able to capture and subvert rural development programs. 
To pre-empt any new sources of opposition from forming within Vietnamese society, the 
state maintained an extensive surveillance network, drawing on the household registration 
system, the police, and the Party. 
The problem remained, however, of applying the vast state apparatus to implement 
official policy. In northern Vietnam between 1954 and 1979, the centre had a relatively 
high degree of control over the provincial and district levels of government. For most of 
this period, no level of government was able to raise much revenue internally, because of 
the small size of the surpluses generated by the northern Vietnamese economy. The 
central government, meanwhile, had at its disposal revenue from Chinese and Soviet aid. 
Government revenue flowed downward from the centre, making lower levels dependent 
on higher levels. 
The structure of the urban socialist system facilitated central control.• Because the 
central bureaucracy was involved in every aspect of urban life from housing to 
employment to rations, it had many opportunities for monitoring and exerting pressure 
on the urban population. Within the confines of a city, lower-level cadres who failed to 
implement official policy were likely to attract scrutiny from their superiors. These 
pressures were sufficient to compel most cadres to comply with the regulations for most 
activities, such as education and security. With economic production, however, the 
personal profits to be made from manipulating accounts and from illicit trading were so 
great that the state was unable to deter cadres from participating. Such practices occurred 
on a very large scale, to the point where they became thoroughly institutionalized (Fforde 
and Paine 1987). 
In rural areas, the state's reach was generally much shorter. Partly this was a 
product of geography and history. Although northern Vietnam is a small place, and the 
Red River Delta is only about 100 kilometres wide and 150 kilometres long, 
communications were very bad, making surveillance difficult. Northern Vietnamese 
villages, moreover, had had a long experience of relative autonomy from the state. The 
French, and before them the various Vietnamese and Chinese dynasties, all maintained an 
implicit agreement with northern villages whereby the villages would supply taxes and 
IThis paragraph draws on Whyte's and Parish's (1984) analysis of state control in Chinese cities. 
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corvee labour to the state in return for the freedom to manage their own affairs. Socialist 
Vietnam thus inherited villages which had a taste for self-government, and a long 
familiarity with the falsification of records and other techniques for resisting extraction by 
the state. Moreover, the debacle of the later land reform excesses and subsequent 
Correction of Errors sapped the loyalty of rural cadres during the mid- l 950s, so that the 
state's basic rural institutions were constructed by people who were no longer fully 
committed to the cause (Fforde and Paine 1987: 22, 35-7). 
At the same time, the structure of rural socialism itself reduced the central 
authorities' hold over commune-level cadres. The large degree of self-government and 
self-funding insulated communes and co-operatives from bureaucratic pressure from 
above. The bureaucracy did have some mechanisms for controlling local cadres: for 
instance, obedient cadres could be rewarded with promotions, or could have the supply of 
fertilizer or textbooks increased, making their jobs easier. These means appear to have 
been sufficient to enable the implementation of policies in areas such as education and 
health, which were popular and which presented few opportunities for personal 
aggrandizement. Economic production, in contrast, involved sharply diverging interests 
and large stakes. Fulfilling state grain quotas implied depriving local people of food; 
enforcing regulations limiting household production created opposition from local people 
and usually lowered the standard of living; meanwhile, administration of co-operatives 
gave cadres frequent opportunites for corruption. With cadres throughout the countryside 
facing similar pressures, the central authorities simply did not have the resources to apply 
meaningful rewards or penalties, or even to find out what was actually happening in every 
commune. Economic policy was faithfully implemented in only a small proportion of co-
operatives, and corruption was endemic (Fforde 1989; Nguyen Luc et al. 1990; Kerkvliet 
1995b ). A recent study comparing Vietnamese co-operatives and Chinese communes 
(Kerkvliet and Selden 1995) concluded that these phenomena were far more prevalent in 
the Vietnamese case than in the Chinese case. 
Was the northern Vietnamese state a strong state? In his influential book, Migdal 
(1988: 4) proposes judging the strength of a state by its 'capacities to penetrate society, 
regulate social relationships, extract resources, and appropriate or use resources in 
determined ways'. The northern Vietnamese state managed to penetrate society to an 
extraordinary degree. It also transformed class relations, and had some influence on 
gender relations, so it can be said to have regulated social relationships to a significant 
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extent. The state did control a large proportion of the country's resources, although here it 
is important to note that the resourses controlled by communes were not necessarily 
available to the leadership in Hanoi. Finally, its ability to use resources in determined 
ways was somewhat limited, in that it was unable to control the behaviour of its own 
economic institutions. Migdal (1988: xiv), presumably having made a similar 
assessment, placed Vietnam in the small club of developing nations with strong states. 
Fforde (1993), perhaps the leading non-Vietnamese expert on Vietnamese political 
economy, has insisted on the contrary that Vietnam has had a weak state. Fforde's target 
in making this claim may be authors such as Porter (1993), who tend to emphasize the 
Vietnamese state's de jure monopoly over power at the expense of the substantial de facto 
limits on this power. Fforde's characterization of the Vietnamese state is a necessary 
corrective to such views. But because the term 'weak state' comes from an international 
literature on the reach of the state, Fforde's usage is potentially misleading, as it suggests 
northern Vietnam resembles Sierra Leone or Bangladesh, when it resembles more closely 
China or Indonesia. 
Continuing government restrictions have prevented scholars from researching the 
legitimacy of the northern Vietnamese state in the eyes of its citizens. The state acted on 
behalf of ideals widely shared by its citizens, such as equality and national independence: 
during times such as the American war it received massive public support. Vietnamese 
people also appear to have judged the state on its economic record, however, and by the 
late 1970s the economy was lurching towards a crisis (Chaliand 1969; Fforde and Paine 
1987: 36-7; Kerkvliet 1995b). 
2.3.3. Economic policies and their implementation 
The resounding successes in the construction of socialism in the Soviet 
Union, the advance of China in every sphere, particularly in agriculture, and 
the massive successes of the other socialist movements in 1958 have greatly 
encouraged us (Vietnamese Workers' Party Central Committee,1 1959, cited 
in Van Tao 1995: 75). 
During the 1950s and 1960s, communist governments were at their high point of 
confidence and optimism. Eastern Europe, China, North Korea, and North Vietnam had 
l•The Vietnamese Workers• Party' was the official name of the communist party in Vietnam. 
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all recently joined the communist bloc, ending the isolation of the Soviet Union. 
Throughout the period, the economies of most communist countries grew strongly, and 
the micro-economic distortions and macro-economic imbalances which were later to 
undermine this growth had in general only just become apparent Many Western anti-
communists were worried at the apparent ability of command economies to generate 
rapid economic growth (Szreter 1993: 682). In this atmosphere the northern Vietnamese 
leadership embarked enthusiastically on a classic communist development strategy. 
This strategy had been developed in the Soviet Union during the 1920s, notably by 
Preobrazhensky and Stalin. Preobrazhensky had argued that the fastest way for the Soviet 
Union to catch up and surpass the industrialized capitalist countries would be to invest as 
much of the economy's resources as possible into heavy industry, which had the greatest 
growth potential, albeit with a long gestation period. The necessary funds would be 
extracted from the agricultural sector, which had a relatively low growth potential. 
Preobrazhensky was always somewhat ambivalent about how these funds would be 
extracted. Stalin, however, was not: his solution was forced collectivization (Nove 1989: 
109-25; Kornai 1992:197-9). At the heart of the strategy was the principle of leadership 
by the state, both as a means and an end. 1 The state, and through it the People, would 
own and control almost all property and means of production. This would allow the state 
to plan economic development, rather than abandoning it to the anarchy of the market. As 
northern Vietnamese leader and Party theoretician Le Duan (1977: 248) put it, 'socialist 
production relations make it possible ... to carry out at a faster pace a concentration of 
capital and a redivision of labour.' 
China and the Soviet Union had promised to provide northern Vietnam with most 
of its initial investment capital, until Vietnam's growth became self-sustaining (Fforde 
and Paine 1987: 39-41; Dinh Thu Cuc and Tran Huu Dinh 1995: 228). During the 1920s 
Preobhazhensky had hoped that an advanced Western country would undergo a 
communist revolution and then provide aid to fund the Soviet industrialization program 
(Nove 1989: 118). Vietnamese planners sought to extract resources for investment out of 
the domestic economy by holding down consumption. Ho Chi Minh ( 1977), in 
numerous speeches, called this 'practising thrift' thuc hanh tiet kiem. Like most 
communist leaders, Vietnamese leaders promised to compensate their people for these 
1 Kornai (1992: ch.3, ch.15) emphasizes this point for communist systems in general, and Porter 
(1993) emphasizes it for Vietnam in particular. 
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short-term sacrifices by guaranteeing necessities such as housing, employment, food, 
education, and health care (Kornai 1992: 53-4; Dinh Thu Cuc and Tran Huu Dinh 1995: 
263-4). 
The leaders intended that the state should control the distribution of goods and set 
prices administratively. The resistance government had introduced rationing and price-
setting during the resistance struggle, and the post-1954 government progressively 
enlarged the system. The state subsidized both domestic and imported inputs for heavy 
industry as well as goods and services for industrial workers, which allowed workers' 
wages to be kept low. Such subsidies absorbed about one third of the state budget (Dang 
Due Dam 1995: 36). Meanwhile the state endeavoured to force co-operatives to sell 
prescribed volumes of agricultural products at low prices. Because of the huge differences 
which soon emerged between goods' official prices and their relative scarcities, illicit 
trading became widespread. Vietnamese policy makers sometimes grudgingly accorded 
these markets a semi-legal status, as in the case of the market for food. 
Northern Vietnam's rural transformation had entered a second phase in 1953, when 
the government began to endorse large-scale confiscation of rich and middle peasant land. 
The policies aimed at political change as much as economic change, and land reform 
cadres were ordered to educate poor peasants about exploitation under the former system, 
and to encourage them to take a more active part in village government. Spurred on by 
hard-line speeches from above, many local cadres took the campaign to irrational 
extremes, so that large numbers of middle peasants and former resistance fighters were 
expelled from the Party, had their land expropriated, or were imprisoned or killed.1 In 
1956 the top level of the Party launched a Correction of Errors campaign. Much land was 
returned and many purge victims were rehabilitated (Moise 1983). Amidst this turmoil, 
however, Vietnamese farmers managed to repair the effects of the resistance war, and to 
increase production. According to official figures, paddy production rose by 15 per cent a 
year between 1954 and 1957 (Vickerman 1986: Appendix Table 4). While it may be 
doubted that such production gains were possible in the environment created by the land 
reform, there is little doubt that production did increase rapidly. 
1Some foreign commentators claimed that tens of thousands of landlords were killed between 1953 
and 1956. A more reasonable estimate would be less than 15 000, and probably closer to 5 000 
(Moise 1983: 222). 
23 
In 1958, the government announced the beginning of a major campaign to 
collectivize agriculture. By 1960, 86 per cent of all peasant households had reportedly 
been organized into agricultural co-operatives. Vietnamese leaders admitted this result had 
been achieved through disregarding the official policy of voluntarism (Van Tao 1995: 
81 ), although like the Chinese collectivization and unlike the Soviet collectivization, 
bloodshed appears to have been entirely avoided. Over the following 20 years, co-
operatives grew as shown in Table 2.1. 'Low level' co-operatives paid rent to members 
who had contributed land or other means of production to the co-operatives; 'high level' 
co-operatives did not. 









Per cent of peasant households 
belonging to co-operatives 
Total Of which 
Low level High level 
5 100 0 
45 95 5 
86 14 
90 28 72 
96 15 85 
96 3 97 
Dashes indicate no data available. 
Mean per co-operative 
Households Cultivated Members of 
area (ha) working age 
26 <20 
40 
68 33 125 
85 49 170 
199 115 337 
369 202 
Sources: 1958, 1959. Vickerman (1986: 143-5, Appendix Table 3). 1960-75. Fforde and Paine (1987: Appendix 
Tables 69. 70, 71). As Fforde and Paine point out, the official figures contain numerous inconsistencies. 
Calculating the mean number of households per co-operative from Appendix Table 70 in Fforde and Paine 
gives results which are different from those in Appendix Table 71 by up to 15 per cent. The results from 
Appendix Table 71 are shown here. 1980. Kerkvliet and Selden (1995: 16) 
Co-operatives were divided into smaller units called brigades, which, in larger co-
operatives, were also divided into still smaller units called teams. In the early 1960s, 
brigades typically embraced 15 to 30 households. Data on brigades are scarce. It seems 
that, like co-operatives, they became larger on average over time, with, by the end of the 
1970s, some brigades embrassing 200 or more households, or an entire hamlet (Houtart 
and Lemercinier 1984: 26; Vickerman 1986: 161). Given, however, that the average size 
of co-operatives was still less than 400 households in 1980, the average size of brigades 
is likely to have been much less than 200. 
Fforde (1989: 80-1) estimates that in the late 1970s roughly three-quarters of all co-
operatives disobeyed official regulations and left most of the organization of production 
and distribution to brigades. In most cases brigades were based on pre-existing 
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geographical units such as neighbourhoods. They effectively owned their own land, 
which consisted of the plots brigade members had owned after the land reform. Brigades 
organized their own work points systems, and sometimes traded amongst themselves. 
They turned varying amounts of their production over to the co-operative, depending on 
the local balance of power. It appears that brigades were able to exclude outsiders, as land 
per person and the values of workpoints within brigades often varied (Fforde 1989: 53, 
55, 81, 99, 103, 123-4). 
There appear to have been fascinating parallels between northern Vietnamese 
brigades and Chinese work teams, which were approximately the same size, had de facto 
control over their own resources, had the ability to exclude outsiders, and were the 'basic 
unit for accounting'. One important difference between the two institutions is that the 
devolution to teams was legalized in China, as part of the pragmatic reform of agricultural 
institutions after the Great Leap Forward, whereas in northern Vietnam it was officially 
prohibited (McNicoll 1980: 444-5; Perkins and Yusuf 1984: 79; Fforde 1989). 
Vietnamese co-operatives were seldom efficient or popular. They did make it easier 
to organize social services, and some public goods, such as irrigation, which brought one-
off productivity gains. However, they were clumsy to administer, remuneration rarely 
. reflected individual contributions, and workers' discipline was generally poor, so that 
productivity was low. According to official figures, total paddy output for northern 
Vietnam was only about 10 per cent higher in 1975-80 than it had been in 1960-65, while 
the population had grown by almost 50 per cent (Vickerman 1986: Appendix Table 4; 
Vietnam 1990: Table 39). Given the incentives for co-operatives to hide production levels 
in order to reduce procurement, the official production figures need to be treated 
sceptically. However, the general impression of stagnation or decline in production and 
consumption is borne out by interviews with villagers concerning productivity and living 
standards (Hy Van Luong 1992: 204; Kerkvliet 1995b: 402-7). Rural people began to 
express dissatisfaction with co-operatives almost as soon as collectivization had occurred. 
According to official reports, 17 per cent of all households belonging to co-operatives 
asked to leave during the year 1963 alone (Dinh Thu Cuc and Tran Huu Dinh 1995: 235). 
By the late 1970s, shirking, foot dragging, and other ways of avoiding collective labour 
appear to become politicized-a form of passive resistance (Kerkvliet 1995b: 402, 413-
15). 
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At the end of the 1946-54 war, industry was given three years to recover before 
large-scale nationalization. In 1957 the government converted all industrial and handicraft 
production to state enterprises or co-operatives, and launched its program of rapid 
industrial growth. Between 1954 and 1970 the state invested two to four times as much in 
industry as it did in agriculture, and from 1971 to 1979 it invested about 1.5 times as 
much (Beresford 1988: Table 9.3). Domestic savings during this period were negligible, 
so the government funded almost all this investment out of loans and foreign aid, 
principally from the Soviet Union and China.1 
Initially, the policy seemed to be paying off, with official figures showing a rise in 
industrial production of 15 per cent a year between 1959 and 1964 (Beresford 1988: 132). 
Almost all socialist states manage to achieve an initial rapid expansion of industrial 
production, only to find that the distortions created during the rush for growth eventually 
cause a slow down (Kornai 1992). The symptoms appeared remarkably early in northern 
Vietnam: by the early 1960s, Vietnamese economists were already complaining that 
shortages of spare parts and raw materials limited the country's expensive new factories 
to running at half capacity (Beresford 1988: 143). According to official figures, industrial 
output grew by an average of six per cent per year between 1965 and 197 5 (Fforde and 
Paine 1987: Appendix Table 30). Published statistics do not give separate figures for the 
North after reunification, but industrial output in all Vietnam reportedly grew by an 
average of 0.5 per cent per year between 1976 and 1980 (Vietnam 1990: Table 57). 
Whether the reports of strong growth during the war were more than propaganda is 
unclear. The fact that growth was slow or non-existent after the war is less in doubt, since 
the reforms beginning in 1979 were largely a reaction to postwar difficulties. 
The years 1965 to 1975 were the peak years of the war against the American-
backed South. Although north Vietnam's economic performance was, of course, affected 
by the war, fewer of its economic problems can be blamed on the war than might be 
thought. Early American bombing destroyed much of northern Vietnam's fledgling 
industrial sector, and the country was forced to divert much of its manpower and 
resources to the war effort. However, the Vietnamese were surprisingly successful at 
lThe exact amounts of foreign aid are not known, but Western scholars estimate that the Soviet 
Union and China between them gave or lent northern Vietnam about 80 million US dollars per 
annum between 1955 and 1965, and about 330 million dollars per annum between 1965 and 1975. 
China cut off all aid in 1978, while the Soviet Union increased its lending and aid to about 500 
million dollars per annum (Beresford 1988: Table 9.4). 
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rebuilding and decentralizing their industries; wartime patriotism plus outrage at 
American bombing inspired people to longer work hours; and China and the Soviet 
Union were willing to replace through aid all that the Americans destroyed. Given, first, 
that agriculture and industry appeared to have experienced the classic problems of 
communist development even before the start of the war, and, second, that growth in both 
agricultural production and industrial production remained slow after the war, it seems 
likely that the early rapid growth would have been difficult to maintain even without the 
war. The worst economic consequence of the war may not have been its effect on 
aggregate output, but its effect on economic structures. The war made Vietnamese 
industry even more import-dependent, and even less integrated with the national economy 
than before. In addition, it disguised the need for reform for a decade or more (Fforde and 
Paine 1987). 
Table 2.2, which uses official statistics collected by Fforde and Paine (1987), and is 
loosely based on a table assembled by them, gives an indication of changes in 
employment patterns between 1960 and 1975. Separate figures for northern Vietnam 
after reunification are difficult to obtain. As with most official Vietnamese statistics, the 
tabulation lacks definitions of terms and contains occasional minor numerical 
inconsistences. 
The greatest proportional and absolute increases in employment appear to have 
occurred within the state sector. The state sector included state factories or farms, and as 
well administration, education, health, or other services. Most of the increase in 
employment was probably paid for out of aid from fraternal socialist countries (Fforde 
and Paine 1987: 39). The working-age population is defined as all males aged 16 to 65 
and all females aged 16 to 60. The official figures imply that state-sector employees 
represented 6 per cent of the working-age population in 1960, and 16 per cent in 1975.1 
As shown in Table 2.3 the rapid expansion of the state sector in northern Vietnam in the 
1960s and 1970s stands in contrast to the situation in China, where state-sector 
employees represented around 12 per cent of the working age population in both 1958-60 
and 1976-80. This meant that the size of the increase in the total number of state-sector 
jobs was almost 40 per cent of the size of the increase in the working-age population in 
northern Vietnam, compared with only about 12 per cent in China. 
lThis and subsequent calculations were based on the figures shown in the original tabulation. rather 
than the rounded-off figures shown in Table 2.2. 







State sector 0.5 
Industrial and artisanal co-operatives 0.4 
Agricultural co-operatives 4.9 
Individual sector agriculture 0.8 
Petty trade, services, indiviudal sector 0.3 
handicrafts 
Armed forces 0.3 
Total 7.2 
*All males aged 16 to 65 years and all females aged 16 to 60 years. 












The figures for the armed forces are based on US Army estimates, collected by Pike (1986: 2), 
who puts the size of the People's Army of Vietnam at 200 000 in 1955, 400 000 in 1965, and 
650 000 in 1975. The figures shown here were derived by linear interpolation. 
All other figures come from Fforde and Paine (1987), who give a translation of a Vietnamese 
compendium of official statistics. The sources of the individual figures are as follows. State 
sector: Table 12; Industrial and artisinal co-operatives: Table 37; Agricultural co-operatives, 
Individual sector agriculture: Table 72; Petty trade, services, handicrafts: Tables 37, 96. 
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Employment figures from outside the state sector are likely to be more unreliable 
than employment figures from within it. The figures on the armed forces shown in Table 
2.2 derive from informed speculation by US Intelligence. According to Table 2.2, 
employment within the armed forces and within artisanal and industrial co-operatives 
expanded, while employment within agriculture contracted slightly. The figures on 
agricultural employment are at least consistent with other evidence of stagnation within 
agriculture. 
TABLE 2.3 Employment and working age population in China (millions). 
1958-60 1976-80 Increase 
State-sector employees 47 74 27 
Employees in all sectors 262 401 139 
Working-age population* 340 570 230 
*The working-age population is defined here, as for northern Vietnam, as all males aged 16 to 
65 and all females aged 16 to ro 
Sources: 
State-sector employees, employees in all sectors. Selden (1988: Table 6.2). 
Working-age population. Estimated from United Nations (1995: 588). 
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As Fforde and Paine (1987: 76-8) emphasize, the official statistics do not measure 
employment in the 'outside economy'. Although the statistics shown in Table 2.2 imply 
that the proportion of the working-age population which was employed fell from about 
95 per cent in 1960 to about 80 per cent in 197 5, this may only mean that the size of the 
'outside economy' increased--or that the army may have been larger than previously 
thought. Most descriptions of wartime northern Vietnam stress the existence of labour 
shortages and long work hours. 
After 1975, the shift to a peacetime economy appears to have left co-operatives and 
state enterprises with far greater labour forces than they could use. Workers in many state 
factories and members of agricultural co-operatives worked only 150 to 180 days a year 
(Werner 1984: 51). 
When Chaliand ( 1969), Houtart and Lemercinier ( 1984 ), and Luong ( 1992) talked 
to northern Vietnamese villagers, they were told many stories about the improvements in 
living standards brought about by the Revolution. In my own limited conversations with 
elderly Vietnamese I have been told similar stories. The Revolution did indeed mark the 
end of two decades or more of crises and immiseration, and marked the beginning of a 
few years of rapid growth-the achievements of which were at least sustained, even if 
they were not enlarged. 
2.3.4. Social policies and their implementation 
Between 1954 and 1979, Northern Vietnam had more success with its social 
policies than with its economic policies. The Vietnamese leadership exhibited a 
developmentalist concern with improving health, literacy, and and living standards, but 
with a utopian edge. Socialist transformation, according to Vietnamese ideologues, would 
lead to three revolutions: one in the relations of production; one in culture and ideology; 
and one in science and technology. The revolution in science and technology would be the 
most important of the three (Vo Nguyen Giap 1977: 10). 
Northern Vietnam's achievements in the fields of education and health are 
justifiably famous. By 1980, despite chronic poverty and the legacy of war, roughly 90 
per cent of six year olds in northern Vietnam were attending school (Woodside 1983: 
401 ); in the same year the joint life expectancy at birth was probably above 60 years (see 
Section 3.2). These results had been made possible by the establishment of thousands of 
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village schools and clinics catering to the rural majority. The schools and clinics were 
organized and paid for through the institutions of rural socialism, which, by the standards 
of similar institutions in other countries or economic institutions in northern Vietnam, 
proved to be highly effective at mobilizing local resources and attracting local 
participation. 
Similarly impressive was northern Vietnam's system of social welfare. The 
system provided support, albeit at varying levels, for vulnerable groups such as the 
elderly, children, the disabled, and families of war victims, as well as groups who had 
made special contributions to society such as resistance fighters and war veterans. In 
general, the central government organized transfer payments to urban people through the 
urban socialist system. The government instructed rural communes and co-operatives to 
organize and fund their own programs (Nguyen Xuan Lai 1977: 35), although various 
ministries and mass organizations also provided money or rice to special groups such as 
veterans in both urban and rural areas. The massive subsidization and rationing of basic 
goods was an important part of the welfare system, protecting the purchasing power of 
vulnerable groups. Most subsidies went to urban people, who bought all their own food 
and usually lived in government housing, unlike rural people, who grew much of what 
. they ate and lived in private houses. As Selden ( 1993: 225) notes, many individuals may 
have been persuaded to join the war effort by the knowledge that the community would 
look after their families in their absence. 
After 1954, the government was able to fulfil some of the promises to women 
made during the resistance war. Legislators continued to enact equal rights legislation; co-
operatives and state enterprises offered maternity leave and creches to female workers; 
and the new schools enrolled almost as many female students as males. In most 
communist countries, the female labour force participation rates rose when forced growth 
pushed up the economy's demand for labour. In northern Vietnam, the rise in female 
labour force participation occurred instead during the mobilization for the American war. 
Figures are scarce, but Table 2.4 gives a few examples. Few countries had such a large 
proportion of political posts occupied by women as Vietnam had in the early 1970s, 
although the ratio of women to men steadily decreased further up the hierarchy. Women 
were not displaced by men returning from the army until a few years after 197 5, because 
almost as soon as the men were demobilized they were remobilized for the conflicts in 
Cambodia and on the Chinese border (Werner 1981: 188). 
TABLE 2.4 Percentage of total positions occupied by women in northern Vietnam 
1961-1975, various employment sectors, Party and government bodies 
1961 1964-5 1971-2 1975 
Light industry 43 45 66 65 
Heavy industry 23 
Agriculture 57 61 
Education 12 58 
Provincial People's Committees 17 36* 
Village and Township People's 17 21 41 
Councils 
Dashes indicate no data available. 
Source: Werner (1981: Tables 1, 2, 3) 
*1969-70 
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The centrepiece of government efforts to reform families was the 1960 Marriage 
and Family Law .1 During the drafting of the Law, officials conducted surveys, consulted 
the implementing bodies, and published preliminary versions in newspapers, with 
invitations for readers to write in with their comments. After the Law had been passed, 
the government charged the Vietnamese Lawyers' Association with monitoring its 
implementation (Ginsburgs 1975: 629-30, 39). The Law built on the two decrees on 
marriage and the fami~y issued in 1950. Women and adult children were given legal 
rights to household property (Articles 15, 20). Polygamy and forced marriage were 
forbidden, and a minimum marriage age was set at 18 for women and 20 for men 
(Articles 4, 6). Divorce was legalized, and provisions were made for equitable division of 
property and care of the children (Articles 25-33). Contemporary Vietnamese reports 
claim that the law was energetically enforced. Many couples do seem to have taken 
advantage of the provisions for a divorce, as there were reportedly about 20 000 cases a 
year during the early 1960s, after which the number tapered off (Phan Thi Dae 1987: 
161). 
The northern Vietnamese government first declared an interest in family planning in 
1961, and by 1963 a family planning program had been established. However, despite 
occasional rhetoric about the danger population growth posed to development, few 
resources were devoted to family planning programs during the 1960s and 1970s 
(Nguyen Huyen Chau 1988). 
The government poured far more resources into its migration schemes. Vietnamese 
governments since the fifteenth century Le dynasty have organized mass migration to 
1An English translation of the Law is given in Kim (1973). 
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relieve population pressure in the Red River Delta (Nguyen The Hue 1995: 32-4). In the 
first Five Year Plan (1961-5), the northern Vietnamese government proposed a policy of 
moving sufficient people from the delta to the highlands to absorb the entire natural 
increase of the delta. By 1975 something like one million people had migrated-a large 
number, but seven million short of the natural increase in the Delta. After reunification, 
the government proposed to send over 700 000 northerners to destinations in the South 
before 1980. Only a fraction of this number actually moved and many of these eventually 
returned to their old homes (Desbarats 1987: 44, 60-1). 
2.4. Market Leninism 1979-1995 
2.4.1. Economic reform 
By 1979 Vietnam's economic problems had reached crisis proportions. Both 
agricultural and industrial production were stagnant, food shortages were increasing, and 
the state's economic institutions were being undermined by large-scale non-compliance. 
Vietnam was also forced to bear the costs of national reunification, plus military action in 
Cambodia and on the Chinese border. To make matters worse, in 1978 and 1979 China 
and the West cut off all aid. The Vietnamese leadership responded with some initially 
modest Dengist reforms. 
Between 1979 and 1986, Vietnamese policy makers introduced a series of 
measures seeking to boost production while leaving the country's basic economic 
institutions intact. They reduced rationing and price controls, and permitted some growth 
in private trading and retailing, although private traders continued to suffer from 
harassment from the authorities. In 1981, the government passed legislation permitting 
agricultural co-operatives to contract certain agricultural tasks to households. State-owned 
enterprises were progressively given more autonomy from the central plan. The process 
of liberalization was not unidirectional, but consisted of successive concessions and 
retreats in different policy areas. The macro-economic results were generally encouraging: 
although, according to official figures, growth in agricultural output declined from a peak 
to about five per cent per annum by the mid-1980s, growth in industrial output continued 
at over ten per cent. Progress was held up mainly by a bungled wage and price reform in 
1985-6 which sent inflation up to nearly 500 per cent per annum (Beresford 1988: 160-
71; Fforde 1995). 
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At the Sixth Party Conference in 1986, the Party announced the start of a new, 
more radical, strategy for reform under the title of 'Renovation', Doi Moi. Perkins (1993: 
4) suggests that Vietnamese policy makers were impressed by the success of China's 
reforms, and looked to the hyper-growth economies of ASEAN. Policy makers were 
probably also worried about the possibility of high inflation stirring up mass discontent. 
Over the following years, the government progressively dismantled the apparatus of price 
control, phasing out rationing and set prices, and floating the exchange rate. A decree in 
1988 devolved organization of agriculture from co-operatives to households, stripping co-
operatives of most of their responsibilities. Successive policies ceded state-owned 
enterprises increasing autonomy, and hardened their budget constraints. Legislation was 
passed to facilitate foreign trade and investment, both of which increased dramatically. By 
1993, the private sector was expanding rapidly, and the economy was growing by about 
eight per cent a year. 
2.4.2. Reform and the state 
Economjc reform may not have been matched by comparable political reform, but 
the new economic situation has had a dramatic effect on most state institutions. With the 
demise of most agricultural co-operatives, communes lost their main source of revenue. 
Though they do levy fees and taxes on residents, the sums are far smaller than in the days 
when they had direct access to the budgets of co-operatives, and they now appear to 
receive most of their income from higher levels of government. With the disappearance 
of rural socialism and of the socialist components of urban socialism, the Vietnamese 
state has lost much of its distinctiveness. This is far less true of China, where Village and 
Township Enterprises appear to have taken over many of the structures and functions of 
rural communes. 
In both Vietnam and China, however, 'economic reforms have shifted revenue 
from the center to the provinces, leaving the provinces in a much better bargaining 
position' (McCormick 1995). With the decline in foreign aid to Vietnam and the growth 
in the domestic economy, aid by 1993 accounted for only three per cent of government 
revenues (Vietnam 1995a: Table 4.8). Figures are not available, but revenue generated in 
the provinces is now a 'significant' proportion of overall revenue (World Bank 1995: 35). 
Tax collection officials are responsible to their provincial People's Committees as well as 
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to the Ministry of Finance. Despite the World Bank (1995: 35) claim that their 'effective 
role in exercising expenditure decisions is very limited', the current situation appears to 
give a great deal of bargaining power to provinces, or at least the wealthier ones. Wealthy 
provinces spend about twice as much per capita as poor provinces, and different 
provinces give priority to different sectors (Allen 1993: Table 2.1; World Bank 1995: 
Table 2.6), which suggests that the central government's ability to redistribute revenue 
and to set provinces' agendas is strictly limited. 
The growth of the private sector, particularly of labour markets, has reduced state 
power at the grassroots. People employed in the private sector can more easily escape the 
notice of the household registration system, and are not subject to the system of penalties 
and bonuses used by the state to encourage its employees to follow official policies such 
as the family planning policy. Moreover, the private sector offers prestigious career paths 
which are more financially rewarding than those of the state sector, so that the state can no 
longer count on enlisting the services of its most talented citizens. In recent years, for 
instance, the government has made a concerted effort to attract people back into the mass 
organizations, only to be met by overwhelming public indifference (Marr 1993: 352). 
Since 1945, the northern Vietnamese state has promised its population that it would 
secure national independence and bring about rapid development. It succeeded in its first 
objective but only partly succeeded in its second, as it has tacitly admitted by introducing 
economic reforms. The success of the reforms in stimulating rapid economic growth 
appears to have protected the government from major challenges to its legitimacy. 
Vietnamese from all social classes, however, have made public complaints about 
particular corrupt officials. While speech is freer now than at any time since 1946, the 
government does not permit organized opposition groups, and there are periodic 
crackdowns on dissenters (Marr 1993; Kerkvliet 1995; McCormick 1995). 
2.4.3. Social services 
The provision of social services in northern Vietnam was profoundly affected by 
economic reform. Northern Vietnam's social services had in fact been deteriorating since 
1975, because of the steady decline in government resources, combined with the costs of 
building up social services in the South. Once devolution of agricultural production began 
to take effect, and rural socialism began to unravel, crisis set in. By the mid-1980s, many 
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benefits had been eroded into insignificance; schools and clinics were unable to purchase 
equipment or supplies; training and retraining had been suspended; and teachers' and 
health workers' salaries had fallen below subsistence levels. Many teachers and health 
workers had begun covert fee-charging. 
The situation began to change in the late 1980s. As its finances improved, the state 
was able to embark on institutional reconstruction, although the emerging system bore a 
closer resemblance to that of neighbouring capitalist countries than it did to the former 
two-tier socialist model. The state took over responsibility for paying the salaries of local 
teachers and health workers, leaving communities to pay most other expenses. Although 
some of these expenses were paid out of commune resources, the main source was user 
fees, which by 1990 were legal and entrenched. According to a World Bank survey, 
private expenditure now accounts for 60 to 70 per cent of all health expenditure in 
Vietnam, which is one of the highest proportions in Asia (World Bank 1993: Table 7.3). 
The Vietnamese government has recently reformed its sickness and old age insurance 
scheme, but only employees of the state or of private firms with ten or more people are 
covered (Nha Xuat Ban Chinh Tri Quoc Gia 1995). A few rural communities have 
developed their own small insurance schemes. 
Many northern Vietnamese claim that social services now are of a lower quality 
than during the 1970s. Basic literacy rates and mortality rates appear, nevertheless, to be 
slightly better now than during the 1970s. Presumably the effect of the deterioration in 
services has been offset by the effect of rising incomes. 
The government has undertaken no new significant initiatives to advance the causes 
of women's liberation or egalitarian families. The 1986 Marriage and Family Law 
contains no important changes from the 1959 Law, except, perhaps, for the injunction that 
'husband and wife shall have the obligation to implement family planning' (The Gioi 
Publishers 1993: 297). Many of the recent institutional changes have militated against the 
provision of social services directed at women. Co-operatives and state enterprises used 
to provide creches; only state enterprises have survived renovation, and they have 
acquired hard budget constraints and so are no longer willing or able to provide the same 
level of support to their workers. Some commentators argue that the return to family 
fanning represents a return to patriarchy for rural women. This simplistic account 
assumes that family farms are necessarily patriarchal and overlooks the fact that in 
matters such as work points for traditional female tasks, or in the distribution of 
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leadership positions, co-operatives also discriminated against women. In any case, family 
farming never disappeared. 
The government's most energetic foray into social engineering during the reform 
period has been its family planning program. Starting in the mid-1980s, the government 
reorganized the family planning bureaucracy and increased its funding, as well as 
introducing new family planning legislation and a system of targets, incentives and 
penalties (Hull and Le Bach Duong 1992). Implementation of these policies appears to 
have been highly uneven, depending on the way the state apparatus evolved in different 
provinces, or even villages. Goodkind ( 1995) found evidence in the northern province of 
Hai Hung of local officials levying large fines against couples who exceeded family 
planning targets. Hai Hung is the province where the Party's hold is probably strongest, 
however, so these findings cannot safely be generalized to the rest of the North. 
2.4.4. The Socialist Republic of Vietnam? 
The State promotes a multi-component commodity economy functioning in 
accordance with market mechanisms under the management of the State and 
following a socialist orientation (1992 Constitution. Article 15). 
The writers of the 1992 Constitution managed to accurately convey the ambiguity 
surrounding Vietnam's socialist status. Some elements of the political system and 
ideology of the 1960s and 1970s have been retained, while others have been abandoned 
or modified. Vietnamese leaders have chosen to retain most of the institutions and ideas 
of democratic centralism. They have preserved the state's monopoly over political 
organization and the media, and the police routinely harass perceived opponents. State 
agents have also maintained a high degree of involvement in economic production. 
According to official figures (Vietnam 1995a: Table 4.5), the proportion of Gross 
Domestic Product accounted for by state enterprises increased from 33 per cent in 1990 
to 40 per cent in 1994. Fforde (1995) tentatively suggests that Vietnam may nevertheless 
have a 'purer' market economy than China, since the Vietnamese government had less 
revenue at its disposal at crucial stages of the reforms to grant special privileges to state-
owned enterprises. 
Vietnam's leaders might have been expected to seek development strategies which 
minimized the growth in economic differentiation, in order to give themselves greater 
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grounds for claiming continuity with the past. Billboards in northern Vietnam do in fact 
display slogans such as 'Rich, Civilized, and Equal Vietnam'. The principle of equality 
has, however, been spectacularly overridden by some major policies aimed at promoting 
economic efficiency. During decollectivization, for instance, policy makers instructed 
rural communities to distribute most land on an egalitarian basis, but to set aside some 
land to be auctioned off to the highest bidders, in order to boost productivity. Most 
communities have objected to the idea of distributing land on the basis of ability to pay 
and have progressively increased the proportion of equally-shared land at the expense of 
auctioned land (Luong and Unger 1995: 3-4). Another example of the government betting 
on the strong has been the policy of concentrating infrastructural investment and joint 
ventures within the three regions of Vietnam which are already most developed: Hanoi-
Haiphong, Danang, and Ho Chi Minh City. Moscow no longer excites the imagination of 
Vietnamese policy makers: the inspiration for this last policy is reputed to to be Bangkok. 
3.1 
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Chapter 3. Mortality, fertility, and numbers of 
surviving children, 1900-2000 
Introduction 
Mortality began declining rapidly in northern Vietnam some time after 1945; 
fertility began to decline slowly in the 1960s. This rough account of northern Vietnam's 
demographic transition can be inferred fairly safely from the small amount of 
demographic data available. Some information about magnitudes and timing must be 
added to the story, however, before anything of interest can be said about the demography 
of northern Vietnamese families. Moreover, the smooth playing out of northern 
Vietnam's demographic transition has been disrupted by the effects of two of the most 
devastating wars of the twentieth century, and a famine which probably killed as many 
people as the two wars combined. 
This chapter attempts to use available information to construct a rough but 
serviceable model of the main trends in northern Vietnamese mortality and fertility, and 
of the effects of the famine and wars. It incorporates elements of a backward projection 
and of a macro-simulation of population dynamics. The reconstructed values for 
mortality and fertility are used in this chapter to estimate trends in mean numbers of 
children surviving, and will be used in subsequent chapters to investigate other aspects of 
the demographic structure of northern Vietnamese families. 
The statistical sources on which the reconstruction is based consist of vital 
registration statistics, recent censuses and surveys, and a few older small scale studies. 
Evidence becomes progressively more scarce further back in time, and for the period 
prior to the 1950s there are virtually no statistical data at all. To make the most of the 
existing data, their likely biases are discussed and their consistency is examined. 
Information on conditions during each period within northern Vietnam and on 
demographic rates in comparable countries is also incorporated into the reconstruction. 
The initial data and the assumptions are presented in detail, so that readers are able to 
assess the plausibility of the results. Reconstructed values for numbers of surviving 
children for recent years are compared with reported values from censuses and surveys to 
assess the reliability of the reconstruction methods. The reconstructed values for children 
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surviving are also tested for their sensitivity to alternative assumptions about mortality 
and fertility. 
The reconstruction of both mortality and fertility rates is carried out in two stages: 
first, the estimation of trends, and second, the adjustment for famine and war. The first 
stage is broken down further into the estimation of levels, and then the estimation of age-
patterns. All estimated rates, except for infant and child mortality, pertain to five-year age 
groups. Estimates are made for each year of the twentieth century. Cohort mortality and 
fertility rates and estimates of numbers of children surviving are calculated and discussed 
in the final two sections of the chapter. Regional differences are shamelessly ignored until 
the end of the chapter, when urban-rural differentials are discussed. 
Trend levels are defined as the levels which were likely to have occurred if northern 
Vietnamese institutions had developed as they actually did, but if there had been no 
famine, military or bombing deaths, and if fertility had not been reduced by the crises or 
increased by post-crisis baby booms. The trend levels exclude the excess deaths and 
averted births which were directly attributable to the famine and wars, but include the 
births and deaths which were indirectly attributable to the famines and wars, through their 
influence on northern Vietnam's pattern of development. This method does not allow a 
full accounting of the effects of the famine and wars to be made, but a method which 
incorporated the indirect effects would require the construction of elaborate alternative 
histories. Crude as the methods used are, they do at least allow some notion to be gained 
of the role played by famine and war in northern Vietnam's demographic development. 
3.2 Mortality 
3.2.1 Reconstruction of mortality trends 
Mortality levels are represented in the reconstruction by the life expectancy at birth 
of males. The century will be dealt with in four periods: 1900-1945, 1945-1965, 1965-
1989, and 1989-2000. 
1900-1945 
Gourou (1936: 187-9), summarising mortality conditions in the 1930s, claimed that 
'it is certain that mortality has fallen greatly since the establishment of the French 
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protectorate'. He argued that mortality had been reduced through inoculation campaigns 
against smallpox, cholera, and other epidemic diseases, through the improvement of 
dykes and irrigation systems in the Red River Delta, and through the suppression of 
internal wars and disorder. Gourou's account receives indirect support from Kunitz 
( 1986: 280-1 ), who proposed a similar list of factors to explain the decline of mortality in 
Europe during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Kunitz argued that mortality in 
Europe had been reduced through the stricter enforcement of quarantines by nation states, 
through the improvement of agricultural production and distribution systems, and 
through an improvement in military discipline. 
Statistics on colonial mortality levels are scarce. The most reliable data which 
Gourou (1936: 196-7) was able to find came from a selection of villages with moderately 
good vital registration systems, and from registers maintained by Catholic parishes. 
Using these sources, Gourou calculated a crude death rate for the 1920s and 1930s of 20 
per thousand. He immediately warned the reader, however, that his sources missed many 
infant deaths, so that his estimate was too low. He gave little indication of how far the 
estimate should be revised upwards. The only longitudinal data which Gourou could find 
came from a district near the coast with 237 000 people in 1909 and 367 000 people in 
1934. The death rate in this district fluctuated sharply year by year but showed no trend 
over time. According to a Vietnamese Ministry of Health source cited by Jones (1982: 
Table 3), the northern Vietnamese crude death rate in 1936 was 26 per thousand, while 
the infant mortality rate was 300 to 400 per thousand, and the life expectancy at birth was 
34 years. The reported figures for the infant mortality rate and life expectany appear to be 
consistent, judging by the life tables generated later in this chapter. If these figures give 
any indication of true levels, then, as shown in Table 3 .1, mortality levels in colonial 
northern Vietnam were significantly lower than in rural China during the same period, 
slightly lower than in India, and significantly higher than in Sri Lanka. 
Mortality levels in colonial northern Vietnam are represented in this chapter by 
setting the male life expectancy at birth equal to 30 years in 1900 and 35 years in 1945, 
with a constant increase between the two dates. Any inferences made from the limited 
available evidence are necessarily arbitrary, as the choice of round numbers and of a 
constant increase is meant to suggest. The effect on numbers of surviving children of 
alternative assumptions will be examined in Section 3.5.4. The assumption of declining 
mortality despite the lack of a trend in Gourou' s data is based on the belief that French 
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public health campaigns and dyke-building must have had some ongoing effect on 
mortality. It also seems likely that the significant improvement in life expectancy evident 
in colonial India and Sri Lanka was at least partly duplicated in colonial Vietnam. 
TABLE 3.1 Estimates of mortality in India, Sri Lanka, and rural China 
India 
Mukherjee (1976: Table 9.1) 
Crude death rate, per thousand 
Joint life expectancy at birth, 
years 
Mari Bhat (1989: Table 5) 
Male life expectancy at birth, 
years 
Sri Lanka 
Caldwell (1986: Table 4) 

















Barclay, Coale, Stoto, and Trussel (1976: Table 13) 
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Crude death rate 42 





















Between 1945 and 1965 mortality levels fell dramatically. Following the 1945 
Revolution, the new government began constructing a health system far more ambitious 
than anything left behind by the French. Schools were set up to provide basic training to 
hundreds of health cadres, inoculation campaigns were launched, and mass organizations 
such as the Women's Union were instructed to participate. After the French re-occupation 
in 1946, the government continued its campaign from its bases in the mountains (Worth 
1985: 191-3). Health cadres were desperately short of Western medicines, but this period 
was the high point of support for the regime and popular enthusiasm for change-
essential conditions for a successful public health campaign. Following the war, in 1956 
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alone 13 million people reportedly attended classes on hygiene and preventative medicine 
(Van Tao 1995: 54). Similarly impressive figures were reported for well-digging, latrine-
building, and the establishment of maternity facilities. With collectivization in 1959-60, 
the organization and funding of village health centres became fully institutionalized, so 
that by 1965 all lowland villages and 80 per cent of upland villages reportedly had health 
centres with two to four trained staff (Dinh Thu Cuc 1995: 261). Vietnamese authors 
argue, plausibly, that because most of these centres' funding and staff came from the 
local community, the centres tended to be accessible and responsive to local needs 
(Hoang Dinh Cau 1965). 
The improvement in living standards was potentially as important to lowering 
mortality as the expansion of the health system. Consumption levels have an important 
effect on mortality levels in a population like that of northern Vietnam during the 1950s 
and 1960s where endemic infectious diseases are the major cause of mortality, since 
people who are adequately nourished are more likely to survive episodes of these diseases 
(Kunitz 1986: 279). Between 1954 and 1960 agriculture in northern Vietnam recovered 
from the effects of the liberation war and expanded rapidly: according to official figures, 
production doubled during the period (Vickerman 1986: Appendix Table 4). Land reform 
had ensured that productive assets and therefore consumption was broadly distributed. 
Collectivization brought the period of rapid productivity growth to an end: production 
apparently fell by 20 per cent between 1959 and 1960, and remained at roughly the same 
level until 1965 (Vickerman 1986: Appendix Table 4). Collectivization may, however, 
have improved the food intake of vulnerable members of the community, since co-
operatives generally tried to guarantee minimum subsistence levels for all. 
Caldwell ( 1986) notes that, in addition to accessible health systems and nutritional 
floors, poor countries with exceptionally low mortality tend to have mass schooling. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, the early development of northern Vietnam's mass schooling 
system closely paralleled the development of its public health system. Caldwell also 
argues that rapid improvements in health tend to be achieved with least difficulty in 
countries where women have autonomy and influence. The social science literature on 
Vietnam is replete with observations that Vietnamese women have much higher status 
than Chinese women, and that Vietnamese women control household spending (Nguyen 
1944: 50; Jamieson 1986: 112-13). 
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Savitz et aL ( 1993). Calculated from birth history data from 1988 Demographic and Health Survey. 
Hirschman et al. ( 1995). Calculated from reports of births and deaths of kin from a survey of four localities. 
Hirschman et al. present their results as probabilities of survival between various adult ages, and as West 
model life table levels; the corresponding life expectancies at birth are shown here. The figures marked 'incl' 
are the life expectancies including war deaths, and the figures marked •excl' are the life expectancies 
excluding war deaths. 
Available statistics, cited in Table 3.2, confirm the idea that northern Vietnam 
became a superior health achiever (Caldwell 1986) not long after the Revolution. 
Although the accuracy of the vital registration statistics reported in Table 3.2 should not 
be overstated-for instance, Vietnamese statisticians told Jones ( 1982: 790) that the vital 
registration system has under-enumerated deaths-their accuracy should also not be 
understated. Vietnamese statisticians generally consider population data to be the least 
unreliable of all statistical data available in Vietnam. The unusual extent of state 
penetration to the local level in northern Vietnam made a vital registration system more 
feasible than in most developing countries· of comparable poverty. Annual surveys of 20 
per cent of the population were carried out to assess the reliability of the system, and 
official estimates were adjusted on the basis of the survey findings, in the manner of the 
sample vital registration system in India (Jones 1982: 805-6). 
Using retrospective data from the 1988 Demographic and Health Survey, Savitz, 
Nguyen, Swenson, and Stone (1993: Table 3) derive an estimate of the infant mortality 
rate for 1953-63 of 45 per thousand. This figure is far lower than the United Nations 
estimates for most of the rest of Asia at the time (see Table 3.3), and is one point lower 
than the rate estimated for all Vietnam in 1989-93 from the 1994 Intercensal 
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Demographic Survey (Vietnam 1995: Table 6.1). It therefore is almost certainly an 
underestimate. Hirschman, Preston, and Vu (1995: Table 4) use retrospective data from a 
survey conducted in four localities across Vietnam to estimate past mortality levels. They 
report their results as probabilities of survival between various ages and as West model 
life table levels. Table 3 .2 summarizes their results, and shows the life expectancies which 
their results imply. The survey distinguished between military and non-military deaths, 
enabling Hirschman, Preston, and Vu to make separate estimates including and excluding 
the effects of the war. This information will be used later in the chapter to adjust trend 
mortality rates. The estimates made by Hirschman, Preston, and Vu imply that in 1955-
64 mortality levels in all Vietnam were equal to or lower than those in Sri Lanka. This 
may have been possible, but given the much harsher economic conditions in northern 
Vietnam, it is perhaps safer to assume that their estimates are somewhat too low. What 
the vital registration statistics and the estimates constructed by Savitz et al. and Hirschman 
et al. do show, however, is that by the late 1950s and early 1960s mortality had already 
declined sharply from colonial levels. 
TABLE 3.3 Mortality estimates for Southeast Asia, Sri Lanka, and China, 
1950-1965 
1950-1955 1955-1960 1960-1965 
Infant mortality rate (per thousand) 
Southeast Asia 154 135 119 
Sri Lanka 91 76 65 
China 195 179 121 
Joint life expectancy at birth (years) 
Southeast Asia 41 44 46 
Sri Lanka 57 61 64 
China 41 45 50 
Note. The figures for China in 1955-65 include mortality from the Great Leap Forward 
famine. During the period 1965-70, which was not affected by the famine, the infant 
mortality rate was 81 per thousand and life expectancy at birth was 60 years. 
Source: United Nations (1995: Tables A.26, A.27) 
The downward trend in non-military mortality between 1945 and 1965 is 
represented in the reconstruction by setting the male life expectancy at birth at 58 years for 
1965, compared with 35 years for 1945. This gives an average annual gain in life 
expectancy of 1.15 years. In Sri Lanka between 1946 and 1953, which was the fastest 
period of mortality decline there, the average annual gain in joint life expectancy was 1. 7 
years. The corresponding figure for Kerala between 1956 and 1971 was 0.8 years 
(Caldwell 1986: Table 4). 
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The vital registration data for 1957, and the accounts of the wartime public health 
campaigns both give reason to believe that non-combat mortality in Vietnam began 
declining substantially during the 1946-54 war. The rate of decline was presumably lower 
during the war than afterwards, so that it would be more realistic to divide the period 
1945 to 1965 into two, and to assume a faster decline between 1955 and 1965 than 
between 1945 and 1955. The difference this adjustment would make to the overall results 
is small, however, so a constant decline has been used instead. 
1965-1989 
Northern Vietnam's rural health system appears to have survived the 1965-75 war 
intact (Worth 1985: 254-740). Between 1975 and 1981, however, foreign aid receipts fell 
sharply, medical supplies were diverted to the South, and economic growth was virtually 
nil, so that neither co-operatives nor the central government were able to support the 
health system at previous levels (Allen 1993: 44; Fforde 1995: Figure 3.2). After reforms 
in 1981, the economy grew at between five and ten per cent a year, but the health sector 
remained starved of funds (Quinn-Judge 1986; Allen 1993: 44; Fforde 1995: Figure 3.2). 
Health workers increasingly relied on fee-charging to make ends meet, which, since rural 
incomes probably grew slower than the rest of the economy between 1982 and 1989 
(Fforde 1995: 3), meant that many people were unable to pay individually for services 
which previously had been paid for by the community or the central government (Pham 
Bich San 1991: 48). 
The first section of Table 3.4 shows official Vietnamese estimates collected by 
Banister. The 1979 life expectancy estimates were derived from the 1979 Census, and the 
rest appear to be derived from vital registration data. The vital registration data should be 
treated with suspicion, given the difficulty of maintaining an accurate vital registration 
system during a war. The estimates made by Savitz et al. again appear implausibly low: 
northern Vietnam during the 1965-75 war almost certainly did not have an infant 
mortality rate 40 per cent lower than that of Sri Lanka. The estimates made by Hirschman 
et al. also imply low mortality, though not lower than that of Sri Lanka or of China (see 
Table 3.5). Both sets of estimates suggest that mortality was lower after 1965 than before; 
Savitz et al.s' estimates suggest little change after 1965, while Hirschman et al.'s 
estimates suggest a downward trend. 
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Banister ( 1985). Official estimates, collected by Banister from numerous sources. 
Savitz et al ( 1993 ), Hirschman et al ( 1995 ). See sources for Table 3.2. 
Vietnam ( 1983 ). The official report from the 1979 Census. 







m=65, f=69 m=64, f=68 
Vietnam ( 1994b). Calculated from 1989 Census data. The figures for the North are population-weighted means of 
provincial figures. 
Vietnam (1995). Calculated from birth history data from the 1994 Intercensal Demographic Survey. The figure 
for the North is a population-weighted mean of regional figures. 
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Although potentially more reliable than estimates based on vital registration or 
survey data, the 1979 Census estimates reported in Vietnam ( 1983: Table 9) have been 
questioned by Banister (1993: 14-15). The official life table rates may be too low because 
they rely on the vital registration system for data on the number of deaths, even though 
the vital registration system was known to under-enumerate deaths. The official report on 
the 1989 Census (Vietnam 1991a: Table 10.6) used data on household deaths to estimate 
the joint life expectancy at birth in 1988-9 to have been 65 years. The census statisticians 
tested this estimate against estimates derived from data on children ever born and 
surviving, against estimates from analysis of cohort survival ratios between the 1979 and 
1989 Censuses, and against estimates derived from the North model life table. The 
results were found to be consistent. 
TABLE 3.5 Mortality estimates for Southeast Asia, Sri Lanka, and China, 1965-1995 
1965-70 1970-75 1975-80 1980-85 1985-90 1990-95 
Infant mortality rate (per thousand) 
Southeast Asia 110 101 91 78 66 55 
Sri Lanka 61 56 44 35 24 18 
China 81 61 52 52 50 44 
Joint life expectancy at birth (years) 
Southeast Asia 49 52 55 58 61 64 
Sri Lanka 64 65 67 69 71 72 
China 60 63 65 67 67 69 
Source: United Nations (1995: Tables A.26, A.27, A.28, A.29) 
None of the Census estimates apply to northern Vietnam alone, so to obtain an 
estimate of life expectancy in northern Vietnam, I took a population-weighted mean of the 
provincial-level estimates presented in one of the Census reports (Vietnam 1994b: Table 
2.1). This gives figures for the North which are one point higher than the national 
average. 
For the purposes of the reconstruction, the male life expectancy for northern 
Vietnam in 1989 has been set at 64 years, this figure being one year below the Chinese 
male life expectancy for 1985-90 (United Nations 1995: Table A.26), and one higher than 
the Vietnamese Census estimate for all Vietnam for 1988-9, in accordance with the 
finding that life expectancies were slightly higher in northern Vietnam. The value chosen 
for 1965 was 58 years, so the 1989 value implies that on average 0.25 years of life 
expectancy was gained each year between 1965 and 1989. 
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1989-2000 
Between 1989 and the mid-1990s the Vietnamese health sector has been subject to 
dramatic changes. The central government has legalized private practice, the charging of 
user fees by public facilities, and the selling of pharmaceuticals on the private market; it 
has given provincial or district governments responsibility for paying the salaries of 
commune health centre staff; and it has increased its budget allocation to health by over 
four times (World Bank 1993: 164-5; Vietnam 1995a: Table 4.15). Meanwhile, surveys 
have found that for about 50 per cent of households, the first response to illness is now to 
purchase drugs on the open market and to treat themselves (Allen 1993: 46-8). The 
World Bank (1995: 99-100) estimates that in the mid-1990s, 'less than 20 per cent of all 
medical consultations involve any private sector provider' and that 'the state budget paid 
for 16 per cent of all health expenditures in 1993'. On top of the health sector changes has 
come a transformation of the rural economy through the introduction in 1989 of 
household contracts legislation, dismantling the last vestiges of collectivized agriculture. 
Some observers are pessimistic about the long-term consequences for health 
standards of the health sector and economic reforms (Kaufman and Sen 1993: 256-7). 
Aside from the report from the 1995 Intercensal Demographic Survey, which estimated 
that the national infant mortality rate fell from 46 per thousand in 1984-88 to 44 per 
thousand in 1989-93 (Vietnam 1995: Table 6.1), there is little statistical evidence on these 
effects. When constructing population projections for the years 1995 to 2005, officials at 
the Vietnamese General Statistical Office chose to assume no reduction in mortality rates. 
If, however, the 1979 Census estimates of mortality were too low and the 1989 Census 
estimates about right, so that mortality has been falling during the 1980s despite the 
disruption of reforms, then it appears likely that mortality would have continued falling 
during the 1990s when the economy has been growing strongly. For the reconstruction, 
the male life expectancy at birth in the year 2000 has been set at 66 years. This implies an 
annual gain in life expectancy of 0.18 years, or slightly less than the annual gains achieved 
during 1965-89. 
The assumptions made about mortality levels for the entire period 1900 to 2000 are 
summarized in Table 3.6 
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TABLE 3.6 Values chosen for male life expectancy at birth to represent mortality levels in 
northern Vietnam, 1900-2000 
1900 1945 1965 1989 2000 
Male life expectancy, 30 35 58 64 66 
years 
1900-45 1945-65 1965-1989 1989-2000 
Mean annual gain 0.11 1.15 0.25 0.18 
To generate age-patterns of mortality appropriate to the estimated levels of 
mortality, I have used the lo git life table system. Brass ( 1971) found that families of 
realistic model life tables can be derived from a standard life table using the expression 
Yx = a+f3Y;, where Yx is the logit transform, defined as Yx =tln[(l-lx)ftx]· Here the 
superscript s denotes the standard life table, and lx is the life table probability of surviving 
from birth to age x. The level of mortality in the resulting life tables is governed mainly 
by the parameter a, while the ratio of mortality at older ages to mortality at younger ages 
is governed mainly by the parameter /3. This relationship is not linear, allowing infant 
mortality to be reduced at a much faster rate than adult mortality (Brass 1975: 88-9; Basia 
Zaba 1988: 131). 
The 1989 Census life table for males is used here as the standard for males, and the 
Census life table for females is used as the standard for females (Vietnam 1991a: Table 
10.6). Although these life tables refer to all Vietnam rather than to northern Vietnam, 
separate life tables for the North have not been published, and available evidence suggests 
that in 1989 mortality conditions in northern Vietnam differed only marginally from the 
national average (see Table 3.4). 
For the entire period 1900-2000, f3 has been set equal to one, implying that the 
different levels of mortality were distributed according to an identical age-pattern, equal to 
that found by the 1989 Census. There is some empirical justification for this assumption: 
Brass ( 1971: 96-106) found that f3 varied around a central value in over one hundred 
years of mortality data for Sweden and for England and Wales, and proposed a tentative 
argument for why age-patterns of mortality might remain roughly constant over time in 
all populations. The only data suitable for testing the assumption of a constant age-pattern 
of mortality are the life tables reported by Banister (1993: Table D-2) based on 1979 
Census data. Figure 3.1 below compares the central death rates from the 1979 Census life 
table with the central death rates from a model life table with same life expectancy at birth 
derived from the 1989 Census life tables using f3= 1. The curves are sufficiently similar to 
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vindicate the choice of /3= 1. Perhaps the most compelling reason to assume a constant 
age-pattern of mortality, however, is the lack of evidence on which to base an alternative 
assumption. 
FIGURE 3.1 The age-pattern of mortality from the 1979 Census life table, and from a model 
life table based on the 1989 Census life table, usin =1 
Age group 






1979 Census life table - - - - - - Model life table. B= 1 I 
Both life tables are the life tables for males. The model life table is derived from the 1989 Census life table. 
setting a so that the life expectancy at birth from the model life table equals the life expectancy at birth from 
the 1979 Census life table. 
The last step is to work out values for a which generate model life tables with the 
appropriate life expectancies for each period. The life expectancies are a function of the 
model life table Ix-values, which are a function of the a-values. Finding the a-value 
associated with each life expectancy would require putting the a-values in terms of the Ix-
values, and the ix-values in terms of the life expectancies, which is prohibitively difficult. 
The method used instead was to start with the life expectancies attached to the years at the 
beginning and end of each period. For the period 1900-1945, for instance, the life 
expectancies 30 and 35 are used. Values of a which produced life tables with the correct 
life expectancies where then found through trial and error. To generate life expectancies 
for the intervening years, a was assumed to change at a constant annual rate. The 
relationship between the values of a and the life expectancies is non-linear, which means 
that the annual change in life expectancy within each interval is affected in an arbitrary 
way by the properties of the relationship between the life expectancies, the Ix-values, and 
the a-values. These effects were sufficiently small, however, that they did not greatly 
influence the overall shape of the curve, as can be seen in Figure 3.2. 
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Survival functions for selected years are shown in the appendix to this chapter. In 
Figure 3.2, the values for life expectancy for males were part of the assumptions, but the 
life expectancies for females and the infant mortality rate were derived from the 
calculations. The infant mortality rate for males and the infant mortality rate for females 
were virtually the same, so a combined rate is shown. 
FIGURE 3.2 Mortality levels from model life tables, 1900-2000, prior to adjustments for crisis 
mortalit • 
80 400 




... /,,,,. .... 
60 ...... ~ 300 ,.., 
' I 
' I 50 I 250 Life Infant 
expectancy 40 200 mortality 
at birth, rate, 







-... -10 - ... _ 50 
....... 
0 0 
1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 
---Life exp., males - - - -Life exp., females - - - - - - Infant mortality 
3.2.2 Adjustments for famine and military deaths 
To incorporate the deaths from the 1944-45 famine and the 1946-54 and 1965-75 
wars, estimates of the excess death rates have been added to the death rates from the 
original life tables, and the combined death rates used to calculate adjusted life tables. 
The estimates of the 1965-75 military death rates for ages 15 and above shown in 
Table 3.7 come from Hirschman, Preston, and Vu (1995: Table 7). Hirschman et al. 
based their calculations on data on deaths of kin from their small, nationally representative 
survey. These death rates imply that the number of people killed from bombing and 
combat in North and South Vietnam combined was about one million. As no rigorous 
count of Vietnamese killed was ever made, most published estimates are essentially 
speculation. So, despite the small size of the survey, and the fact that they refer to North 
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and South together, the estimates from Hirschman et al. are the most suitable available for 
the reconstruction. Both Hirschman et al. (1995: 802-4) and Savitz et al. (1993) found 
that their data suggested the war had surprisingly little effect on infant and child mortality. 
Children may have been relatively protected from the effects of the bombing, since they 
were evacuated from the cities during the worst periods. A figure of one per thousand for 
excess mortality among children has been chosen in the reconstruction as a round number 
of similar magnitude to figures for the other non-combatant age groups. 
TABLE 3.7 Estimates of excess annual death rates (per thousand) during famine and war 
1944-S famine 1946-54war 1965-75 war 
Age Male Female Male Female Male Female 
0-1 68 68 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
1-4 137 137 1.0 LO 1.0 LO 
5-14 68 68 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
15-29 68 68 9.4 0.3 9.4 0.3 
30-44 68 68 4.3 1.1 4.3 l.l 
45-59 68 68 1.1 2.0 1.1 2.0 
60+ 137 137 0.0 1.5 0.0 1.5 
Figures for 1965-75 war based on Hirschman et al. (1995: Table 7). See text for explanation. 
Hirschman et al. do not present estimates of military death rates from the 1946-54 
Liberation War. They do make broad estimates of survival probabilities for this time, 
including and excluding military deaths, but the potential for recall errors regarding deaths 
40 years prior to the survey was great. Historians have speculated that military deaths in 
this war may have been up to half a million (Hirschman et al. 1995: 783), which suggests 
that mortality rates could have been of the same magnitude as those in the 1965-75 war. I 
have used the same mortality rates for the 1946-54 war as for the 1965-75 war. 
The head of the colonial French administration claimed that one million people were 
killed by the 1944-5 famine in northern Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh used a figure of two 
million in his 1945 Declaration of Independence, which is the number usually used by 
Vietnamese historians (Moise 1983: 154; Marr 1995: 227). It is hard to imagine what 
evidence these claims could be based on. Given that the population of northern Vietnam 
in 1943 was about 12.5 million, the estimate of one million famine deaths implies an 
excess death rate of about 80 per thousand. This would have been around three times the 
normal death rate for colonial Vietnam. The increases in the death rate caused by the 
1932-3 collectivization famine in the Soviet Union and the 1959-62 Great Leap Forward 
famine in China (Livi Bacci 1993: Table 4) were of about the same magnitude, so I have 
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decided to use the French figure, though the excess death rates implied by the Vietnamese 
figure are within historical experience (Bongaarts and Cain 1982: 45). In Section 3.5.4 
the effects on numbers of children surviving of using the two million figure will be 
assessed. Mortality among children aged one to four, and among the elderly usually 
increases more sharply during a famine than that among other age groups. The excess 
mortality rates for children and for people aged 60 years or more during the 1944-5 
famine were assumed in the reconstruction to be twice as high as for the other age 
groups. To calculate the age-specific mortality rates associated with the overall mortality 
of one million deaths, I needed to make some assumptions about the age structure of the 
population. In the absence of anything better, I used the age structure that would be 
observed in a stable population with the life table which I calculated for northern Vietnam 
in 1945, before adjustments. This life table is shown in the appendix to the chapter. 
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Adjustments for famine mortality were applied to the year 1945. This involves 
misstating the timing of the famine by six months. To get the timing right would have 
implied spreading the mortality over two years, which would have led to the rates being 
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halved, a worse distortion for present purposes. Adjustments for the liberation war were 
made for the years 1947 to 1954: the war did not begin until late November 1946, so no 
adjustment is made for this year. Adjustments for the American war were made for the 
years 1965 to 1975. 
As is apparent from Figure 3.3, the reconstructed rates lack the random variations 
which characterize real data, even after the reconstructed rates have been adjusted for 
crisis mortality. This is true of all the rates generated in this chapter. 
3.3 Fertility 
3.3.1 Reconstruction of fertility trends 
Fertility in northern Vietnam appears to have begun a slow decline from a high 
level some time during the 1950s or 1960s. The statistics plotted in Figure 3.4, and other 
statistics on fertility in northern Vietnam are presented in Appendix Table 3.3. Gourou's 
(1936: 196-7) crude birth rate of 38 per thousand is the reported rate from the sample of 
villages mentioned in Section 3.2.1. As with his figure for the death rate, Gourou warns 
that the birth rate is an underestimate, because of the under-reporting of infant deaths. The 
estimate for 1936 of 48 per thousand comes from unpublished Ministry of Heath data 
cited by Banister (1985: Table 5). The estimates in the mid to high 40s for the 1950s and 
early 1960s come from the vital registration system. A broad idea of plausible levels for 
northern Vietnam can be gained by comparing the northern Vietnamese figures with 
those from other countries, presented in Table 3.8 and Figure 3.6. 
Between 1900 and the mid-century, the crude birth rate in northern Vietnam 
probably fluctuated somewhere between 40 and 50 per thousand, and the total fertility rate 
probably fluctuated somewhere between five and seven births per woman. Pre-decline 
fertility in northern Vietnam has been represented here by setting the total fertility rate 
equal to six for the period. Both the round number and the assumption of no change are 
intended to draw attention to the tentativeness of the representation. The effect of 
alternative assumptions on numbers of children surviving will be tested in Section 3.6.4. 
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Gourou (1936: 196-7). The figure refers to selected villages in the Red River Delta described in Section 3.2.l 
above. Gourou suggests that the figure is an under-estimate. 
Vital registration data. Banister (1985: Table 5). Banister cites vital registration data from a number of sources, 
notably unpublished data from the Vietnamese Ministry of Health. 
Census estimates. Vietnam (l994c: Tables 1.1, 1.2). Estimates from the General Statistical Office monograph 
on population projections, obtained by applying the reverse survival method to age distribution data from the 
1979 and 1989 Censuses. The estimates were presented for provinces and regions; I obtained the figures fer 
northern Vietnam by taking a population-weighted mean of these. 
In the absence of any decisive statistical evidence, the reconstruction will assume 
that the downward trend began in 1960. Figure 3.4 indicates that the crude birth rate, as 
reported by the vital registration system, began declining in the late 1950s; this is treated 
as part of the post-war baby boom discussed below. Discussion of the reasons why 
fertility began to decline will be postponed until Chapter 4. 
TABLE 3.8 Estimates of fertility levels in India and rural China 
India 
Mukherjee (1976: Table 9.1) 
Crude birth rate, per thousand 
Mari Bhat (1989: Tables 4, 13) 
Crude birth rate, per thousand 









Barclay, Coale, Stoto, and Trussel (1976: Tables S, 6) 
1929-31 
Crude birth rate 




















According to the report on the five per cent sample from the 1989 Census (Vietnam 
1991a: Table 9.3), the total fertility rate in all Vietnam in 1988-9 was 3.8 births per 
woman. Separate results for North and South have not been given in any of the official 
reports on the Census, but taking a population-weighted mean of the provincial results for 
1985-9 presented in Vietnam ( 1994c: Table 1.2) gives a figure of 4.16 for the North , 
3.91 for the South, and 4.04 for all Vietnam. As indicated by Figure 3.6, other provincial-
level data also suggest that fertility is now lower in the South than in the North. 
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1979 Census, 1989 Census. Vietnam (1994c: Table 1.2). Estimates from the General Statistical Office 
monograph on population projections. All estimates were obtained by applying the reverse survival method to 
age distribution data from the 1979 and 1989 Censuses. GSO statisticians calculated the estimates of the crude 
birth rate first, and derived the estimates of the total fertility rate from these, using the relationship between 
total fertility rates and crude birth rates found in the provincial results from the 1989 Census. The estimates 
were presented for provinces and regions; I obtained the figures for northern Vietnam by calculating a 
population-weighted mean of these. 
1988 Demographic and Health Survey. Vietnam (1990a). Estimates from 1988 DHS report, calculated from birth 
history data. 
1994 Intercensal Demographic Survey. Vietnam (1995: Tables 3.2, 3.4). Estimates from 1994 ICDS report. The 
regional results were presented in the form of total duration-specific marital fertility rates (TDMFRs). To obtain 
the TFR of 3.4 for northern Vietnam I first multiplied all the regional TDMFRs by the ratio of the national TFR 
to the national TDMFR, which provided estimates of the regional TFRs. I then took a population-weighted 
mean of the regional TFRs. This procedure is not particularly satisfactory, so that the figure of 3.4 can only be 
considered a rough estimate. 
The 1994 Intercensal Demographic Survey (Vietnam 1995: Table 3.2) reported a 
national TFR of 3.3 for the period 1989-93 and of 3.1 for the year 1993. There is only 
one table in the report showing survey estimates of total fertility rates, one figure but no 
tables showing survey estimates of the change in total fertility prior to 1989, and one table 
showing total duration-specific marital fertility rates (TDMFRs), but not total fertility 
rates, by region. As a back-of-an-envelope calculation, I multiplied the regional TDMFRs 
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by the ratio of the national TFR to the national TDMFR, which gave a rough 
approximation of the regional TFRs. I then took a population-weighted mean of these, to 
obtain a TFR of 3.4 for northern Vietnam and 3.3 for southern Vietnam. A figure of 3.4 
for the North would imply a marked increase in the rate of fertility decline since the late 
1980s. There are a number of reasons why such an increase is plausible, ranging from the 
boom in the rural economy to stricter enforcement of birth limitation policies. It would 
be unwise, however, to attempt detailed explanations of recent trends until the nature of 
the trends is known with greater precision. 
A TFR of 3.9 in 1989 has been chosen to represent the decline in fertility in 
northern Vietnam between 1960 and 1989. In the absence of more detailed evidence, a 
constant decline has been assumed. This implies a rate of decline for this period of 0. 72 
births per woman per decade. For the period 1989-2000, a rate of decline of one birth per 
woman per decade has been assumed, implying a TFR in the year 2000 of 2.8 births per 
woman. Figure 3.7 shows the assumed fertility levels for the whole century. The 
adjustments made for famine and war will be explained in Section 3.3.2. 
FIGURE 3.6 Estimates 9f total fertility rate, northern Vietnam, southern Vietnam, China, 
Southeast Asia, 1950-1995 
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Northern and southern Vietnam. Calculated from Vietnam (1994c: Table l.2) and Vietnam (1995: Table 3.4). 
See sources for Appendix Table 3.3 for details. 
China and Southeast Asia. United Nations (1993: Tables A.18, A.19); United Nations (1995) 
FIGURE 3.7 Assumed fertility levels, northern Vietnam 1900-2000, before and after 
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If a population has a crude birth rate of over 40 per thousand and a total fertility rate 
of around six, as the northern Vietnamese population had prior to about 1960, then few 
couples in the population are likely to be taking deliberate action to limit their number of 
births (Bongaarts 1975: 292). Under a 'natural' or 'parity-independent' fertility regime of 
this type, the age-pattern of fertility usually conforms fairly closely to a standard pattern. 
Robinson (1987: Appendix Table B) gives the mean age-.pattern of fertility for ten 
countries in South and Southeast Asia for periods when their total fertility was close to or 
above six. This age-pattern has been adopted here for northern Vietnam prior to 1960. 
Appendix Table 3.5 presents this age-pattern. 
Vietnam (199la: Table 4) gives a table of age-specific fertility rates for regions in 
Vietnam for the period 1988-9. I took a population-weighted mean of the regional figures 
to obtain age-specific fertility rates for northern Vietnam in 1989. To obtain age-specific 
fertility rates for the years between 1960 and 1989, each age-specific rate was assumed, 
like the total fertility rate, to have changed by a constant amount each year. For instance, 
the age-specific fertility rate for women aged 20 to 24 in 1989 was 227 per thousand, and 
in 1960 it was 263. This rate was assumed to have declined by 1.24 per thousand each 
year between 1960 and 1989. The age-specific fertility rates for the period 1989-2000 
were calculated in a similar way. 
An alternative method for generating age-distributions for fertility would have been 
to have used the 1988-9 age-distribution as a standard, and transformed it using the 
Coale-Trussel or Gompertz fertility models, much as the 1989 life table was used as a 
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standard and transformed using the logit function. In the case of fertility, however, it was 
possible to make a plausible estimate of the age-pattern of fertility during earlier periods 
by taking advantage of the relative consistency of the age-pattern of natural fertility 
between countries. Using an assumption of linearity makes subsequent calculations much 
simpler. No such strategy was possible in the case of mortality, because the age-pattern of 
mortality varies significantly more among countries. 
3.3.2 Adjustments for famine and war 
Although the 1989 Census report (Vietnam 1991a: 2) makes a casual reference to a 
post-war baby boom in 1954-60, few data exist and little has been written on the effects 
of the 1945 famine, the 1946-54 war, and the 1965-75 war on fertility. The adjustments 
which have been made are therefore little more than educated guesses. Fertility usually 
falls nine months after the onset of famine, and then, after an interval equal to the length 
of the famine, usually rises to a level somewhat above the trend for a short time 
(Bongaarts and Cain 1982: 47-9). A similar pattern usually occurs during and after wars. 
Judging by the age-sex structure of the Vietnamese population in 1979 and the official 
estimate of the size of the northern Vietnamese population in 1970, the average number 
of men between the ages 18 and 50 during the 1965-75 war was probably about four 
million. Pike ( 1986: 2) reports that the northern army had about 400 000 members in 
1965 and 650 000 in 1975. Kolko (1985: 186-7, 444-5) reports that the North had several 
hundred thousand soldiers or cadres in the South at any one time during the war. The 
proportion of husbands separated from their wives because of military duties in 1965-75 
was probably on the order of 10 to 20 per cent. War also presumably depressed fertility 
levels by causing couples to intentionally delay or reduce childbearing. Without claiming 
to any sort of precision, I have lowered fertility at all ages by ten per cent below trend 
levels for the years 1945, 1947 to 1954, and 1965 to 1975, and raised fertility by five per 
cent for the years 1946, 1955 to 1959 and 1975 to 1979. The adjusted· fertility rates are 
shown in Figure 3.7 above. 
3.4 Regional data on demographic rates 
This chapter, and to a large extent the entire thesis, is concerned with trends and 
processes across northern Vietnam as a whole, with only a little attention being paid to 
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regional differences. The thesis relies on published data, which is usually presented at a 
high level of aggregation. The published data presented here permits a few impressions 
of regional differences to be gained, but, as will be seen, contain limitations. 
This is not, however, to deny the strong case for investigating regional differences, 
which would allow a more nuanced account of northern Vietnamese demographic 
history. The necessary data do exist. Provincial governments maintain their own 
statistical collections: time series of birth rates and death rates have in fact been published 
for the provinces of Thai Binh and Hanoi (Xenos, Tran, Luu and Vu 1991: Table 3.1; 
Vietnam 1992: Table 11). Communes too are supposed to have maintained records, as 
are colonial villages and parishes. Collecting this type of data, and assessing the reliability 
of each source would be a time-consuming but valuable exercise. 
3.4.1 Urban-rural differences 
Vietnam ( 1994b: Table 2.5) gives estimates of urban and rural mortality rates, 
obtained from 1989 Census data. Unfortunately the estimates are for all of Vietnam, 
rather than the North and South separately. Estimates for earlier periods are not available. 
Table 3 .9 presents estimates which suggest, as would be expected, that mortality is lower 
in urban areas than in rural areas. 
TABLE 3.9 Estimates of the infant mortality rate (per thousand) 







Source: Vietnam (1994b: Table 2.5). 







The 1988 DHS report and the 1989 Census report provide estimates of urban and 
rural fertility for all of Vietnam, but not for northern and southern Vietnam on their own; 
the 1994 Intercensal Demographic Survey report provides no estimates of urban and rural 
fertility (Vietnam 1990a: Table 3.2; Vietnam 1991a: Table 9.3; Vietnam 1995). The DHS 
and Census estimates for all Vietnam are shown in Table 3.10. According to vital 
registration statistics, the crude birth rate in the urban part of Hanoi Municipality in 1980 
was 21 per thousand, while in the rural part of Hanoi Municipality and in the Red River 
Delta as a whole it was 31 per thousand (People's Committee of Hanoi 1989: 15; 
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Nguyen The Hue 1995: Appendix Table 7). Unfortunately, estimates of rural and urban 
fertility prior to the 1980s are not available. 
TABLE 3.10 Estimates of total fertility rates. Urban and rural areas, all 
Vietnam. 1988 Demographic and Health Survey, 1989 Census. 









Sources: Vietnam (1990a: Table 3.2), Vietnam (199la: Table 9.3) 




In Vietnamese, land is divided into lowlands (dong bang), midlands (mien trung) 
and uplands (mien nui). The 1979 Census report (Vietnam 1983: Table 4) shows the 
amount of each type of land in each province. The six provinces which contain 100 per 
cent uplands, Ha Tuyen, Cao Bang, Lang Son, Lai Chau, Hoang Lien Son and Son La, 
are provinces where the majority of northern Vietnam's ethnic minorities live, where 
fertility and mortality are highest, and where the social and economic infrastructure is 
weakest. These provinces contain about 15 per cent of the population of northern 
Vientam, as shown in Table 3.11. Fertility and mortality rates for the six purely upland 
<provinces and for the rest of northern Vietnam are shown in Tables 3.12 and 3.13. No 
explanation for the apparent rise in fertility in the upland provinces during the late 1980s 
is given in the Census report. The rise may be due to an error in the data or the 
calculations. 
TABLE 3.11 Population in lowland and midland provinces, and in upland 
provinces (millions). Northern Vietnam. 1979 Census, 1989 Census. 
1979 Census 1989 Census 






The figures in brackets are percentages of the total population. 




TABLE 3.12 The infant mortality rate (per thousand) and life expectancy at 
birth in lowland and midland provinces, and in upland provinces. Northern 
Vietnam. 1989 Census 
Life expectancy at birth 
IMR Males Females 
Lowlands and midlands 38 66 70 
Uplands 62 60 64 
Source: Calculated from Vietnam (1991:: Table 1.1) and Vietnam (1994b: Table 2.5). 
TABLE 3.13 Estimates of total fertility rates in the lowland and midland 
provinces, and in upland provinces. Northern Vietnam. 1979 Census, 1989 
Census. 
1979 Census 1989 Census 
1965-9 1970-4 1975-9 1975-9 1980-4 1985-9 
Lowlands and 4.5 4.4 3.8 4.2 4.3 3.9 
midlands 
Uplands 6.1 5.6 5.1 5.2 5.2 5.5 
Source: Calculated from Vietnam (1991: Table 1.1) and Vietnam (1994c: Table 1.2). 
3.5 Net fertility 
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When mortality levels fall, the 'efficiency' of any given level of fertility increases: 
more children survive to adulthood out of the same number of children ever born. 
Measurement of the extent to which declining mortality increases the efficiency of fertility 
is obviously important to explaining overall population growth. It is also important to 
explaining the behaviour of parents and families, because what is normally referred to as 
the 'demand for children' is usually a demand for surviving adult children, rather than a 
demand for children ever born. 
The concept of 'net fertility'-fertility adjusted for the effects of mortality-is a 
useful one. Just as there are many possible measures of fertility, each appropriate for 
different purposes, so there are many possible measures of net fertility. The measure of 
net fertility which will be used in Chapter 4 is the net reproduction rate (NRR). The NRR 
is the average number of daughters a woman would give birth to over her lifetime if she 
were to experience the current age-specific mortality and fertility rates. It is calculated 
from data pertaining to five-year age-groups by using the expression 1 f 5/; 5L; l+SR i=ts 
where i is confined to multiples of 5, SR is the sex ratio at birth, 5 fx is the age-specific 
fertility rate, and 5Lx is the standard life table function for females. The NRR is useful 
because of its similarity to the total fertility rate, the average number of children a woman 
would give birth to over her lifetime if she were to experience the current age-specific 
fertility rates. I An example of a cohort measure of net fertility is the number of surviving 
children to a woman of a given age. The corresponding cohort measure of gross fertility 
is the number of children ever born to a woman of a given age. 
lAnd, implicitly, if she lived until the end of her reproductive period. 
62 
Figure 3.8 shows the net reproduction rate implied by the reconstructed values for 
mortality and fertility. In Figure 3.8 and in all subsequent graphs showing results 'before 
adjustments' and 'after adjustments', the 'before adjustments' results were obtained by 
performing the calculations on age-specific mortality and fertility rates which had not 
been adjusted for famine and war, while the 'after adjustments' results were obtained 
using age-specific rates which had been adjusted, as described in Sections 3.2.2 and 3.3.2. 
The NRR is calculated from female mortality rates alone, and the dips during the 1946-54 
and 1965-75 wars are not as great as they would be with a measure of net fertility which 
incorporated both male and female mortality. 
FIGURE 3.8 The net reproduction rate in northern Vietnam, 1900-2000, before and after 
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Figure 3.9 shows how alternative assumptions about mortality and fertility rates 
affect estimates of the NRR. The 'high' estimates start with a total fertility rate of 6.6 
between 1900 and 1960, rather than 6.0 as in the original assumptions. They also start 
with a male life expectancy at birth of 33 years rather than 30 years for 1900, and of 38.5 
years rather than 35 years for 1945. The gap between the high assumptions and the 
original assumptions then decreases until, by 1989 in the case of fertility, and 1965 in the 
case of mortality, the rates are identical. The 'low' estimates represent the opposite case to 
the 'high' estimates: fertility is 10 per cent lower than originally assumed for 1900-1960, 
and life expectancies are 10 per cent lower than originally assumed for 1900-1945, after 
which the gaps decrease. The 'high crisis' estimates use adjustments for famine and war 
mortality twice as high as originally used, assume fertility is reduced by 20 per cent rather 
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than 10 per cent during a famine or war, and leave the post-crisis fertility rate unchanged 
at 5 per cent above trend levels. 
Both sets of alternative assumptions still imply that net fertility rises quickly and 
then slowly falls. Under the 'high' assumptions, the 1960s peak is significantly higher 
than the late 1970s peak, whereas under the 'low' assumptions, the 1960s peak is about 
the same height as the 1970s peak. With the 'high crisis' assumptions, the 1946-54 and 
1965-75 wars are sufficient to reduce net fertility to, or below, late-colonial levels. 
FIGURE 3.9 The effects of alternative assumptions concerning mortality and fertility on 
estimates of the net reproduction rate. 
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Goodman, Keyfitz, and Pullman (1974: Equation 1.2a) derive the following 
expression for calculating the expected number of surviving children to a woman aged a 
when mortality and fertility levels are constant: 
J~ [a-xfxdx 
In this expression a is the youngest age of reproduction, lx is the probability of survival 
from birth to age x, and f xdx is the number of births a woman is expected to have 
between the ages x and x+dx. The entire integral represents a weighted mean of the 
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expected number of births during each interval x, x+dx, with the weighting equal to the 
probability that a child born when the mother is aged x will still be alive when the mother 
reaches age a. The expression above applies only to living women if a is less than the 
highest age of reproduction, and applies to living or dead women if a is greater than the 
highest age of reproduction. 
Goodman et al. (1974: 25-6) indicate how integrals of this type can be converted 
into expressions which can be evaluated using data for five-year age intervals. Their 
method yields the expression: 
a-5 
L sf i sLa-i-5 
i=l5 
where a and i are restricted to multiples of five, 5f x is the age-specific fertility rate for the 
age group x to x+4, and 5 Lx is the life table function, which, when 10 equals one, can be 
interpreted as five times the probability that a person born during the years t to t+4 will 
still be alive at the beginning of year t+x. 
The first step in extending Goodman et al.' s calculations to the case where mortality 
and fertility are changing is to define 5f ~ as the age-specific fertility rate during year t, 
and 5Z:x (mate) and 5~ (female) as the male and female life table quantities. Women born at 
the exact beginning of year t experience the fertility rate 5]; between exact ages x and 
4 
x + 5, where 5]; = t L s1;+x+i. The use of exact years and ages allows the calculations 
i=O 
to be kept relatively simple. The averaging is necessary because, in the reconstruction, 
fertility and mortality rates pertain to five-year age-groups and single calendar years. 
Analagous equations are used to calculate survival functions for people born at the exact 
beginning of year t. The number of surviving children to a woman of exact age a, who 
was born at the beginning of year t, can then be approximated by 
SR "t I "t+i+j I ""t I "t+i+j a-5 ( 4 J a-5 ( 4 J I-SR~ sf. S ~ 5£a-i-5(mal<) +I-SR~ sf. S ~ S[;a-i-s(female) • 
This expression was used to derive the estimates shown in Figure 3.10. The numbers on 
the horizontal axis in Figure 3 .10 and in all subsequent figures refer to the beginning of 
calendar years, unlike in all previous figures, where they referred to the mid-points of 
calendar years. 
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FIGURE 3.10 Mean number of surviving children for women aged 30 years and 50 years, 
northern Vietnam 
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Note. The unbroken lines show the estimates of surviving children based on data which have been adjusted foc 
famine and war; the broken lines show the estimates based on data which have not been adjusted. 
Much of the smoothness of the curves in Figure 3.10 is due to the fact that numbers 
of surviving children are a function of mortality and fertility rates over a long period-for 
women aged 50 the period is 35 years. Some of the smoothness is misleading, however, 
and is due to the equation averaging over cohorts in place of using data for single years 
· and ages. This disguises the timing of the effects of crisis mortality slightly by, for 
instance, shifting some of the effects of the famine from 1945 to 1941-1944. I 
recalculated numbers of children surviving using a formula based on single-year age 
groups. This stretched the capacities of my computer to the limit, but had only a small 
effect on the shape of the curves, so I carried out the rest of the analysis using five-year 
age groups. 
The results shown in Figure 3.10 will be discussed once some of the underlying 
assumptions have been investigated. 
3.6.2 The independence assumption 
Goodman et al. (1974: 2) note that they are assuming each person's survival 
probabilities to be independent of everyone else's survival probabilities. This assumption 
implies that whether or not the mother is still alive has no bearing on the survival 
probabilities of her children. In practice, the mortality rates of children with living 
mothers are likely to be lower than the mortality rates of children whose mothers have 
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died, and a set of survival probabilities based on all children in a population will 
understate the survival probabilities of children with living mothers. Goodman et al.' s 
equation will therefore underestimate the number of surviving children to a living mother 
or a mother who lived until the end of her reproductive period. 
To gain some idea of the extent of underenumeration, I have experimented with the 
following formula: 
lx =l';px +l;1(1-pJ 
In this formula lx is the standard survival probability, covering both children whose 
mothers are alive and children whose mothers are dead; Zr;' is the probability of a child 
surviving to age x, given that the child's mother is still alive when the child reaches age x; 
l;1 is the probability of a child surviving to age x, given that the child's mother has died 
by the time the child reaches age x; and Px is the probability that the child's mother is still 
alive when the child reaches age x. I substituted into this formula a number of the 
mortality estimates derived above and a range of guesses at mortality among orphans to 
obtain some idea of the degree of underestimation. The survival probabilities for all 
children understate the survival probabilities for children with surviving mothers to the 
extent that maternal death is common and that maternal death lowers the survival 
probabilities of children. The degree of underestimation is therefore greatest in the earliest 
periods, and appears to be around five per cent. In later periods, the degree of 
underestimation appears to be two per cent or less. This means that the increase in the 
mean number of children surviving up to the 1980s is slightly overstated in Figure 3.10. 
3.6.3 A comparison with the 1989 Census and the 1994 Intercensal Demographic 
Survey results 
Values for children ever born and children surviving derived from the 
reconstruction can be checked against values for the corresponding years from the Census 
and ICDS (Vietnam 1994b: Appendix Table 2.1; Vietnam 1995: Table 3.8).1 The Census 
tvietnam (1991a: Table 9.1) also gives data on children ever born from the 1989 Census. The value 
for average children ever born for the age group 25-29 appears to be incorrect, as the result obtained 
by dividing the total number of children ever born by the total number of woman is 1.731, while the 
number reported is 1.173. This mistake may have been carried through into the mortality calculations 
presented in the report. One of the methods used to estimate mortality in the report is the Trussel 
method based on data on children ever born and children surviving. The report writers (Vietnam 
1991a: 104) note that the estimated value for the age group 25-29 is anomalous. 
I have also checked the reconstructed values against the 1988 Demographic and Health Survey 
values for children ever born. The values are consistent except at the age groups 40-44 and 45-49, 
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and the ICDS results were important sources of data for the reconstruction, and so do not 
constitute totally independent checks; however, sufficient additional data and assumptions 
were used in the reconstruction for the comparisons to have some significance. The 
Census and ICDS results are reported as mean values for five-year age groups, and the 
reconstructed data had to be put in the same form. To do this the number of children 
surviving and children ever born were assumed to increase linearly within each age group 
and then weighted averages were calculated, using the single-year age distributions from 
the 1989 Census (Vietnam 1991: Table 1.2). 
Unfortunately, separate tabulations of children ever born and children surviving for 
North and South Vietnam have not been published. Vietnam {1994b Appendix Table 2.1) 
gives provincial-level results which can be used to calculate North-South figures by 
taldng population-weighted means. This source only gives results, however, for ages 20 
to 34. When using results for all Vietnam to check results for northern Vietnam, it is 
necessary to allow for the fact that fertility began declining earlier in the North than the 
South, so that average parities for older women in northern Vietnam can be expected to 
be lower than average parities for older women in all Vietnam. Available evidence mainly 
suggests that mortality levels have been similar in the two halves of the country in recent 
decades (Table 3.4), so the ratios of surviving children to children ever born for all 
Vietnam should provide a reasonable indication of the ratios for northern Vietnam. 
Respondents, particularly older respondents, often understate the true number of 
children ever born, particularly with regard to children who have died. Comparison of 
fertility and mortality estimates from data on children ever born and children surviving 
with estimates from other data suggests that substantial under-reporting of deceased 
children occurred in the Vietnamese Census (Vietnam 1991a: 111). The higher values for 
mean numbers dead from the reconstruction are therefore perhaps closer to the true 
values than the unadjusted values from the Census. The higher values for all age groups 
except women aged 30-34 reported in the ICDS are difficult to explain, although the 
absolute differences between the ICDS results and the reconstruction results are small. 
where the reconstructed values are about 20 per cent lower. As Feeny and Xenos (1992: 62) have 
noted, however, the DHS fertility results are at odds with the results from all other sources and may 
contain a reporting or calculation error. 
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FIGURE 3.11 Comparison of mean numbers of children ever born, children surviving, and 
children dead per woman from the 1989 Census, and the 1994 Intercensal Demographic 
Survey with figures from the reconstruction 
Children ever born Children surviving Children dead 
(Shown on different scale) 
The light columns represent values from the Census and ICDS; the dark columns represent values 
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Respondents tend to under-report children surviving to a lesser extent than they 
under-report children who have died. The reconstructed values for children surviving are 
close to the Census and ICDS values except for the older age groups, where they are 
slightly lower. Allowing for slight understatement in the Census and ICDS results, the 
pattern shown in Figure 3.11 is the one which would be expected if the reconstructed 
values were correct, with reconstructed and reported values similar except at higher ages. 
The Census and ICDS results for children ever born were obtained by adding 
together reported numbers of children surviving and deceased. The Census and ICDS 
results therefore understate the true number of children ever born by an amount equal to 
the relatively substantial understatement of children deceased plus the less substantial 
understatement of children surviving. Once this problem is taken into account, the pattern 
shown again suggests that the reconstructed values are approximately correct. 
It appears that the reconstruction gives sensible results for the recent past. This is 
the easiest test to which the reconstruction could be subjected, since the mortality and 
fertility estimates used in the reconstruction are more accurate for the recent past. No data 
are available for testing the results of the reconstruction in the more distant past. The 
earlier results can, however, be tested for their sensitivity to alternative assumptions about 
mortality and fertility levels. 
3.6.4 Sensitivity testing 
The alternative assumptions used to calculate the estimates in Figure 3.12 were 
explained in Section 3.5. Neither the higher early fertility rates and life expectancies of the 
'high' assumptions nor the lower early fertility rates and life expectancies of the 'low' 
assumptions dramatically change the overall shapes of the curves. The numbers of 
surviving children still fall in response to the 1944-45 famine and 1946-54 war, then rise 
to a peak significantly above colonial levels, before falling again. The notion that average 
numbers of children to women at the end of their reproductive periods has recently been 
falling is, incidentally, supported by the 1989 Census and 1994 ICDS, since, as shown in 
Figure 3.11, the ICDS reported a lower number of surviving children to women aged 45-
49 in 1994 than the Census did in 1989. As the use of the 'high crisis' assumptions 
indicates, higher famine and war mortality rates and lower famine and war fertility rates 
imply larger dips in numbers of surviving children during the 1940s and 1950s. 
However, the numbers of surviving children still rise after then. 
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FIGURE 3.12 The effects of alternative assumptions concerning mortality and fertility on 
estimates of surviving children to women attaining age 30 and women attaining age 50. 
Women attaining age 30 Women attaining 50 
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No sensitivity testing has been performed for the timing of the mortality and 
fertility declines. However, different assumptions would impling shifting the height and 
the placement of the peaks and troughs shown in Figure 3.12. For instance, assuming a 
later start to the fertility decline would raise the height of the peaks currently shown as 
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lying in the 1960s (in the case of 30-year-old women) and the 1980s (in the case of 50-
year old women), and would shift the peaks to the right. 
3.6.5 Regional variation in numbers of children surviving 
Because separate mortality and fertility rates for urban areas and rural areas or 
lowland areas and upland areas have not been estimated in this chapter, it is not possible 
to plot the likely course of numbers of surviving children in the different regions. Table 
3.14, however, provides an indication of recent levels as reported by the 1989 Census. 
Separate urban-rural results for northern Vietnam alone were not available. 
TABLE 3.14 Regional variation in mean numbers of children surviving, by 
age of women. 1989 Census. 
All Vietnam Northern Vietnam 
Age Total Urban Rural Total Lowlands Uplands 
and 
midlands 
15-19 0.0 0.0 0.0 
20-24 0.6 0.4 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.8 
25-29 1.6 1.1 1.8 1.7 1.6 2.0 
30-34 2.6 ·1.9 2.8 2.2 2.2 2.7 
35-39 3.4 2.6 3.7 
40-44 4.0 3.3 4.2 
45-49 4.5 4.0 4.6 
Dashes indicate no data available. 
Calculated from Vietnam (1991a: Tables 9.1, 10.1) and Vietnam (1994:b Table 2.1). 
3.6.6 The recent rise in numbers of surviving children 
The reconstruction results clearly show that the large average numbers of surviving 
children to women at the end of the reproductive lives reported in recent surveys and 
censuses are not long-standing or 'traditional'. The average has probably only been 
above four for women reaching the end of their reproductive lives since some time in the 
1970s. Even the numbers calculated for colonial times were probably higher than in 
previous centuries, given that colonial mortality levels were probably lower than they had 
previously been. 
What perhaps makes this finding surprising is northern Vietnam's long wars. It 
appears, however, that despite their destructiveness, the wars did not undo the effects of 
the dramatic declines in mortality achieved during the 1950s and 1960s. 
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Chapter 4 Fertility decline 
4.1. Introduction 
The northern Vietnamese state has shaped the course of northern Vietnamese 
fertility indirectly, by influencing the demand for children, and directly, through its birth 
control programs. The nature and relative importance of these factors differed during the 
transition to Socialism in the 1960s and 1970s, and the transition to Market Leninism in 
the 1980s and 1990s. 
In this chapter, the demand for children is treated as an outcome of their costs and 
benefits. The analysis of the benefits draws on a framework developed by Greenhalgh 
(1988, 1989), which examines the place of children within familial strategies for 
increasing or preserving social, economic, or political status. Greenhalgh developed her 
framework to explain Chinese fertility decline. It is useful for looking at northern 
Vietnam, because so much of the institutional landscape of northern Vietnam between 
1945 and 1995 has resembled that of China. At the same time, however, there are some 
interesting differences between the institutions and fertility declines of northern Vietnam 
and China, which the chapter will discuss. 
A summary of some of the political and institutional history presented in Chapter 2 
and the fertility and mortality data presented in Chapter 3 is used to set the stage for 
subsequent explanations. Net fertility, as well as gross fertility, is given attention, since 
the demand for children is implicitly a demand for surviving children. 
4.2. Transition to Socialism 1958-1979 
4.2.1. Overview of institutional and demographic change 
In the late 1950s, northern Vietnam embarked on a program of rapid 
industrialization which was to be financed by foreign aid and the extraction of surpluses 
from a collectivized rural economy. Despite the initially rapid increase in industrial 
capacity, chronic inefficiencies and distortions in both industry and agriculture led to 
economic stagnation. In contradiction to official policy, production in most co-operatives 
was organized at the level of the brigades. The semi-illegal free market or 'outside 
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economy' grew steadily, at the official economy's expense. Education, health, and 
rudimentary social security programs were constructed for the urban and most of the 
rural population, the financing of the rural services being possible through the 
contributions made by agricultural co-operatives. War against the American-backed 
South caused huge disruption and loss, though the economic costs were alleviated 
through extensive foreign aid. 
According to vital registration data, the crude birth rate in northern Vietnam during 
the late 1950s was between 40 and 50 per thousand, or about the same as during colonial 
times. By the mid 1970s, the birth rate had reportedly fallen to somewhere in the low 30s; 
in Hanoi1 in 1980 it was officially 21 per thousand. No wartime baby bust or postwar 
baby boom is visible in the vital registration data, though this does not rule out the 
possibility of small swings having occurred (as was assumed in the reconstruction in 
Chapter 3). Data from the 1979 and 1989 Censuses suggest that by the late 1970s the 
average total fertility rate in the upland provinces was about 5 and in the rest of northern 
Vietnam was about 4 (Section 3.3). 
Net fertj.lity, measured here by the net reproduction rate, followed a different course. 
Rapid mortality decline during the 1950s and 1960s, combined with much smaller 
declines in (gross) fertility, increased the net reproduction rate to what were probably 
historically unprecedented levels. The net reproduction rate would have been reduced for 
the duration of the 1965-75 war, but it is likely that the level it reached during the late 
1970s was only slightly lower than during the early 1960s, with the fall in fertility 
between these two periods only having partly undone the effects of mortality decline 
(Section 3.5). 
Available statistics on marriage suggest that marriage patterns remained relatively 
stable through the 1960s and 1970s, and on into the 1980s and 1990s, with only a slight 
rise in the average age at first marriage (see Section 6.2). The bulk of the decline in 
fertility in both periods was therefore due to a decline in marital fertility. 
There is perhaps a danger of over-explaining fertility decline in northern Vietnam 
during the 1960s and 1970s. Several hundred thousand men, or 10 to 20 per cent of all 
males between ages 15 and 49, were killed or were separated from their wives for 
extended periods during the 1965-75 war. Some of the reduction of the birth rate during 
_ 
1This figures excludes the 'suburbs' (see Section 2.3.2). 
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the 1960s and 1970s must have been due to spousal separation or death, requiring no 
analysis in terms of social structures or individual choices. Large gaps in present 
knowledge of the proximate determinants of fertility, such as marriage, spousal 
separations, casualties, and contraceptive practices, make it difficult to quantify the effects 
of spousal separation or death during this period. However, the fact that fertility did not 
return to pre-war levels during the demobilization of the late 1970s suggests that northern 
Vietnam's fertility decline in the 1960s and 1970s cannot soley be attributed to spousal 
separation or death. The war's indirect effects on fertility, through its influence on family 
strategies and opportunities, are discussed below. 
4.2.2. The demand for children 
Cain ( 1986: 300), in a discussion of childrearing costs in Bangladesh, notes that 
these costs are tiny relative to the costs of children in wealthy countries, but huge in 
comparison to Bangladeshi incomes. Most Bangladeshi parents are too poor even to feed 
their children adequately. The same point can be made for northern Vietnam. Discussion 
with northern Vietnamese people about conditions during the 1960s and 1970s confirms 
that providing for young children was difficult. In northern Vietnam, as in Bangladesh, 
simply providing food could be a challenge. Surveys in the 1960s also reported that half 
of all households were short of food for at least two months of the year, and that droughts 
could cause widespread hunger (Dinh Thu Cuc and Tran Huu Dinh 1995: 235, 265). 
According to official figures, the increase in food availability only just kept up with the 
increase in population during the 1960s and 1970s (Nguyen Luc et al. 1990: 49-53). 
Bad as conditions were, however, they were better than during colonial times, 
which ended with the great 1944-5 famine. Northern Vietnamese villagers told this to 
visiting foreigners (Houtart and Lemercinier 1984: 26-8; Luong 1992: Ch.5), and cadres 
referred to it when drumming up support for government policy (Chaliand 1969: 98-9). 
Whether or not the increase in average incomes matched the increase in net fertility is 
impossible to tell. 
Not only did average incomes rise, however, but the northern Vietnamese state 
erected a system of transfer payments to channel income towards those bearing children, 
and to reduce the costs they faced. The object of these policies was to improve the 
welfare of children and their families, and not to encourage childbearing- though this 
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was probably one of their effects. The individual schemes varied in importance, but their 
cumulative effect may have been significant. 
State sector work units gave special supplementary payments to employees with 
many children. During the 1960s and 1970s, however, all supplementary payments 
together made up somewhat less than 10 per cent of household income for state sector 
workers, while basic salaries equalled 70 to 80 per cent (Fforde and Paine 1987: 94, Table 
133). Given that supplementary payments were made not only for high dependency 
ratios, but also for reasons such as extra work responsibilities or service in remote areas, 
it appears that few state workers received large childrearing subsidies through the 
supplementary payment system. Urban families received other childrearing subsidies 
through the rationing system, but it is difficult to measure their importance. 
Agricultural co-operatives tried to ensure that all member households, including 
those with high dependency ratios, were able to meet their basic subsistence needs. 
Fforde ( 1989: 124) describes one co-operative in which households with ill members or 
many children received special allowances. In another co-operative, children received 
about 20 per cent of the work points of adults (Nguyen Xuan Lai 1977: 199). 
Childrearing subsidies are likely, however, to have represented an even smaller 
. proportion of total household income than in state sector households, due to the 
importance of household plots. Even in model co-operatives like the one described by 
Houtart and Lemercinier (1984: 40), total income or food received from the co-operative, 
whether in the form of regular work points, or as supplementary payements, was roughly 
equal to the income or food received from the household plot. 1 In less exemplary co-
operatives the income and food received from the co-operative made up only 25 to 40 per 
cent of the total (Kerkvliet 1995b: 405). 
Because virtually all lowland and midland children attended school for at least some 
time, education costs were an important part of the costs of children. All lowland and 
most upland villages are reported to have had their own schools by the mid-1960s (Le 
Thanh Khoi 1987: 133-4). The 1989 Census statistics on school attendance by cohort 
shown in Table 4.1 give some indication of past school attendance patterns. The school 
attendance figures include any type of school, including the extensive adult education 
1Although the meaning of 'household expenditure' is not explained in the Vietnamese surveys, 
Chinese tables based on similar government surveys to the Vietnamese ones refer to 'self-purchased 
goods'. 'Household expenditure' in northern Vietnam almost certainly includes fictive 'purchases' 
like this. 
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schools. This may explain why virtually all lowland and midland respondents who were 
in their early twenties during the mid-1960s claimed to have attended school at some time 
during their lives, but makes it more difficult to infer at what years or ages people 
attended school. Primary school involved a minimum of seven years education until 
1979, when the minumum was increased to nine years (Woodside 1991: 175). 
Repetition of school years has been common, however, so that many students who 
completed primary school would have spent longer than the minimum time doing so 
(Fraser 1991: 196). Table 4.1 indicates that females have had more or less the same 
opportunities of attending school as males in lowland and upland areas. Unfortunately 
the provincial results from which Table 4.1 were calculated were not disaggregated 
between urban and rural areas. 
TABLE 4.1 Percentages of northern Vietnamese population who ever attended school and 
who com2Ieted 2rimarl school. 1989 Census. 
Ever attended school Completed primary school 
Lowland and Upland provinces* Lowland and Upland provinces* 
midland midland 
provinces* provinces* 
Age Males Females Males Females Males Females Males Females 
5-9 64 64 41 38 0 0 0 0 
10-14 98 98 73 64 10 11 3 5 
15-19 98 98 76 66 49 50 23 24 
20-24 98 98 78 70 58 61 32 29 
25-29 99 98 82 72 64 61 39 32 
30-34 99 98 83 74 64 61 39 31 
35-39 99 97 82 71 58 49 34 24 
40-44 98 95 81 66 49 33 27 16 
45-49 98 90 77 54 39 17 20 7 
*'Upland' provinces are defined here as those provinces in which the entire population was living in upland 
areas at the 1979 Census {Vietnam 1983: Table 4). Of the remaining northern provinces only Quang Ninh, 
with 58 per cent, had more than a third of the population living in upland areas. The upland provinces are Ha 
Tuyen, Cao Bang, Lang Son, Lai Chau, Hoang Lien Son, and Son La. 
Source: Calculated from Vietnam (1991: Tables 4.5, 4.5). 
Communities partly absorbed the costs of children's schooling. From the 1960s, 
the salaries of school teachers were supported out of commune or central government 
budgets, so that parents were generally not required to pay school fees for their children. 
Attendance at primary school was, nevertheless, not free. Parents were required to 
contribute money or labour towards school construction and maintenance. Special 
charges were levied for examinations, and for supplementary payments to teachers. 
Textbooks and writing materials were provided by parents. Post-primary education was 
more expensive than primary education, with the biggest cost being the living costs of 
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students attending schools in towns or cities. According to government surveys, 
education costs accounted for two to three per cent of average household expenditure in 
rural areas between 1965 and 1975 (Fforde and Paine 1987: 138). In China, schools did 
charge fees, but the overall cost of schooling appears to have been about the same as in 
northern Vietnam (Parish and Whyte 1978: 80; Perkins and Yusuf 1984: 143). In both 
northern Vietnam and China, the stagnation of collective farming and the limits on family 
farming reduced the opportunity cost of sending children to school. 
Similarly, medical consultations were generally free, but patients were required to 
pay for medicines. Health care appears to have accounted for about the same proportion 
of household spending as education (Fforde and Paine 1987: Table 138). 
The central government and local communities attempted to improve the welfare of 
women by relieving some of the direct costs and opportunity costs of children. Women 
in the state sector received four months maternity leave, regardless of the birth order of 
the child (Jones 1982: 797). Some co-operatives offered similar benefits (Chalian~ 1969: 
201 ). Formal institutions appear to have relieved only a small proportion of families from 
childcare duties. According to official figures, creches catering for children aged two 
months to three years offered a total of 132 000 places in 1965, and 350 000 places in 
1972 (Foreign Languages Publishing House 1979: 14). These figures imply that about 10 
per cent of children in the eligible age group were enrolled in creches in 1965, and about 
20 per cent were enrolled in 1972. Parents appear to have continued relying on 
grandmothers for child minding (Houtart and Lemercinier 1984: 91; Fraser 1991: 189). 
Although urban workers with several children were entitled to extra government 
housing allocations, overall housing shortages and long queues meant that large urban 
families still faced serious crowding (see Section 6.5). Rural families appear to have 
received extra land for family plots for each extra child, regardless of birth order (Jones 
1982: 802). 
Government policy dramatically reduced the costs to parents of their sons' 
marriages. In the cities and in most rural areas, elaborate wedding ceremonies and 
banquets were banned, in exchange for the local communities paying some of the 
wedding expenses. Parents in northern Vietnam are usually expected to provide land or 
housing to sons establishing separate households. In the cities the availability of 
subsidized government housing, and in the countryside the provision by the co-operatives 
of small plots of residential land, reduced this burden (see Section 6.5). 
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Although the evidence on the costs of children gathered together here is far from 
conclusive, it does suggest that on balance the ability of parents to support large families 
was enhanced by the institutional and economic changes of the 1960s and 1970s. Income 
levels were higher than previously, and the systems of transfer payments and subsidies 
helped pass the costs of childrearing away from parents onto the rest of society. The only 
obvious ways in which the burden of childrearing increased was through mass schooling, 
particularly at higher levels, and through housing shortages in the cities. 
A convenient way to analyse the benefits of children in northern Vietnam is to draw 
on the mobility-security framework developed by Greenhalgh (1988: 658-66, 1989: 101-
3) to analyse the fertility consequences of socialist transition in China. Greenhalgh looks 
at the benefits families derive from children under familial strategies to enhance or protect 
their social, political, and economic status. In China these strategies have been centred on 
sons, as daughters traditionally joined their husbands' families at marriage. The political 
limits on wealth accumulation and entrepreneurship in China left occupational 
advancement as the main method of upward mobility. The preferred occupations were 
within the urban state sector. For most of the 1960s and 1970s such jobs were difficult 
enough for urban school leavers to obtain, and virtually inaccessible for rural school 
leavers. Sons therefore lost much of their value as means of upward mobility. In urban 
areas the provision of adequate old-age support to state workers undercut much of the 
security value of sons. In rural areas, the communes' 'five guarantees' system of old age 
support usually provided only tiny amounts and was generally considered demeaning, so 
that the security value of sons was retained. The overall effect of institutional change was 
therefore to dramatically reduce the benefits of children in urban areas, and only partly to 
reduce them in rural areas. 
Northern Vietnam had been engaged in wars almost continuously since the 1940s, 
and as far as anyone knew, might have been fighting new wars in the 1980s or 1990s. 
Parents had to face the possibility that any sons they reared would have a strong chance of 
being conscripted into the army, and of being absent for long periods or killed on duty. 
This possibility may have weakened the value of sons within mobility or security 
strategies. 
Northern Vietnamese daughters, like Chinese daughters, become members of their 
husbands' families at marriage. Northern Vietnamese adages refer to daughters as 'wild 
ducks' (who will eventually leave); in colonial Vietnam, parents would not teach secret 
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handicrafts to daughters, but would teach them to daughters-in-law. Researchers have 
noted, however, that strong contacts do remain between women and their natal families 
after marriage, particularly since village endogamy rates of 50 per cent or more are 
common (Hy Van Luong 1989; Diep Dinh Hoa, Gillogly, Le Thi Van Hue et al 1991: 
58-9), suggesting that sons may be the main focus of familial strategies, but not 
exclusively so. 
The size of the 'outside economy' may have permitted families to circumvent some 
of the official restrictions of wealth accumulation and entrepreneurship, but the main route 
to mobility in northern Vietnam, as in China, appears to have been through the acquisition 
of an urban state sector job. Vietnamese educators repeatedly complained about students, 
with the encouragement of their parents, chasing diplomas in order to escape (thoat ly) 
the countryside and secure such jobs (Nguyen Canh Toan 1977). This may have been a 
more acheivable goal in Vietnam than in China. As discussed in Section 2.3.2, the 
official figures imply that average annual increases in the size of the state sector work 
force between 1960 and 197 5 were equal to almost 40 per cent of the average annual 
increases in the working-age population. The equivalent figur~ for China during the 1960s 
and 1970s was 10 to 15 per cent. The gains to those who made it into the urban state 
sector may not, however, have been as great in northern Vietnam as they were in China. 
Chinese state employees enjoyed not only greater security than peasants or urban non-
state workers, but also much higher incomes. In Vietnam, with the end of the 1965-75 
war and the loss to the central government of much foreign aid, the incomes of state 
workers fell, until they may have been as low as those of rural people (Fforde and Paine 
1987: 108). The value of children within family mobility strategies in northern Vietnam, 
as in China, appears to have been relatively low. 
Northern Vietnamese children, at least in rural areas, do appear to have retained 
much of their value within security strategies. Earlier in this chapter it was noted that 
income from household plots contributed on average half to three-quarters of household 
income for northern Vietnamese peasants. Government surveys in China during 1978, 
when the shift towards to family farming had already begun, reported that income from 
household plots and sideline activities accounted for only one-quarter of peasant 
household incomes (China 1990: Table T15.27). The economic security of the rural 
household in northern Vietnam depended to a much greater degree than in China on the 
availability of children. As Cain (1982: 165) has pointed out, however, household 
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economies in poor, densely-populated agrarian societies are unlikely to need indefinite 
numbers of children, but only one or two sons to permit a domestic division of labour. 
The Vietnamese Resistance Government first' introduced pensions for state-sector 
workers in 1947 (World Bank 1995: 109), and by the 1960s and 1970s fulltime state-
sector workers who had spent most of their working lives within the state system 
received pensions and rations close to what they had received when working. The 
imperative to rear children for old age support was consequently reduced. 
During the 1960s and 1970s the central government in northern Vietnam provided 
some allowances to rural war veterans and families of war dead, but, like the Chinese 
government it left most of the responsibility for setting up old-age support schemes to 
rural collectives. According to Nguyen The Hue (1995: 63), government surveys 
conducted in the Red River Delta during the late 1970s found that 95 per cent of old 
people were able to buy rice from their co-operatives at subsidized prices, 30 per cent 
were allocated appropriate work by their co-operatives, and 30 per cent were given 
allowances 'of various sizes'. Descriptions of individual villages mention pig-rearing, 
growing lentils, and tending fruit trees as examples of 'appropriate work' (Houtart and 
Lemercinier 1984: 28-9; To Duy Hop et al. 1993: 110). Many co-operatives appear to 
have paid for members' funerals, just as various village associations had done in pre-
- revolutionary times (Nguyen Van Huyen 1944: 92-3; Chaliand 1969: 201; To Duy Hop 
et al. 1993: 105; Bui The Cuong 1994: 49). The arrangements made in rural northern 
Vietnam seem unlikely to have done more than the 'five guarantees' system to reduce the 
importance of children for providing old-age support. 
Some tentative conclusions about the overall mobility and security benefits of 
children, and about the balance between these benefits and the costs of their upbring, are 
possible here. The usefulness of sons within familial strategies was reduced by the real 
possibility that as adults they might be absent with the army or killed in battle. On the 
other hand, experiences from the rapid expansion of the state sector during the 1960s and 
1970s probably led to optimism in families that children might be able to secure coveted 
state-sector jobs. The introduction of generous pensions for state sector workers made it 
less imperative to have children for old-age support in the cities, while the rudimentary 
systems operated by agricultural co-operatives probably had little effect. Given that the 
individual changes had conflicting effects on the expected benefits from children, it 
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appears unlikely that the overall influence was strongly in one direction or another, except 
possibly that the benefits from children was reduced somewhat in the cities. 
Combined with the observation that childrearing became less burdensome during 
the 1960s and 1970s, it appears likely that the demand for children was high during this 
period, though somewhat less so in the cities than in the countryside. 
4.2.3. Population policy 
Work units in urban areas and co-operatives or brigades in rural areas paid some of 
their members' childrearing costs. How likely is it that work units, co-operatives or 
brigades launched their own initiatives to contain the increases in such costs by inducing 
members to reduce their fertility? Given the relative ease with which work units were able 
to cover cost increases through equal increases in subsidies or payments from elsewhere 
within the state sector, they had little incentive to contain members' fertility. In contrast, 
co-operatives or brigades could expect little help from higher levels of government. 
Moreover, local population growth not only increased the amounts to be paid out in 
subsidies for dependants, but also further increased the local ratio of people to land. 
Possibilities for relieving these pressures through out migration did exist. During the 
1960s and 1970s the number of northern Vietnamese people living in urban areas 
increased from about 0.9 million, or about 6 per cent of the population to 2.5-3.0 million, 
or about 10 per cent (Section 2.3.2). In addition, one million or more people migrated to 
New Economic Zones in sparsely populated areas (Desbarats 1987: 44, 60-1). Migration 
flows were nevertheless small compared to population growth between 1960 and 1979 of 
about eleven million (Vietnam 1991a: Table 1.1). 
McNicoll ( 197 5) has suggested two other preconditions, besides limits on the 
possibilities for transferring costs onto others, which communities must fulfil before they 
are likely to take action to lower members' fertility. Communities must be able to protect 
whatever advantages they obtain from reducing fertility: they must, for instance, be able 
to exclude outsiders. Communities must also possess effective formal or informal 
mechanisms for social control and must recognize shared interests. McNicoll (1975: 10-
15, 1995: 3) argues that villages in Tokugawa Japan and production brigades or teams in 
communist China may have fulfilled the preconditions and acted spontaneously to limit 
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members' fertility-although he notes that any spontaneous initiatives in China were 
overtaken in the early 1970s by the later-longer-fewer campaign. 
The similarity between Chinese production. brigades and teams and northern 
Vietnamese co-operatives and brigades was noted in Section 2.3.3. Close examination of 
the workings of Vietnamese co-operatives and brigades might tum up evidence of local 
birth control initiatives. It appears likely, however, that only a minority of brigades or 
teams possesses effective formal mechanisms for social control. Researchers have 
suggested that some of the main reasons for the low productivity of collectivized 
agriculture in northern Vietnam included corruption or favouritism among local cadres, 
slack enforcement of work norms, and a distaste for having to co-operate across kinship 
networks (Kerkvliet 1995b: 402-7). While it is true that an inability to act collectively to 
carry out agricultural production carries its own special monitoring problems-the 
difficulty of measuring individual workers' productivity I-collective action against 
population growth faces special problems because of its unavoidable intrusiveness. 
Whether some brigades or teams had effective informal mechanisms for restraining 
fertility, such as gossip about people who diluted common land resources through 
excessive fertility, is impossible to tell, given the information currently available. 
The upper reaches of the northern Vietnamese government launched Vietnam's 
first family planning program in 1963. The stated aims of the program were to improve 
the productivity and welfare of women, and to reduce population growth. The section on 
population growth stated, with some ambiguity over timing, that 'in all of North 
Vietnam, the population growth rate must be brought down from 3.5 per cent to 2.5 per 
cent, then 2 per cent, and each family will only have two to three children with five to six 
years' birth spacing' (Vu Quy Nhan 1993: 1). The Ministry of Health, the State Planning 
Committee, the National Committee for the Protection of Mothers and Children, and 
mass organizations such as the Women's Union and Youth Union all participated in the 
campaign. Virtually the only contraceptive method offered by the program was the IUD. 
There are reports that the reach of the program was limited by wartime shortages 
(Banister 1985: 5). 
China went beyond family planning in 1971, with the launch of the later-longer-
fewer campaign. Reproductive targets were set from the level of the nation down to the 
1See Lin {1988) for a discussion of monitoring difficulties faced by Chinese collectives. 
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individual woman, and the full weight of the Chinese state was applied to enforce them. 
Much of the decline in the Chinese total fertility rate from 5.8 in 1971 to 2.8 in 1979 (the 
year the one-child policy was launched) appears to be due to the effects of the campaign 
(Wolf 1986; Greenhalgh 1988: 660-2, 664-5, Appendix). 
There are many reasons why northern Vietnam might have been expected to have 
followed the same strategy. Northern Vietnam had much the same political and economic 
institutions as China. The leadership's pursuit of agricultural collectivization and surplus 
extraction from the countryside suggests that it had no greater moral qualms about 
imposing unpopular policies than did the Chinese leadership. The problems of rapid 
population growth and high population densities were at least as severe in northern 
Vietnam as they were in China. Concern about population problems appears not to have 
gone in and out of political fashion in northern Vietnam as it did in China. In fact, 
northern Vietnam's population policy did have many of the trappings of the Chinese 
policy. By the time of Vietnam's second Five Year Plan in 1976-81, national birth rate 
targets were being converted into targets for provinces, districts, and communes (Jones 
1982: 802; Vu Quy Nhan 1993: 5). Official pronouncements on birth rate targets often 
condoned the use of compulsion, although they often also condemned it (Banister 1985: 
20-1). 
There is no evidence that Chinese-style compulsion was applied to population 
policies in northern Vietnam during the 1960s and 1970s, and some weak evidence that 
compulsion was not applied. Western visitors reported that family planning did not 
appear to involve coercion (Gough 1977: 44; Houtart and Lemercinier 1984: 92; Banister 
1985: 20). Provinces appear to have been free to repeatedly violate plan targets without 
facing any penalties. Maternity leave, monetary supplements, or housing allowances 
continued to be given to parents with three or more children (Jones 1982: 802; Werner 
1984: 53). 
The crucial difference between the Chinese and northern Vietnamese situations was 
probably the differing abilities of the two governments to implement unpopular policies. 
As long as northern Vietnam was at war, it was unable to spare the administrative 
resources required by a coercive birth control program, and was in no position to risk 
jeopardizing its public support. Even when the war was over, the Vietnamese 
government lacked the control over local-level institutions enjoyed by the Chinese 
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government, where collective agriculture was far more successfully implemented 
(Kerkvliet and Selden 1995: 37-8). 
Population policy appears, then, to have played only a minor part in determining the 
course of fertility in northern Vietnam during the 1960s and 1970s. Government 
programs began to supply limited numbers of IUDs, but there is no evidence of 
administrative pressure to accept contraceptives, or to limit birth rates. The evidence 
presented in Section 4.2.2 suggested that the demand for children remained relatively high 
in the countryside, and declined somewhat in the cities, which is consistent with the 
pattern of continued high net fertility in the countryside, and declining net fertility in the 
cities. The decline in (gross) fertility during the 1960s and 1970s is, in other words, 
interpreted here as an adjustment to lower mortality rates, in the face of a constant, or 
somewhat reduced, demand for children. 
4.3. Transition to Market Leninism 1979-1996 
4.3.1. Overview of institutional and demographic change 
By the late 1970s and early 1980s, the threat of economic collapse and the 
progressive undermining of the country's economic institutions pushed the Vietnamese 
leadership into granting limited reforms. These reforms included the legalization of output 
contracts between households and co-operatives, and the legalization of limited use of 
private trading by state-owned enterprises. The reforms appear to have been intended, like 
Chinese reforms to the one-child policy, to open a small hole to close a large hole. 
Although the reforms produced a one-off gain in efficiency and output, the growth rate of 
the 'outside economy' increased, draining resources out of the state sector. The 
government responded by increasing its funding to the state sector, paid for by printing 
money. The result, during 1986-8, was hyper-inflation. 
In 1986, at the Sixth Party Congress, the government announced a plan to introduce 
a more comprehensive set of reforms, under the slogan of Doi Moi (Renovation). In 
1988 land and assets belonging to co-operatives were distributed among their member 
households. State-owned enterprises were forced to accept harder budget constraints; 
rationing and state-fixing of prices were done away with; and free markets continued to 
expand, so that from 1989 'the Vietnamese economy is most usefully considered as a 
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market economy' (Fforde and de Vylder 1996: 178). Since the late 1980s, the economy 
has been growing at about 8 per cent a year. 
The northern Vietnamese total fertility rate· continued its slow decline from 
somewhere between 4 and 4.5 in 1980 to somewhere between 3 and 3.5 in the early 
1990s (Appendix Table 3.4). As discussed in Section 3.4, available fertility data indicate 
that the differentials between lowland regions and upland regions, and between cities and 
the countryside were maintained, though the data contain limitations which make it 
impossible to measure these differentials properly. The decline in fertility appears to have 
more than compensated for the decline in mortality, producing a decline in net fertility. 
4.3.2. The demand for children 
Increases in real household income imply increases in parents' ability to pay 
childrearing costs. Measurement of real household income during the 1980s and 1990s 
is difficult, because of the complications introduced by the dismantling of the rations 
system and the hyper-inflation. A reasonably proxy for rural household income is per 
capita staples production, which appears to have stagnated during the mid-1980s, and to 
have begun increasing rapidly in 1988, after the agricultural reforms. Food as a 
proportion of the total expenditure of rural and urban households also began falling 
sharply from about 1988 (Fforde and de Vylder 1996: Figures 3.1, 3.12). Residents of 
Hanoi I have spoken to suggested that living standards began improving quickly from the 
late 1980s. 
Although the transition to Market Leninism eventually increased incomes in 
general, it also undermined the system of transfer payments by which income was 
channelled towards those with children. With the rapid growth of the 'outside economy' 
at the expense of the state and collective sectors during the early 1980s, 'other incomes' 
as a proportion of the household income of state sector workers increased from less than 
one-fifth in 1979 to about one-half in the mid-1980s (Fforde and de Vylder 1996: Figure 
3.10). The payment or non-payment of child allowances began to become irrelevant to 
household income. In 1988 the 'household contracts' legislation did away with work 
points, formerly the principal mechanism through which co-operatives redistributed 
income towards large families. 
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In the northern Vietnamese countryside, local provision of social welfare appears to 
have taken the form of guaranteed access to small plots of agricultural land. Since 1988 
use rights to most agricultural land have been distributed among households according to 
household size, with redistributions scheduled to occur at intervals of fifteen to twenty 
years. Although there has been a great deal of variation in land allocation practices, there 
are many reports of districts only allocating land to the first two children in a family, in 
line with the national birth control policy of limiting couples to two births (Xenos et al. 
1991: 49; Goodkind 1995: 105; Nguyen The Hue 1995: 124). The effects of economic 
reform on parents' ability to bear childrearing costs have thus been contradictory: on the 
one hand, average incomes have been rising; on the other hand, the magnitude of 
transfers to parents have been falling. 
Meanwhile economic developments unambiguously raised the direct costs of 
childrearing. Continuing economic problems, the decline in the revenue-generating 
capacity of co-operatives, and perhaps a shift in government priorities, led to the 
education and health sectors being starved of funds in the late 1970s and the 1980s. 
Teachers' and health workers' salaries fell below subsistence levels. This appears to have 
led both to a reduction in the quality of services and an increasing reliance on means such 
as examination fees and pharmaceutical sales to pay staff salaries (UNICEF 1990: 97-8, 
143-4; Allen 1993; Marr 1993: 338-42). The charging of fees in education and health 
was legalized in 1989. Over the late 1980s and early 1990s, primary school attendance 
rates were maintained, but attendance at secondary school diminished (World Bank 1995: 
Table 7 .6). According to government surveys, the proportion of household income spent 
on 'education, health, and culture' accounted for 5 per cent of the expenditure of rural 
households in 1981-5, and 10 per cent in 1986-90 (Nguyen The Hue 1995: 91). The 
state-run creches have become increasingly expensive, and monthly fees are now 
approximately equivalent to the monthly salaries of goverment workers (about 30 US 
dollars). Private creches are usually more expensive. There are, however, an unknown 
number of informal or family-run creches, particularly in rural areas (Fraser 1991: 190-1; 
Tran Thi Van Anh 1992: 34 ). 
Rising incomes and the waning of official limits have led to rapidly increasing 
expectations concerning socially acceptable wedding celebrations. Stories abound in 
Hanoi about celebrations costing parents a year or more' s worth of income. Similar 
changes have occurred in China. 
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The overall effect of the transition to Market Leninism has been to increase the costs 
of childrearing faster than the ability of parents to bear these costs. Researchers at the 
Institute of Sociology in Hanoi report that parents throughout urban and rural northern 
Vietnam have been complaining that children are far more expensive than they used to be. 
Meanwhile, economic reform appears to have reduced the attractiveness of having 
large families. The mobility strategies practised by families during the 1980s and 1990s 
require money rather than many children. In rural areas, high population density and 
egalitarian distribution means that most allocations of agricultural land are tiny. Research 
in rural areas has indicated that people have been keen to retain family plots as subsistence 
guarantees, but have been pursuing upward mobility through off-farm activities, such as 
livestock-rearing, trading, handicrafts, and, to a still limited extent, light industry (Le Thi 
Vinh Thi 1993: 20-1; Kerkvliet and Selden 1995: 33-4). A major 1992 survey found that 
for the large majority of respondents the greatest obstacle to becoming involved in off-
farm activities was a shortage of capital (Ronnas 1992: 66). Vietnamese researchers have 
reported cases of couples delaying or reducing childbearing in order to devote their 
resources to entrepreneurship (Nguyen The Hue 1995: 122). Urban entrepreneurs make 
the same complaints about capital shortages as rural entrepreneurs (Ronnas 1992: 51), 
and face the same incentive to limit their fertility. 
Families now have far greater scope than during the 1960s and 1970s to achieve 
upward social mobility through conspicuous consumption. With government policy 
legitimating wealth accumulation, families building elaborate houses or throwing large 
parties no longer receive enquiries from the local security forces about the source of their 
money~ High quality imported consumer goods began to enter northern Vietnam on a 
large scale in 1989 (Fforde and de Vylder 1996: 177), enabling the lucky few to purchase 
new clothes, motorbikes, and stereos.1 
Economic reform has only slightly affected the value of children as sources of 
security during old age. The pre-reform system of old-age support for urban workers has 
essentially been maintained. In 1993 the government introduced legislation carrying over 
most of the former provisions for state workers.2 The maximum benefit was set at 75 
per cent of employees' average salaries during their last five years of employment. 
l I also saw a survey of a village near Hanoi reporting that 20 out of 800 households owned a karaoke 
machine. 
2The relevant decrees are printed in Nha Xuat Ban Chinh Tri Quoc Gia (1995). World Bank (1995: 
109-10) gives a brief summary in English. 
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Private enterprises employing ten or more people were instructed to participate in the 
scheme. Funding was supposed to come from levies on employees and employers, but in 
the first year of operation only about one quarter of the planned revenues were collected in 
this way, and most of the deficit was paid for out of central revenues. Further reforms in 
1994 were aimed at reducing contributions from the state budget. As the World Banlc 
(1995: 109-12) has pointed out, the existing system is extremely regressive; it is probably 
no more regressive the its socialist predecessor, however-the existing system is simply 
more transparent. 
In rural areas, the central government makes small contributions towards the 
welfare of the aged. Old people who lost children during the wars, for instance, receive 
allowances which are sufficient to pay for simple meals (Dang Thu 1994: 5). A few 
communities still subsidize rice for old people (Phi Van Ba 1992: 23; An Dien Research 
Group 1994: 58). Old people also often receive allocations of agricultural land, and 
sometimes subsidized fertilizer, pesticides, or other inputs (Phi Van Ba 1992: 22-3; An 
Dien Research Group 1994: 58; Dang Thu 1994: 5). On a smaller scale, there has 
reportedly been a proliferation of small-scale old people's organizations, operating 
schemes to pay for funerals, visit the sick, or exercise in the outdoors ( cau lac bo sue 
khoe ngoai troi) (Duong Chi Thien 1994: 87). None of the post-reform rural schemes are 
particularly generous, but then neither were the pre-reform schemes. 
Northern Vietnamese people, particularly in the countryside, can thus expect to need 
children as sources of old-age support. People's ability to afford investments in children 
has also been enhanced by rising incomes since the late 1980s. Over the course of the 
1980s and 1990s, public subsidies for childrearing have, however, been falling in value, 
and the direct costs of childbearing have been increasing. At the same time, attractive 
alternative uses for parents' resources have been appearing. The combined effects of these 
changes has been to depress the demand for children in both urban and rural areas. 
4.3.3. Population policy 
In 1981 the Council of Ministers stated that family planning should be strongly 
promoted throughout the country. It proposed that the population growth rate be lowered 
from 2.1 per cent to 1.7 per cent by the year 1985, and that parents should have no more 
than two children, with a minimum age at first birth for mothers of 22 years, and five 
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years' spacing between births. The Council of Ministers proposed that incentives be 
introduced for couples who practised family planning, and that subsidies with pronatalist 
effects be altered. Family planning committees were to be established at every 
administrative level down to the commune, with each family planning committee headed 
by the chair of the local People's Committee (Vu Quy Nhan 1993: 5). 
At the Sixth Party Congress in 1986, population control was declared to be the 
second most important national objective, behind only food production (World Bank 
1993: 178). Article 2 of the 1986 Marriage and Family Law stated that 'husband and wife 
shall have the obligation to implement family planning', although Article 4 of the 1989 
Health Law stated, presumably for the benefit of foreign donors, that 'all acts of 
preventing or forcing the implementation of family planning are prohibited' (Banister 
1993: 25; The Gioi 1993: 297). A statement by the Council of Ministers in 1988 
reiterated the message of the 1981 statement. In 1993 the Party Central Committee 
issued a decree outlining its support for the target of two children per couple and 
promising to continue expanding the family planning program (NCPFP 1994). 
In 1984 the National Committee for Population and Family Planning (NCPFP) was 
established. It was given responsibility for co-ordinating family planning activities and for 
establishing birth rate targets down to the local level, although responsibility for the 
distribution of contraceptives remained with the Ministry of Health. The NCPFP began 
setting up offices at the provincial, district, and commune levels (Hull and Le 1992: 84-6; 
Goodkind 1995: 89). The 1993 decree on family planning mentioned above envisaged 
communes having staff working fulltime on family planning matters, as well as 
'collaborators' assigned to hamlets or sub-hamlets (NCPFP 1994: 113). 
If international aid is included, funding for family planning appears to have been 
maintained at approximately the same level between 1985 and 1990, while other areas of 
social spending were being cut (World Bank 1993: 178). Between 1990 and 1993, 
spending on the category 'population and family planning' grew from 0.09 per cent of 
state budget expenditure to 0.35 per cent (Vietnam 1995a: Table 4.16). In 1993, the 
government announced an intention to provide adequate funds for maintaining the supply 
of contraceptives, giving material incentives to family planning acceptors and family 
planning workers, carrying out Information, Education, and Communication work, and 
collecting reliable statistics (NCPFP 1994: 125). 
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Vietnam's family planning program appears to have contained substantial 
inefficiencies and to have been unresponsive to client needs (Knodel, Phan, and Dao 
1995). In this it resembles state stores, and all other government-organized distribution 
systems in Vietnam. It is intuitively plausible that fertility decline in northern Vietnam 
has been somewhat faster than it might have been because of the availability of relatively 
efficient means of contraception, and that greater availability might stimulate somewhat 
faster decline. The extent to which provision of 'modem' contraceptives hastened fertility 
decline depends on the willingness and ability of Vietnamese to use homemade methods. 
The only available evidence on contraceptive use comes from large-scale surveys. The 
1994 Intercensal Demographic Survey reported that about one-third of all women 
practising contraception were using periodic abstinence and withdrawl, regardless of 
education level, occupation, or place of residence (Vietnam 1995: Table 4.5). While the 
size of this figure and the fact that use of rhythmn or withdrawl did not depend on the 
availability of alternative methods suggests that Vietnamese people could control their 
fertility without modem contraceptives, it would be useful, in a country where use of 
family planning is a legal obligation, to have results from more intensive studies. 
There is scattered evidence of determined efforts to implement birth rate targets 
during the early and mid 1980s. Official statements and newspaper articles continued 
arguing for the use of compulsion to meet family planning targets. Some targets appear to 
have been expressed in terms of contraceptive acceptors, others in terms of numbers of 
births (Banister 1985: 18-21). In 1987, the Hanoi Municipality appears to have forcefully 
implemented the incentives and penalties alluded to by the 1981 Council of Ministers 
statement, as an official from the Ministry of labour complained that some penalties had 
been 'unsuitable, and have even violated the rights of citizens. For example, people have 
not been allowed to study, have had their bonuses cut off, have been dismissed, etc' 
(Banister 1989: 159). During the mid- l 980s, some co-operatives provided women with 
money, food or leave from work after they had had an IUD fitted or had undergone an 
abortion. The Women's Union complained that some co-operatives also cut the food 
rations or work points of women who gave birth outside the co-operatives' plans 
(Nguyen Huyen Chau 1988: 66-9). Lam Thanh Liem (1987) was told by Vietnamese 
who had recently emigrated to France that city hospitals were inserting IUDs into women 
who had had two or more children, and that mobile clinics were doing the same in some 
country areas. 
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Many examples of northern villages implementing strong measures against high 
fertility have been described for the late 1980s and 1990s. Xenos, Tran, Luu, and Vu 
(1993: 49) describe a village in the most densely populated part of the Red River Delta 
which in 1989 introduced fines equivalent to 200 kilograms of rice for third or higher 
order births or for second births occurring less than five years after the first. I When 
Xenos et al. stayed in the village in 1991, the local government was in the process of 
linking fees for health care and other services to children's birth order. Xenos et al. were 
not in the village long enough to properly assess enforcement of the fines, although their 
impression was that local people were taking the fines seriously. Surveys conducted by 
Goodkind (1995: 93-101) during 1993 in a town and two villages in Hai Hung Province 
included questions on fines for violating the two-child policy. Over half the respondents 
in the town and about 90 per cent of respondents in the village reported that they had 
heard of such fines being imposed, the amounts levied varying from less than 50 
kilograms of rice to 240 kilograms. Researchers from the Vietnamese Institute of 
Sociology described a village in Ha Son Binh Province where in 1991 women with two 
or more children were required to have IUDs inserted. A woman with two or more 
children who failed to have an IUD inserted was to be penalized by a fine of 20 kilograms 
of paddy. Fees for births at the infirmary were about fifty cents (US) for first and second 
births, five dollars and 100 kilograms of paddy for third births, five dollars and 200 
kilograms of paddy for fourth births, and five dollars and 300 kilograms of paddy for 
fifth or higher order births (Nguyen Thi Huong 1992: 118). The researchers did not say 
how strictly these fees were enforced. Vuong Xuan Tinh (1994: 27-8), another 
Vietnamese researcher, describes parents in one village in Thai Binh Province as being 
willing to pay 800 kilogram fines for third or higher order births if all the previous 
children were girls. Finally, a Vietnamese family planning worker (Tran Thi Hoai 1994: 
99-100) describes a village in Thai Binh Province as imposing fines of up to 750 
kilograms of paddy for fifth or higher order births, with payment being spread out over 
five years. 
Great care must be taken in interpreting available evidence on birth control in 
northern Vietnam. The fact that there is more evidence of forceful birth control programs 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s does not necessarily mean that the incidence of such 
IPer capita paddy production in the province (Thai Binh) to which the village belonged was just 
under 450 kilograms in 1989 (Vietnam 1991a: Table 1.2; Vietnam 1994: Table 49) 
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programs has increased since the late 1980s. Vietnam become slightly more open to 
foreigners since the late 1980s, so that evidence on virtually every aspect of Vietnamese 
society is more plentiful for the late 1980s onwards than for previous years. In additon, 
none of the sources listed above implied that the situations they were describing were 
typical of all northern villages. It is possible that these programs are very atypical, and that 
this is why respondents had heard of them, or why social scientists have written about 
them. The family planning worker noted that next to the village imposing 7 50 kilogram 
fines was a village which imposed no fines at all (Tran Thi Hoai 1994: 99-100). 
Goodkind (1995: 107) explicitly warns against making premature generalizations based 
on the evidence he presents, arguing that more villages across a wider geographical range 
must be studied first. Vietnamese researchers have found that birth control measures vary 
widely between localities (Nguyen The Hue 1995: 123-4). Extensive local variation is 
what would in fact be expected, based on Vietnamese experiences implementing other 
national policies. For instance, almost identical observations about local variation have 
been made in the 1990s regarding land allocation as were made during the 1970s about 
the management of co-operatives (Pham Cuong 1976: 54-6; Kerkvliet 1995a: fn22). 
In China, a significant cause of the geographical variation in birth control programs 
has been difference in the policies of provincial governments (Greenhalgh 1994: 369-72). 
In Vietnam, provincial governments have recently increased their influence over many 
areas of policy (see Section 2.4.2). There is scattered evidence that provincial government 
may have had a significant role in forming population policy in northern Vietnam. 
Vietnamese media reports on family planning often describe initiatives taken by 
provincial governments. The Ha Son Binh village with the infirmary fees mentioned 
above reportedly first adopted a two-child policy in 1985 after an instruction had been 
issued by the Ha Son Binh People's Committee (Nguyen Thi Huong 1992: 117). Most 
of the village examples cited above were from Hai Hung and Thai Binh provinces, where 
the provincial governments have traditionally been unusually loyal to the Party. Indeed, 
Hai Hung was already considered a family planning success story in 1981, when 405 of 
the 422 communes in the province had reportedly fulfilled official family planning targets 
(Jones 1982: fn 43). 
Some government employees in urban areas appear to have been threatened with 
penalties for having more than two children. Goodk.ind ( 1995: 91) describes state-owned 
enterprise workers receiving tickets from their work units at the time of marriage 
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specifying when they were allowed to have each of their two children. Penalties for non-
compliance varied between organizations. Stories circulate around Hanoi about 
promotions being withheld or fines levied for giving birth to a third child. It appears, 
though, that residents of northern Vietnamese cities, like residents of Chinese cities, and 
most other cities across East and Southeast Asia, would prefer to have only one or two 
children anyway, so that a legal limit of two children is not a great cause of conflict. 
Very little research has been published on family planning in southern Vietnam. 
When Goodkind (1995: 99) surveyed two villages and a town in south-central Vietnam, 
he found almost no evidence of fines. Lam Thanh Liem ( 1987) collected reports that 
compulsory IUD insertions and other such measures were being carried out in Ho Chi 
Minh City and elsewhere in the South during the early 1980s. Goodkind (1995: 99) 
notes, however, that Western fieldworkers had found no recent evidence of fines outside 
the Red River Delta and adjacent areas, and that the styles of the family planning 
programs in the two halves of Vietnam appear to be different, with southern programs 
offering more alternatives to the IUD than northern programs. If there are indeed North-
South differences in population policies, one contributing factor may be wariness on the 
part of the central government of imposing unpopular policies in the South. Other 
unpopular policies such as collectivization and conscription have met with far less 
compliance on the part of local officials or the citizemy in the South than in the North 
(Kerkvliet and Selden 1995: 23; Pike 1986: 292). 
The birth control program in northern Vietnam has been operating simultaneously 
with the transition towards Market Leninism. Greenhalgh, Zhu and Li ( 1994: 366) 
summarize the scholarly consensus when they describe how similar economic reforms in 
China initially made enforcement of the one-child policy more difficult. The end of team 
accounting made the application of incentives and disincentives harder. The weakening of 
collective institutions reduced local fund-raising capacity, depriving the birth control 
program of resources to pay cadres or to provide incentives to family planning acceptors. 
Cadres neglected their official duties in favour of more lucrative opportunities for 
entrepreneurship or farming. The effect of these changes and the tightness of the one-
child policy varied markedly between regions. Surveys showed that, nationally, fertility 
was creeping upwards: according to one set of estimates, for instance, the Chinese total 
fertility rate climbed from 2.3 in 1985 to 2.5 in 1987. 
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By 1993, however, the total fertility rate had apparently fallen to 1.9. Chinese 
officials claimed that the credit for this reduction belonged with the national birth control 
program. Greenhalgh, Zhu and Li ( 1994) present evidence from Shaanxi Province 
suggesting that the officials' diagnosis was correct. When the central government 
increased pressure on the Shaanxi provincial government, it in tum increased pressure on 
local birth control cadres, through creating a new, Party-led, Birth Planning Association, 
and through rewarding effective cadres and punishing ineffective cadres more diligently. 
At the same time, the Shaanxi government increased funding to birth control, which 
allowed cadres' wages to be raised, and allowed cadres to increase incentive payments to 
birth control acceptors, to strengthen the registration system, and to offer higher quality 
services. The extent of local variation in policy implementation was reduced. Fertility fell, 
partly because of a reduction in demand for children, but mainly because of the birth 
control program. 
If the arguments in Section 4.2.3 were correct, and the Vietnamese government was 
unable to introduce birth control programs during the late 1970s because of the crisis in 
the former economic system, then, in contrast to China, economic reform was a 
precondition for the birth control programs. A new, more mutually satisfactory, 
equilibrium in state-society relations does appear to have been reached (Kerkvliet 1995a). 
The Vietnamese government has room on its agenda for more than just immediate 
economic survival. At the same time, decollectivization appears to have created identical 
difficulties for northern Vietnamese birth control cadres has it had for their Chinese 
colleagues. For instance, the end of the workpoints system in 1981 made it more difficult 
to impose penalties, programs lack sufficient funds to pay meaningful salaries to cadres 
or meaningful incentives to acceptors, and villages have ceased registering births 
(Kaufman and Sen 1993: 243; Goodkind 1995: 91, 102). 
The evidence on population policy presented above suggests that, in northern 
Vietnam at least, the Vietnamese government may be pursuing a Chinese solution to 
these problems. The Vietnamese central government, like the Chinese central 
government, appears to have been putting pressure on lower levels of government to 
enforce birth and contraceptive acceptance targets. The government also appears to have 
been using some of the increases in government revenue to reward birth control cadres 
and make their jobs easier. As yet it is too early to tell whether these efforts will result in 
a similar reduction in local variation and in overall fertility rates as was achieved in China. 
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Even if the Vietnamese government does not succeed in tightening current birth 
control policies, it does appear plausible that these policies have had some influence on 
fertility levels in some areas. Both gross and net fertility could have been expected to fall 
anyway, in response to a reduction in the demand for children. To what extent the birth 
control program has hastened fertility decline is, at present, impossible to tell. 
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Chapter 5 Northern Vietnamese succession rules and 
the demographic transition 
5.1. Introduction 
In northern Vietnam, as in most of East Asia, families endeavour to transfer family 
property and preserve the family line through succession from fathers to sons. Within 
the patrilineage, males are ranked by age and generation, while females are ranked by 
their relationship to the males. Ancestor veneration is carried out mainly, though not 
exclusively, for patrilineal ancestors. A recent study (Nguyen Due Truyen 1994: 17) in a 
village near Hanoi found that people believed that family property should not be given to 
women unless the women were unmarried or recently married, on the grounds that 
married women became part of their husbands' families. Family property such as land or 
housing is given to sons at the time they establish a separate household, or, for sons who 
remain in the parental home, over a longer period. This results in most property being 
transferred before the deaths of the parents. All sons are supposed to receive 
approximately equal shares of the estate, with the exception of sons remaining in the 
parental household, who often receive a greater share in return for looking after the 
parents (Hickey 1958: 75-6; Luong 1989: 744-7; Pham Thi Nguyet Lang 1990: 92; Do 
Thai Dong 1991: 84, 91; Nguyen Tu Chi 1991: 66, 69; Nguyen Due Truyen 1994: 3, 17-
18; Vuong Xuan Tinh 1994: 25-6). Yang (1945: 82) noted that in China, the preservation 
and preferably the expansion of family property and of the patrilineage were inseparable; 
the same could be said for northern Vietnam. 
The northern Vietnamese state has made a number of conspicuous attempts at 
reshaping its citizens' succession practices. Party theoreticians saw accumulation and 
inheritance within peasant families as leading inevitably to economic differentiation in the 
countryside. They hoped that one of the contributions of collectivization during the late 
1950s and the 1960s would be to put an end to this process (Vickerman 1986: 134-5). 
However, the northern Vietnamese state, like the Soviet and Chinese states, was unable to 
make rural people accept collectivization without compromises. Most families, with the 
exception of landlord families, were allowed to retain and bequeath their gardens, ponds, 
and houses. In the cities, families who owned their own houses were generally allowed 
, I 
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to keep them. In both the countryside and the cities, a great deal of movable family 
property disappeared, often literally underground. Only in the late 1980s did it reappear, 
to be invested in businesses, or prestige housing. The extent of the collectivization and of 
its effect on the transmission of family property should therefore not be exaggerated. 
Decollectivization in northern Vietnam has generally left rice land in the hands of local 
communities, who are obliged to redistribute it at intervals of about 20 years. However, 
the main focus for rural investment and accumulation is not rice agriculture, but houses, 
handicrafts, trading, and small-scale industry, which are owned and controlled by families 
(Ronnas 1992). 
On several occasions, the government passed legislation attempting to propagate 
new succession rules which were less biased against women. The 1960 and 1986 
Marriage and Family Laws stated that sons and daughters had the same rights and 
responsibilities within the family (Kim 1973: 448; The Gioi 1993: 302). The inheritance 
law passed in 1990 (The Gioi 1993: 506-19) specified that all children should receive 
equal amounts of the family estate on the death of their parents. Nguyen Due Truyen 
(1994: 16-18) found that few people had even heard of this law, and that those who had 
heard of it took no notice of it. The Vietnamese state never launched wholesale assaults 
on ancestor veneration like those launched by the Chinese state during the Cultural 
Revolution. Vietnamese cadres did place official limits on expenditure on funerals and 
offerings, but this was a reform which in the past had occasionally been proposed by 
Confucian scholars. 
A less obvious but probably more important influence on Vietnamese succession 
practices has been demographic change. In order for a family to carry out patrilineal 
succession, the father must have at least one surviving adult son at the time of his death. 
Whether a father has a surviving biological son depends on how many children his wife 
gives birth to, how many of these children are sons, and how many sons survive to the 
fathers' deaths. All of these conditions are subject to chance, or what Smith ( 1984: 40, 
1988: 113) calls the 'demographic lottery'. 
The proportion of fathers in a population who have at least one surviving biological 
son at the time of their deaths will, for convenience, be referred to in the rest of the 
chapter as the 'heirship proportions'. In any population, heirship proportions are likely to 
be related to the population growth rate: the higher the growth rate, the more sons, on 
average, survive to the time of their fathers' deaths. As will be discussed later in the 
. . .. ·~ 
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chapter, this relationship is mediated by the parity distribution of fertility, but the 
association between a high population growth rate and high heirship proportions is 
nevertheless strong enough for a rise and then fall in heirship proportions to be an integral 
part of the demographic transition. 
For mathematical demographers, the association between the growth rate of a 
population and the proportion of adults with surviving heirs is a truism (Ryder 1975: 
279-80; Keyfitz 1985: 332-4). In the literature on population old-age support, the effect of 
declining fertility on the proportion of childless old people is similarly well known. 
However, few general discussions of social change or the family make much of the link 
between changing heirship proportions and the demgraphic transition. Similarly, few 
scholars seem to recognize that the high proportion of adults with heirs in populations 
undergoing a demographic transition is historically unprecedented. 
Northern Vietnam's demographic transition was already under way by the 1930s. 
Mortality had fallen and fertility remained high, producing a population growth rate of 
between one and two per cent a year (Gourou 1936: 196-7). Mortality declined further 
after the 1945 Revolution, so that by 1960 the annual population growth rate may have 
exceeded three per cent, before falling to around two per cent during the 1980s, as fertility 
declined (Vietnam 1991a: Table 1.1). The net reproduction rate followed a similar 
course, as was shown in Figure 3 .8. It is clear that the proportion of fathers dying with 
surviving sons has risen over the course of the century. However, it is difficult to guess at 
the size of the changes, the extent of the lag behind the demographic changes, or the 
effects of the 1944-5 famine and the 1946-54 and 1965-75 wars. Statistics measuring the 
proportion of fathers with surviving sons are only available for the 1990s, and even these 
statistics are somewhat unsatisfactory. 
In this chapter two versions of some calculations made by Wrigley (1978) for 
stationary populations are used to address these issues and to illustrate some aspects of 
the demography of succession in northern Vietnam. Wrigely (1978) devoted only a few 
paragraphs to describing his calculations before moving on to explore their general 
implications, which was the main purpose of his paper. He did not fully explain some of 
his assumptions, so that his method is left somewhat obscure. Section 5.2 fills in some 
of the gaps left by Wrigley, and then uses Wrigley's method to estimate heirship 
proportions in various stationary populations. An extensively modified version of 
Wrigley's method is used to estimate proportions of men without heirs in northern 
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Vietnam at successive periods during the twentieth century. These estimates are 
necessarily rough, but are sufficiently clear on orders of magnitude and directions of 
change to allow some substantive conclusions to be formed. 
The government policies mentioned above, and the demographic changes dealt with 
in this chapter, are only two of the many forces likely to have been shaping northern 
Vietnamese succession practices over recent decades. Mass education, migration, and 
war-time disruption, for instance, all probably had important effects. The purpose of this 
chapter is not to examine northern Vietnamese succession practices in their entirety, but 
only to make a case for paying attention to the demographic lottery. 
5.2. The demographic lottery in stationary populations 
Wrigley (1978) developed an ingenious method for estimating the likelihood of 
various combinations of heirs for families occurring in stationary populations. The 
stationary population case is important because most pre-industrial populations were 
approximately stationary. The definition of a family which Wrigley implicitly adopts is 
married couples plus their children, if any. Because he assumes that all adult males 
beyond a certain age marry, his estimates apply to either families or males beyond that 
marriage age. At the conclusion of this section alternatives to the assumption of universal 
marriage are discussed; in the meantime, however, Wrigley's method is explained 
assuming universal marriage. 
Wrigley (1978: 138) assumed that males and females were subject to the same 
survival probabilities, that all fertility was marital, and that the sex ratio at birth was equal 
to one. The main justification for using these assumptions was to simplify the 
calculations, which Wrigley carried out by hand. These assumptions also made it possible 
to ignore the two-sex problem when specifying stationary fertility and mortality rates. 1 
Wrigley (1978: 139, fn 2) reported that subsequent investigations had shown that relaxing 
these assumptions had little effect on the results. When experimenting with different sex 
ratios and survival probabilities, I came to the same conclusion. Wrigley's original 
assumptions are used in the explanation and calculations below. 
lThe two-sex problem, which is as yet unsolved, concerns the conditions under which a population 
composed of two sexes with differing mortality and fertility schedules attains a fixed rate of 
population growth. 
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Three basic independence assumptions are used: each person's survival 
probabilities are assumed to be independent of each other person's survival probabilities; 
people's survival probabilities are assumed to be independent of their birth order; and the 
sex of a given person is assumed to be independent of the sex of his or her siblings. The 
first two assumptions are prominent 'embarrassments for family demography' (Keyfitz 
1987: 10-11) in that they are likely to be violated in practice but have to be used because 
without them the calculations are intractable. Making these three assumptions allows the 
binomial probability distribution to be used in the calculations. 
Wrigley shows that in a stationary population conforming to his assumptions, a 
given probability that sons survive to the deaths of their fathers, denoted p, implies a 
given mean number of children born per marriage. In a stationary population, the total 
number of married men in the population must remain constant. For this to be the case, 
sons who marry must, on average, marry at the time of their fathers' deaths. Since the 
average age at marriage is also the average age at which the sons' fathers die, the 
probability of sons surviving from birth until marriage must be equal to p. Since survival 
probabilities are the same for sons and daughters, the probability of daughters surviving 
to the deaths of their fathers must also be equal to p. In order that the number of fathers 
dying equals the number of sons marrying, each married man must produce on average 
lip sons. Since the sex ratio at birth is assumed to be equal to one, the average number of 
children born per marriage must be equal to 2/p. Wrigley constructed three hypothetical 
populations, with values for p of two-thirds, one-half, and one-third. The implied mean 
numbers of children per marriage in these populations were three, four, and six. 
Once mean numbers of children per marriage have been calculated, the next step is 
to construct distributions of children ever born with the corresponding means. Because 
Wrigley carried out his calculations by hand, and therefore decided to use distributions 
composed of round numbers, he constructed distributions whose means differed 
marginally from three, four, and six. These distributions are shown in Table 5.1, along 
with a modified version of the first distribution which is used to test the sensitivity of 
Wrigley's findings to alternative distributions. Although the distributions he derived 
appear rather odd, Wrigley stated that they were tolerably close to those found in real 
historical societies. 
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TABLE 5.1 Distribution of children ever born per 
marriage in three stationary populations with different 
l!robabilities of surviving to death of father. 
Proportion of families 
Children Popn 1 Popn2 Popn3 Test Popn 
ever born (p=213) (p=l/2) (p=l/3) (p=213) 
0 0.100 0.085 0.070 0.200 
1 0.200 0.125 0.070 0.150 
2 0.200 0.125 0.070 0.150 
3 0.150 0.125 0.070 0.150 
4 0.110 0.125 0.070 0.105 
5 0.085 0.125 0.070 0.050 
6 0.060 0.090 0.070 0.050 
7 0.040 0.075 0.070 0.030 
8 0.025 0.060 0.070 0.080 
9 0.020 0.040 0.280 0.025 
10 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
11 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.010 
12 0.010 0.025 0.090 0.000 
Total 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Mean 3.055 4.080 6.120 3.055 
Based on Wrigley (1978: Tables 3.1, 3.2, 3.3) 
Associated with each number of children ever born is a distribution of possible 
numbers of sons ever born. For instance, if a father has two children, he may have zero, 
one, or two sons. Associated with each number of sons ever born is a distribution of 
possible surviving sons at the death of the father. For instance, if a father has one son, he 
may have zero or one surviving sons. Given the independence assumptions discussed 
above, the probability associated with each element in the distribution can be calculated 
using the binomial probability distribution, the sex ratio at birth, and the probability of 
surviving to a father's death. For instance, if the probability of surviving to a father's 
death is one-third, then the probability of having one male heir, given two sons ever born, 
is (~)(tY (tr-I)= t. 
When using a computer, the easiest way to carry out these calculations is to use 
matrices. A matrix can be constructed showing the probabilities of having j sons ever 
born, given i children ever born. A similar matrix can be constructed showing the 
probabilities of having k surviving sons, given j sons ever born. These matrices can be 
multiplied to give a matrix showing the probability of having k surviving sons, given i 
children ever born. Multiplying a row matrix showing the distribution of children ever 
born in a given population by this matrix yields a row matrix showing the distribution of 
surviving sons. Probabilities for given combinations of sons and daughters can be 
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calculated using the fact that having j sons ever born, given i children ever born, implies 
having i-j daughters ever born. The basic method can be made more efficient by using 
formulae which take advantage of the fact that the matrix entries to the left of the diagonal 
are all equal to zero. 
Wrigley showed that in all three stationary populations described above, almost 
exactly 60 per cent of fathers die with at least one surviving son, 20 per cent die with no 
surviving sons but at least one surviving daughter, and 20 per cent die with no surviving 
sons or daughters. In order to find out the proportions of families with various other 
combinations of heirs, such as two or more surviving sons, I have repeated and slightly 
extended Wrigley's original calculations. (Unlike Wrigley, I have not had to do all the 
calculations by hand.) The results are shown in Table 5.2. 
With the sex ratio equal to one and survival probabilities the same for sons and 
daughters, the proportion of families with x surviving sons and y surviving daughters is 
identical to the proportion of families with y surviving sons and x surviving daughters. 
This allows the relative frequency of various combinations not shown in Table 5 .2 to be 
deduced. For instance, the proportion of families having one or more sons and two or 
more daughters equals the proportion having one or more daughters and two or more 
sons. 
The mean numbers of surviving sons and daughters at the death of the husband are 
not shown in Table 5.2, but in principle they should both be equal to one. In practice, 
because the distributions of children ever born constructed by Wrigley have means 
slightly higher than they ought to be, the mean numbers of children surviving to the death 
of their fathers are also slightly higher than they ought to be (by a margin of 0.04). 
As Table 5 .2 shows, the proportions of families with combinations such as one 
surviving son and one or more surviving daughters are just as stable across the three 
populations as the combinations dealt with by Wrigley. Under the parameters chosen by 
Wrigley, zero growth rates lead to nearly identical heirship proportions. This stability is to 
some extent a result of Wrigley's choice of distributions: sufficiently large alterations to 
the shape of the distributions can affect the results significantly. Table 5 .3 shows the 
results of substituting the distribution labelled ~Test Population' in Table 5.1 for the 
distribution labelled 'Population 1'. The two distributions have the same mean, but the 
'Test Population' contains twice as many families with no children ever born. This leads 
to the Test Population containing 35 per cent more families with no heirs. 
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TABLE 5.2 The proportions of families with the indicated combinations of surviving sons 













Adapted from Wrigley (1978). 










































At very low levels of mortality, the sensitivity of the distribution of surviving 
children to changes in the distribution of children ever born is high. This can be seen 
intuitively by considering the limiting case when there is no mortality, and the probability 
of having a surviving child is entirely determined by the distribution of children ever 
born. A proper investigation of these matters would only be possible by formalizing 
Wrigley's method and investigating the mathematical properties of the matrices. 
However, even if the exact magnitudes found by Wrigley are not generalizable across all 
distributions of children ever born and all levels of mortality, his calculations do give a 
rough impression of the proportions likely to have been found in many pre-industrial 
populations. 
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TABLE 5.3 The proportions of families with the indicated combinations of surviving sons 
and daughters at the time of the husband's death. 'Test Population' (p=2/3). 
Sons 
0 1 2+ Total 
Daughters 0 0.27 0.11 0.07 0.45 
1+ 0.17 0.17 0.21 0.55 
Total 0.45 0.28 0.27 1.00 
Wrigley's method and conclusions are not greatly affected by dispensing with the 
assumption of universal marriage. One approach is to assume that not all males marry, 
and to calculate numbers of heirs alive to all adult males at their deaths, rather than 
calculating the number of heirs alive per marriage or per family. In the original method, 
mean numbers of children ever born per marriage were calculated by using the fact that 
the total number of marriages in the population must remain constant; in the modified 
version, the mean number of children ever born per male over a certain age is calculated 
using the fact that the number of males over this age must remain constant. Distributions 
of children ever born per adult male must be calculated to reflect the fact that not all males 
marry. If there is no childbearing outside marriage, then the proportion of men with no 
children ever born must be at least equal to the proportion of men who do not marry. 
Sufficiently high rates of non-marriage would lead to proportions of males with no heirs 
closer to those in the 'Test Population' than in those considered by Wrigley, particularly if 
mortality rates were low. 
Wrigley's method makes reference to the age of children at their fathers' deaths and 
to the age at marriage, but it does not specify what these ages are. Wrigley (1978: 140-2) 
shows how these ages can be calculated. The mean age of children at their fathers' deaths 
is necessarily equal to the life expectancy of males at the mean age of net reproduction. 
The term 'mean age at net reproduction' refers to the mean age at child bearing, adjusted 
for parental mortality, with the sex of the parent left unspecified (Pressat and Wilson 
1988: 142-3)1. Wrigley uses the term 'mean age of fathers at birth of child' to mean the 
a
2 I ai 
IThe mean age at net reproduction equals ."?:,f.Z.a ."?:,f.Z. where fa is the age-specific fertility 
rate, la is the standard life table function, a 1 is the lowest age of reproduction, and a2 is the 
highest age of reproduction. 
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same thing, for fathers only. When a value for the mean age of net reproduction and a 
model life table have been chosen, it is possible to calculate a value for the life expectancy 
of fathers at birth of child, and hence the mean age of children at the death of fathers, and 
the mean age at marriage. For Population 2 described above, Wrigley chose a mean age 
of net reproduction of 31 years, and a West Level 6 model life table. These implied a 
paternal life expectancy, a mean age of children at deaths of fathers, and a mean age at 
marriage of 26 years. 
These figures imply that in the population described, fathers die on average at age 
57 (31 +26). The life expectancy at birth of males under a West Level 6 model life table is 
30 years. In arithmetic terms, the difference between the mean age at death of fathers and 
the mean age at death of all males is due to the fact that fathers are assumed to survive to 
the mean age of net reproduction. Substantively the difference is due to the fact that the 
mean age at death of fathers talces the point of view of children, while the mean age at 
death of all males talces the point of view of males. 
5.3. Imp~cations of the demographic lottery for the development of 
northern Vietnam's succession rules 
Northern Vietnam appears to have had patrilineal succession rules for several 
centuries (Haines 1984: 310-14). Like most historical populations, the northern 
Vietnamese population grew slowly. Over much of their history, then, northern 
Vietnam's succession rules have been applied in demographic conditions roughly similar 
to those modelled by Wrigley. Families without male heirs would have had strong 
incentives to help develop or maintain less-preferred succession models, to which they 
were able to conform. 
Virtually all societies allow families to compensate for demographic misfortune by 
adopting children. It was accepted in colonial Vietnam that parents without a surviving 
son would try to adopt one, preferably from within the husband's patrilineage. Adoption 
was governed by elaborate rules, distinguishing different grades of adoption, and 
specifying the adopted son's rights if a biological son was subsequently born (Jamieson 
1986: 99-100). Since, in a stationary population, the mean number of sons alive at the 
time of their fathers' deaths is approximately equal to one, adoption on a sufficiently large 
scale could in principle leave every father with a surviving adopted or biological son at the 
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time of his death. However, in a stationary population, the demand for adopted sons is 
likely to be much greater than the supply, particularly if mortality is high. High mortality 
creates uncertainty over whether a given son will survive to adulthood, so families may 
be prudent to retain sons who are apparently surplus, in order to insure themselves 
against the risk of having no adult sons. And, in addition, not all families necessarily want 
to limit themselves to one surviving adult son. Adoption is therefore likely to have been 
only a partial solution to succession problems created by the demographic lottery. 
In northern Vietnam, an alternative to full adoption has been to designate as 
successor someone from outside the household, such as a nephew or a daughter's son 
(Vuong Xuan Tinh 1994: 25-6). This alternative is relatively secure against the 
demographic lottery, but has the disadvantage that an heir residing in another household 
may not be as willing to exchange services for the bequest as an heir residing in the same 
household, particularly if the non-coresident heir will also receive a bequest from a 
second source. 
Colonial northern Vietnamese villages and sub-village institutions such as giap, 
could, in a restricted sense, act as heirs to sonless members. In exchange for payments of 
land or assets into communal funds, these institutions would perform ancestor veneration 
once the members had died. This practice was known as mua hau, or 'buying posterity'. 
According to surviving records, mua hau land in most villages made up no more than a 
few per cent of total village land. Nguyen Dong Chi (1977: 49) describes one exceptional 
village, however, in which families without biological sons were allowed to transfer only 
token amounts of land to daughters or adoptive sons, and on the death of the father were 
required to donate all remaining land to the village mua hau fund. Land in the village's 
mua hau fund was never sold, but was periodically redistributed among all households. 
By the 1920s, mua hau fu,nd land accounted for two-thirds of all agricultural land in the 
village. Nguyen Dong Chi does not give any indication of how long these rules had been 
operating, but the example does illustrate the difficulty of maintaining unbroken patrilines 
indefinitely. 
Provisions allowing women to assume some of the duties and privileges of men 
help insulate families against the effects of the demographic lottery, although this comes 
nowhere near constituting an explanation for the existence of such provisions. In northern 
Vietnam, women and their children perform ancestor veneration for both the women's 
and their husbands' ancestors (Luong 1989: 747). The legal code promulgated by the Le 
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Dynasty specified that daughters as well as sons were able to inherit family property. The 
date the code was promulgated is not known with certainty, but was in either the fifteenth 
or the seventeenth century (Haines 1984: 307-8). Chinese codes, however, never allowed 
women to inherit. The neo-Confucian Nguyen dynasty in Vietnam promulgated a new 
code during the nineteenth century prohibiting inheritance by women (Ta Van Tai 1981: 
121-2). 
5.4. Recent demographic changes and the demographic lottery 
In the modified version of Wrigley's method presented here, the sex ratio at birth is 
assumed to be 1.05 rather than 1.00, and the survival probabilities of males and females 
are permitted to differ. Wrigley's three fundamental independence assumptions are 
retained: each person's survival probabilities are assumed to be independent of everyone 
else's survival probabilities; peoples' survival probabilities are assumed to be independent 
of their birth orders; and the sex of each person is assumed to be independent of the sex 
of his or her siblings. All mortality and fertility estimates are derived from Chapter 3 .1 
Three sets of life tables are used: one set based on trend mortality rates only; one set 
based on trend rates plus the assumption that 1.8 million northern Vietnamese people 
·died as result of the 1944-5 famine and 1946-54 and 1965-75 wars; and one set based on 
trend rates plus the assumption that 3. 6 million people died as a result of the famine and 
wars. 
The modified version proceeds in the opposite direction to Wrigley's original 
method: rather than starting by assuming a value for the probability that a son survives 
from birth to the death of his father, it derives an estimate of this probability from other 
estimates and assumptions. The calculations are set out in Table 5.4. First, dates of birth 
of the sons are chosen. Next, a value for the mean age of net reproduction is assumed. 
This value is assumed rather than calculated from data on male fertility, because no such 
data are available for northern Vietnam, even for the 1990s. The choice of numbers was 
based on estimates made by Wrigley (1978: 140-1). Although the mean age probably 
changed slightly over time in response to changing mortality and fertility rates, it is 
assumed here to be constant, for the sake of simplicity. 
lTue one exception was the life expectancy at age 29 for fathers born in 1886. Because cohort life 
tables were not calculated in Chapter 3 for cohorts born before 1900, I used the life expectancy at 
age 29 from the 1915 period life table. 
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The average date of birth of the fathers is calculated by subtracting the mean age of 
net reproduction of the fathers from the date of birth of the sons. Once the date of birth of 
the fathers is known, the fathers are assigned a cohort life table, which is used to find their 
life expectancy at the date of birth of the sons. The fathers' life expectancy at the birth of 
the sons is, necessarily, equal to the interval through which sons must survive if they are 
to be alive at the time of their fathers' deaths. The average date of the fathers' deaths is 
calculated by adding the fathers' life expectancy to the sons' date of birth. Finally, the 
probability that the sons survive to the time of their fathers' deaths is approximated by the 
probability, read from the sons' cohort life table, that they will survive the interval. 
Estimating from means rather than whole distributions generally implies a loss of 
accuracy. This is not such an issue in the current calculations, since the estimates on 
which the calculations are based are themselves rather tentative for the earlier periods. In 
any case, the calculations use cohort measures, which fluctuate much less than period 
measures, allowing the value for the middle of an interval to represent the entire interval 
reasonably well. 
Table 5 .4 implies that a son born in the 191 Os . had about a 50 per cent chance of 
surviving until his father's death, while a son born in the 1960s had about an 80 per cent 
chance; or, to take the fathers' point of view, a father dying in the 1940s had about a 50 
per cent chance of a given son of his still being alive at that time, while a father dying in 
the 1990s has about an 80 per cent chance of a given son still being alive. What happened 
in the intervening period depends on which set of assumptions concerning crisis mortality 
is closest to reality. Under the unadjusted trend rates, the probabilities rise smoothly. 
Under the moderate and extreme assumptions the probabilities fall in response to the 
famine and wars. As discussed in Section 3.2, the moderate assumptions have a 
somewhat more evidence in their favour than the extreme assumptions, though neither is 
well-supported. 
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TABLE 5.4 Calculation of the probability that a son is alive at the death of his father. 
Northern Vietnam. 















Age of father at 
birth of son 
(years) Date of birth of 
father 
Life exp of 
father at birth 
of son I Age of 
son at death of 
father 
(years) Date of death of 
father 
Mortality data not adjusted for famine and war 
30 1885 28 1943 
30 1900 31 1961 
30 1915 36 1981 
30 1930 40 2000 
Mortality data adjusted for famine and war - moderate adjustments 
30 1885 28 1943 
30 1900 30 1960 
30 1915 33 1978 
30 1930 39 1999 
Mortality data adjusted for famine and war • large adjustments 
30 1885 28 1943 
30 1900 29 1959 
30 1915 30 1975 
30 1930 38 1998 
Origin of value 
Assumed First column e30 for males 





















lx. for the son's 
birth cohort, 
where x is the 
value in the 
fourth column 
The first panel of Table 5.4, which was calculated from the unadjusted mortality 
data, can be used to illustrate the way in which mortality decline normally affects the 
probability of sons surviving until their fathers' deaths, p. The life expectancy of the 
fathers increases, which means that the length of the interval through which the sons must 
survive also increases. The extra years through which the sons must survive are, 
however, at young or mid-adult ages, when survival probabilities are high. These extra 
years are of little consequence for the value of p compared with the dramatic 
improvement produced by mortality decline in the sons' ability to survive through 
infancy and childhood. For instance, sons born in 1915 must survive only to age 28 while 
sons born in 1960 must survive to age 40. If sons born in 1960 did not have to survive 
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these extra 12 years, the value of p would be 0.02 higher than it is; however, their 
probability of surviving to age 5 is 0.23 higher than that of sons born in 1915, and their 
probability of surviving to age 28 is 0.30 higher. Changes in the mean age of net 
reproduction also lengthen or shorten the interval through which sons must survive to 
their fathers' deaths. The effect of these changes is likely to be small, however, since the 
years added or subtracted are at the adult ages, and since the mean age of net reproduction 
tends to be relatively stable. 
Famine mortality, although usually heaviest among children and the aged, is shared 
among all age groups. In the calculations, and probably in reality, the 1944-5 famine 
reduced both fathers' life expectancies and sons' survival probabilities. If the estimates 
made by Hirschman, Preston, and Vu Manh Loi ( 1995: Table 7) are correct, then the 
1965-75 war caused excess mortality rates of approximately 9 per thousand for men aged 
15 to 29, and 4 per thousand for men aged 30 to 44, while no other male or female age 
group suffered excess death rates higher than 2 per thousand (see Table 3.7). Among 
certain cohorts, war lowered the survival probabilities of sons significantly while barely 
affecting the life expectancies of the fathers, significantly lowering the probability that 
sons survived until their fathers' deaths. Such was the case for the cohorts of sons born in 
1930 and 1945. 
The length of the interval through which sons must survive is important to the 
application of succession rules. As the interval lengthens, sons who remain in the parental 
household wait a longer time before they inherit from their fathers. Sons who depart from 
the parental household at the time of their marriages and receive their share of the family 
estate then are not so greatly affected. The variation in the length of the interval means, 
incidentally, that graphs of mean numbers of surviving children to 60 year-olds similar to 
those produced for 50-year-old women in Section 3.6 cannot be used as proxies for the 
proportions of fathers dying with surviving children. 
The next step in the calculations is to choose the group for which heirship will be 
calculated. As mentioned above, Wrigley chose to make the calculations for all married 
couples, which, since he was assuming universal marriage, meant that heirship 
proportions were calculated for everyone over the marriage age. Calculations are made 
here for adult men. An appropriate definition of 'adult men' is all males who live to 20 
years. All that is implied in the following calculations, however, is that the males have 
survived childhood, and so have a reasonable chance of surviving through their twenties 
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and thirties, the prime reproductive years. The calculations are made for cohorts of men 
born in 1885 and 1930, and reaching the mean ages of net reproduction in 1915 and 
1960. The men from these cohorts who had sons are represented by the first and fourth 
rows of each panel in Table 5.4. 
Before the proportions of adult men with heirs at the time of their deaths can be 
calculated, figures are needed on the distributions of numbers of children ever born to 
these men. Figures are needed on male fertility ten years or so either side of the dates 
1915 and 1960. As discussed in Section 3.3, evidence on fertility prior to the 1960s is 
scarce, but the evidence which does exist suggests that the total fertility rate for women 
was probably about six until about 1960, when it began to decline, particularly in urban 
areas. The total fertility rate for men was presumably roughly similar. A total fertility rate 
does not take account of the probability that the person could die before reaching the end 
of his or her reproductive years. According to the survival probability estimates in 
Chapter 3, men born in 1885 and 1930 who reached age 20 had about a 10 per cent 
chance of dying before age 30 and about a 20 per cent chance of dying before age 40. The 
number of children ever born to men from these cohorts who reached age 20 was 
probably somewhat less than six. 
Rather than pretend to more precision than is possible here, I have chosen one 
empirical distribution of children ever born to apply to both cohorts. The distribution is 
that of women aged 45-49 in the 1989 Demographic and Health Survey (Vietnam 
1990a: Table 3.5). It has a mean of 5.8. The distribution is shown in Table 5.5, where it is 
called 'Distribution l'. 'Distribution 2' in Table 5.5 is an adjusted version of 'Distribution 
1' with the same mean, but has greater weight at either end of the distribution. The two 
distributions are used to demonstrate the implications of alternativ~ assumptions about the 
shape of the distribution of numbers of children ever born. 
The estimates of proportions of adult men dying with heirs shown in Table 5.6 
were calculated using matrices in the way described above. The values of p for daughters 
were calculated in the same way as the values of p for sons, using the cohort life tables 
estimated in Chapter 3. Table 5.7 shows the mean numbers of surviving children per 
adult male at their deaths. Because the means of the two distributions of children ever 
born are equal, the means of the distributions of surviving children are also equal. 
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TABLE 5.5 Hypothetical 
distributions of children ever 
born to adult men. 
Children Distn 1 Distn 2 
ever born 
0 0.009 0.040 
1 0.033 0.040 
2 0.059 0.070 
3 0.098 0.075 
0.138 0.128 
5 0.122 0.122 
6 0.131 0.121 
7 0.157 0.098 
8 0.103 0.098 
9 0.052 0.079 
10 0.050 0.050 
11 0.025 0.050 
12 0.023 0.030 
Total 1.00 1.00 
Mean 5.84 5.84 
Although there do not appear to have been any statistics collected on numbers of 
surviving children to men at their deaths, a rough test of the plausibility of the results 
calculated for men dying in the 1990s can be made by using results from recent surveys 
of old people. Table 5.8 shows the distributions of surviving children reported by old 
people in two 1993 surveys. One of these surveys was carried out in Hanoi by the 
Institute of Sociology, the other was carried out in nine locations across Vietnam by 
Vietnamese social scientists on behalf of the United Nations (Institute of Sociology 
l 993a; Dang Thu 1994 ). The average age at death for the cohort shown in Table 5 .4 as 
dying in 1999 was 69 years. In the Hanoi survey the mean age of respondents was 68 
years; in the Vietnam survey it was 66 years. Neither of these surveys is ideal for present 
purposes because numbers of children surviving are reported for the total sample, and 
neither sample is representative of northern Vietnamese males. The Hanoi Survey has 86 
male respondents and 110 female respondents, giving a total sample of 196. The 1989 
Census found that urban women aged 45-49 had on average 4.0 surviving children, while 
Vietnamese women in general had on average 4.5 (see Table 3.14). Depending on when 
rural-urban fertility and mortality differentials first emerged, the Hanoi sample might be 
expected to understate the number of surviving children per male in northern Vietnam. 
The Vietnam Survey has 327 male respondents and 174 female respondents, giving a 
total sample of 501. Of these 190 came from the South, and 311 came from the North. 
113 
TABLE S.6 The probabilities of various combinations of surviving sons and daughters at the 
time of adult males' deaths, under two distributions of children ever born, and two sets of 










































































Southern Vietnamese appear to have had higher fertility than northern Vietnamese during 
the 1960s, so that the inclusion of southern Vietnamese is likely to lead to an overestimate 
of numbers of surviving children. Bearing these probable differences in mind, the 
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agreement between the two surveys and the estimates is close enough to confirm that the 
proportions reported in Table 5.5 are a reasonable first approximation. 
TABLE 5.7 Mean number of surviving children at death of 


















TABLE 5.8 Numbers of surviving children to Vietnamese men and women aged 60 and 
over, as reported in United Nations survey and Institute of Sociology Hanoi Survey. Numbers 
of surviving children to northern Vietnamese men in the 1990s at the times of their deaths, as 
estimated by the method described in the text. 
Per cent distribution of old people, or of men at the times of 













Vietnam Survey. Dang Thu (1994: Tables 12, 13). 














5-6 7-8 9+ 
34 18 6 
29 15 6 
25 16 8 
3-5 6-9 10+ 
57 21 3 
47 32 2 









Tables 5.5, 5.6, and 5.7 can be used to explore the demography of succession. The 
mean numbers of children alive at the deaths of their fathers shown in Table 5.7 give an 
indication of the extent of generational replacement. In a stationary population, the mean 
number of sons and the mean number of daughters would both be approximately equal to 
one. As Table 5.7 shows, the greater the population growth rate above zero, the greater 
the heirship proportions. As inspection of Tables 5.5 and 5.6 shows, however, the 
heirship proportions can also be affected by differences in the distributions of children 
ever born. In this case the sensitivity seems to be the same whether the survival 
probabilities are about 0.5 or 0.8. Table 5.7 shows how higher mortality rates for males 
reduce the sex ratio below the sex ratio at birth of 1.05. 
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For all the cohorts modelled in Table 5 .4, there is a considerable lag between the 
time when most men have children and the time when they die. The proportion of men 
dying without heirs is therefore determined by fertility levels several decades before the 
men's deaths, in conjunction with mortality levels during the intervening period. The 
average lag between fatherhood and death is equal to the life expectancy of men at the 
mean age of net reproduction, which for men dying in the 1990s has been about 40 years. 
So, although fertility has probably been declining in northern Vietnam since the 1960s 
(Section 3.3), not until early next century is the proportion of men dying without male 
heirs likely to start rising again. 
Because the probability of dying without a male heir is largely determined by 
fertility and infant mortality rates when fathers are in their twenties and thirties, many of 
the men who are likely to die next century without male heirs already know that this will 
happen. Expectations about dying without heirs are likely to change in line with 
demographic changes, and well before the deaths occur. 
5.5. Conclusions 
The estimates derived in this chapter probably have large margins of error. 
However, the findings on directions of change are sufficiently clear to be taken seriously, 
particularly since they accord with the basic demographic principle that the probability of 
having a surviving heir is proportional to the population growth rate. At the time of the 
August Revolution in 1945, the proportion of men dying without surviving sons is 
already likely to have been unusually low by historical standards. Three decades of war 
probably delayed the fall in these proportions which would otherwise have followed the 
dramatic reductions in mortality achieved by the post-revolutionary government. By the 
1990s, however, the proportions had fallen to unprecedented levels, giving virtually all 
northern Vietnamese families the opportunity to follow the preferred patrilineal model of 
succession. Never before in Vietnamese history have so many families been able to 
conform to this model. In fact, the majority of families have been faced with an 
embarrassment of riches: two, three, or more sons with claims on the family estate. 
Because of the number of families with many sons, the supply constraint on adoption has 
probably been removed. 
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Never in Vietnam's history have demographic conditions been less conducive 
towards families changing away from the patrilineal succession model, partly because so 
many families have been in a position to follow this model, and partly because so many 
families have had to share the family estate among two or more sons, making it 
especially difficult to extend the same privileges to daughters. As the net reproduction rate 
falls towards one, and perhaps eventually below one, demographic conditions may start 
to have the opposite effect, for instance by forcing parents to bequeath property to 
daughters. 
At a societal level, the current loosening of the demographic constraints on the 
patrilineal succession model is not sustainable, since it is contingent on rapid population 
growth. It appears not to have been sustainable at a family level either, as fertility has been 
falling faster than has been necessary to compensate for the decline in mortality. Although 
in the mid-1990s the northern Vietnamese net reproduction rate of about 1.5 is still well 
above the Hong Kong rate of 0.6, northern Vietnamese families, like their fellow-
Confucians in Hong Kong, seem to be demonstrating that conforming to the preferred 
succession model is not an absolute priority for them. 
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Chapter 6 The co-residential household 
6.1. The northern Vietnamese household formation system 
A society's 'household formation system' (Hajnal 1982)-its rules on who should 
live with whom-can endure for centuries, making it one of the distinguishing features of 
the society. There is evidence that the household formation system operating in 
Northwest Europe during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries may already have been 
five centuries old by that time (Hajnal 1982: 477). Evidence on the antiquity of northern 
Vietnam's household formation system is virtually non-existent, although references in 
the Le Dynasty penal code suggest that a household formation system centred on males 
already existed in the fifteenth century (Haines 1984: 308, 310-12). 
Vietnamese social scientists are more or less unanimous on the household 
formation rules of ethnic Vietnamese in present day northern Vietnam (Do Thai Dong 
1991: 91; Le Thi 1991: 11; Nguyen Tu Chi 1991: 68; Phi Van Ba 1991: 152; An Dien 
Research Group 1994: 54-5). Casual conversations which I have had with ordinary 
Vietnamese in Hanoi verified the statements made by the social scientists. Marriage is 
_ patrilocal: sons are expected to remain in the household of their parents after marriage, 
while daughters are expected to go to the household of their husband's parents. If no son 
is available, the parents try to live with a daughter, usually the youngest. If parents have 
more than one married son, then usually only one son will remain permanently in the 
parents' household. The other sons are likely to spend some time in the parental 
household after their marriage, but within a year or two will try to establish new 
households. Usually it is the eldest son who remains in the parental household. 
These rules would normally yield households no more complex than stem 
households, formed around the aged parents and their married son. Such households are 
the preferred type, and are often referred to as 'traditional' Vietnamese households. In 
Hajnal' s ( 1982) terminology, these rules describe a stem household system. 
The ethnic group following these rules, the Kinh or 'ethnic Vietnamese', make up 
83 per cent of the population of northern Vietnam, and 96 per cent of the population in the 
six Red River Delta provinces (Vietnam 1991, vol. 1: Table 1.4 ). Other ethnic groups in 
northern Vietnam have different household formation systems. Even among the Kinh, 
' - -_ -~ 
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detailed investigation would probably reveal far more variation across time and place than 
the preceding summary suggests. For instance, Mai Thi Tu and Le Thi Nham Tuyet 
(1978: 16) report that in some villages in Ha Tay and Ha Bae provinces, couples live with 
the wives' parents for a few months or even years after their marriages, and the 
husbands' families have to organize a special 'return ceremony' before the couples come 
to live with them. Hy Van Luong (1989: 743-4) describes how a key informant of his 
lived during the 1920s in a household spanning four generations, with all three surviving 
sons of the patriarch and sixteen members-a household which only just fell short of the 
Confucian ideal of five generations under one roof. Luong makes it clear, however, that 
this household was not typical, even in the history of the informant's relatively wealthy 
family. The study of long term changes in the northern Vietnamese household system 
has barely begun, although when Vietnamese authors give an opinion on the age of the 
current system, they usually state that it has existed since at least colonial times. 
Northern Vietnam's current household formation rules appear to be similar to those 
operating in many places in China (Zeng Yi 1986; Davis 1993). They are different from 
those operating among the Kinh in southern Vietnam, where the parents tend to live with 
the youngest child, regardless of the child's sex (Do Thai Dong 1991: 91 ). The southern 
Vietnamese rules are similar to those operating in Thailand (Knodel, Chamratrithirong, 
and Debavalya 1987: 48) and much of the rest of Southeast Asia. 
6.2. Marriage 
Previous chapters have mentioned marriage, but have not made any analysis of 
patterns or trends. Given the central role of marriage within household formation, it is 
impossible to continue without at least a summary of available information on these 
issues. 
6.2.1. Proportions marrying 
The 1944-5 famine, the 1945 Revolution, and the 1946-54 and 1965-75 wars all made 
normal courtship and marriage difficult or impossible while they were occurring; 
moreover, the wars created low sex ratios and a female marriage squeeze which lasted 
long into peacetime. According to estimates made by Hirschman, Preston and Vu (1995: 
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Table 7, 806-7), men from northern and southern Vietnam of combat ages during the 
1965-7 5 war may have suffered excess death rates up to ten times those of women in the 
same age groups, and men from all age groups may have suffered 800 000 of the one 
million or so excess deaths caused by the war. Presumably male casualties were 
disproportionately high during the 1946-54 war as well. The low sex ratios at marriage 
ages were sustained after 197 5 by the inclusion of a disproportionately high number of 
young men among the million or more people emigrating from Vietnam (Good.kind 
1994: 3-4). Data on age-sex structure from the 1979 and 1989 Censuses indicate the 
magnitude of the marriage squeeze. In the 1979 Census, no age group from 20-24 up 
(except, for no clear reason, the age group 50-54) had a sex ratio of more than 90 men to 
100 woman. At the time of the 1989 Census, no age group from 20-24 up had a sex ratio 
of more than 92 (Vietnam 1991 a: Table 2.1 ). The magnitude of the imbalance was 
roughly similar across most provinces in northern and southern Vietnam (Vietnam 1991: 
Vol. 1, Table 1.2). By comparison, at the Thai census of 1980, no age group below 50-54 
had a sex ratio of less than 96 (Good.kind 1994: Table 3). The Vietnamese Census figures 
may exaggerate the imbalance, since men of military conscription age may have been 
under-enumerated, and many men were out of Vietnam at the time of the Censuses, 
working in the Eastern Bloc or on military duties in Cambodia (Hirschman et al. 1995: 
793). But even allowing for some over-statement, there was probably still a sizeable 
deficit of males at marriage ages. Table 6.1 gives a rough summary of the major 
disruptions to the marriage market, including an indication of the effect of the marriage 
squeeze on cohorts at marriageable ages. To the marriage squeeze created by war and 
emigration must be added the marriage squeeze created by the expectation that husbands 
should be older than wives, combined with rapid population growth, implying that 
younger cohorts are larger than older cohorts. 
Table 6.1 Disruptions to the northern Vietnamese marriage market, 1945-1989 
Age 1945-49 1950-54 1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 
20-24 W, SR W, SR W, SR W, SR SR SR SR 
25-29 W, SR W, SR SR W, SR W, SR SR SR SR 
30-34 W, SR W, SR SR SR W, SR W, SR SR SR 
'W' indicates that a war (or, in the year 1945, a famine and a revolution) was taking place during most of the 
period. 'SR' indicates that the sex ratio in the age group was significantly below one, due to war deaths and 
sex-selective emigration. 
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Table 6.2 summarizes findings from the 1989 Census on marriage. (The 1979 
Census cannot be used because it did not include a question on marriage.) The divergence 
between proportions of men and women single evident in Table 6.2 would appear larger 
if absolute numbers rather than proportions of people marrying were shown, since there 
are ten per cent or more females than males in the age groups 20-24 and above. As the 
Census report (Vietnam 1991a: 76) notes, 12.5 million women but only 11.9 million 
men reported themselves as currently married in the Census. The report states that 
polygamy is too rare to explain the discrepancy and suggests that it was probably due to 
single women with children reporting themselves as being currently married. Presumably 
single women could also have reported themselves as being widowed, separated, or 
divorced. The actual proportions of single women are therefore probably higher than is 
shown in Table 6.2, and the actual proportions in the various sub-categories of ever-
married are probably lower than is shown. 
TABLE 6.2 Per cent distribution of the northern Vietnamese population aged 15 to 49, by 




Currently Widowed Divorced Separated (Total) 
married 
Males 
15-19 95 4 0 0 0 4 
20-24 54 45 0 0 0 (46) 
25-29 18 81 0 0 0 (82) 
30-34 4 95 0 0 0 (95) 
35-39 2 97 0 0 0 (98) 
40-44 1 98 1 0 0 (99) 
45-49 1 97 1 0 0 (99) 
Females 
15-19 88 11 0 0 0 (12) 
20-24 37 62 0 1 0 (63) 
25-29 14 83 1 1 1 (86) 
30-34 9 87 2 2 1 (91) 
35-39 7 87 3 2 1 (93) 
40-44 5 85 6 2 1 (95) 
45-49 2 84 11 2 1 (97) 
Zeros indicate a figure of less than 0.5. Due to rounding, some rows do not tally exactly. 
















Has the marriage squeeze resulted in an abnormally low proportion of women 
marrying? Answering this question requires a standard for what is abnormal. Table 6.3 
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compares the proportions of women who are never-married northern Vietnam with the 
proportions in southern Vietnam, and in other places in Southeast and East Asia. The 
proportions in northern Vietnam are high compared to those in China and Indonesia, but 
low compared to those in Taiwan, southern Vietnam, Thailand and the Philippines. The 
case of Taiwan argues against postulating an 'East Asian' pattern of low proportions 
never-married, while the case of Indonesia argues against postulating a 'Southeast Asian' 
pattern of high proportions never-married. Given available data, the lack of an obvious 
standard against which to compare Vietnamese marriage patterns makes it impossible to 
make a judgement on the role of the marriage squeeze there. 
TABLE 6.3 Percentages never married among females aged 30 to 49 in Vietnam and other 
countries in East and Southeast Asia 
Northern Southern China Taiwan Republic Indonesia Thailand Philippine 
Vietnam Vietnam 1987 1990 of Korea 1990 1990 sl990 
1989 1989 1990 
30-34 9 13 1 11 5 5 14 13 
35-39 7 10 0 6 2 3 10 9 
40-44 5 7 0 4 1 2 7 7 
45-49 2 4 0 2 l 2 5 6 
Zeros indicate less than 0.5 per cent. 
Northern and Southern Vietnam. Calculated from Vietnam (1991 : Table 3.1). 
China. United Nations (1990: Table 41). 
Remaining countries from Jones (1995: Table 1). 
One definite finding that does emerge from Table 6.2 is that divorce and separation 
has been relatively rare. Table 6.2 may actually overstate the number of cases, because of 
single women misrepresenting their status as mentioned above, and because Census 
enumerators were instructed to record as separated women whose husbands were 
refugees overseas (Vietnam 1991a: 84). 
6.2.2. Age at first marriage 
The limited evidence available on the average age at first marriage prior to the 1980s 
suggests that the age has risen slowly over time. A French judicial committee 
documenting colonial Vietnamese customs stated that 'for males 18 years and for 
females 16 years is usually considered the normal age of marriage' (Lusteguy 1935: 33). 
There is reason to doubt these figures, however, because as Lusteguy (1935: 32-3, fn98) 
argued, they were based on little empirical study and may have been chosen to fit with the 
French civil code for Vietnam, which specified a minimum marriage age of 18 years for 
males and of 15 years for females. Northern Vietnamese household formation rules 
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appear in many respects to resemble those of China, so information on age at marriage in 
China may give some indication of age at marriage in northern Vietnam. Surveys in 
southern China during the 1920s and 1930s found an average age at first marriage of 18 
or 19 years for females, and 20 or 21 years for males (Parish and Whyte 1978: Table 27). 
Nguyen The Hue (1995: Table 13) cites the figures for mean age at marriage within 
the Red River Delta shown in Table 6.4. He does not name his source, but it was 
presumably the vital registration system, which collects data on marriage (Jones 1982: 
806-7). 












Source: Nguyen The Hue (1995: Table 13) Nguyen The Hue does not state the origin of 
these figures but they presumably come from the vital registration system. 
Results from the 1988 Demographic and Health Survey (Vietnam 1990a: Tables 
2.7, 2.8) and the 1989 Census shown in Tables 6.5 and 6.6 provide a check on Nguyen 
The Hue's figures. The disaggregated DHS results for urban and rural women must, 
. however, be treated with caution. Given that the total sample for northern and southern 
Vietnam was only 4172 women, some of the subsample sizes must be small. In addition, 
the categories 'urban' and 'rural' refer to the places of residence of the women at the time 
of the survey rather than at the time of the marriage. The Census results for northern 
Vietnam shown in Table 6.6 were calculated by me from published provincial figures. 
These figures were not disaggregated into rural and urban, so separate singulate mean 
ages at marriage for urban and rural could not be calculated. 
The Census and DHS figures agree reasonably closely. Nguyen The Hue's figures 
are somewhat higher, but refer to the Red River Delta rather than to all of northern 
Vietnam. According to the 1989 Census, the singulate age at marriage in the Red River 
Delta was 23 .4 years for males and 22.4 years for females, or slightly higher than for all 
of northern Vietnam. Together the three sources provide strong grounds for believing that 
average marriage ages were in the low twenties for northern Vietnamese men and women 
between the 1950s and 1980s, and some grounds to believe that there has been a slight 
rise over time. It is difficult to know how much significance to accord to the sharp rise in 
age at marriage reported by urban women aged 35 to 44 in the DHS. These women were 
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marrying during the 1965-75 war and it is probable that their marriage were delayed; but 
because the sizes of the subsamples are small the magnitudes shown are not trustworthy. 
TABLE 6.5 Median age at marriage for women in northern 
Vietnam, by age and urban-rural residence. 1988 
Demographic and Health Survey. 
Age of women Urban Rural Combined 
15-19 
20-24 21 21 
25-29 24 21 21 
30-34 24 21 21 
35-39 27 21 22 
40-44 26 21 22 
45-49 23 20 20 
Dashes indicate that less than half the age group was married, so that the 
median age at marriage cannot be calculated. 
The categories 'urban' and 'rural• refer to the places of residence of the 
woman at the time of the survey. not the time of marriage. 
Source: Vietnam (1990a: Tables 2.7, 2.8). 
TABLE 6.6 Singulate mean age at marriage in northern 









Females 21.4 23.9 21.3 21.7 
1988 DHS. Calculated from Vietnam (1990a: Tables 2.2, 2.4). Northern 
Vietnam, 1989 Census. Calculated from Vietnam (199l:Table 3.1). 
6.2.3. Remarriage 
In colonial Vietnam, widows who remarried lost significant social standing and 
property, according to Nguyen Van Huyen (1944: 51) and Vu Quy Vy (1974: 160). 
There is some evidence that in pre-revolutionary China widow remarriage was common, 
particularly if the widows were poor or young, although they would loose any property 
belonging to the first marriage (Parish and Whyte 1978: 157). Men in pre-revolutionary 
northern Vietnam and China could remarry without stigma; indeed, among the wealthy, 
polygynous marriages were common. 
There are no statistics available on remarriage in northern Vietnam during recent 
decades. The 1988 DHS and the 1989 Census questionnaires did not distinguish between 
first marriages and second or higher-order marriages. As Table 6.2 above and Table 6.7 
below show, the age-specific proportions of men reporting themselves as currently 
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widowed in the 1989 Census were much lower than the corresponding proportions of 
women. A slightly higher average age at marriage among males, greater male mortality 
than female mortality during normal times, and much greater male mortality than female 
mortality during wartime have made it much less likely for men to be widowed than 
women. 
Table 6.7 gives a rough indication of the differences. The estimates of proportions 
ever-widowed were constructed by assuming that all men and 90 per cent of women 
married, and that all men married at 22 and all women married at 21. Cohort mortality 
rates constructed from the mortality estimates from Chapter 3 were then used to calculate 
the probability that an individual would still be alive in 1989, while his or her original 
spouse had died. More elaborate methods are not warranted, given the small amounts of 
information available on past marriage patterns and on mortality during the war. The 
results from the method used are necessarily imprecise, but they do suggest that there 
would be appreciable numbers of widowers if men had not been remarrying. Remarriage 
is presumably easy for men, given the lack of stigma attached to it, as well as the 
marriage squeeze against women. Table 6.7 suggests that the age-specific proportions of 
women currently widowed is somewhat smaller than the age-specific proportions ever-
widowed. It is impossible to be sure, given the tentativeness of the estimates, but it does 
appear that some widow remarriage has been occurring, despite any stigma against it, and 
despite the marriage squeeze against women. Similar arguments apply to divorced and 
separated individuals. 
TABLE 6.7 Per cent of northern Vietnamese population currently 
widowed according to the 1989 Census by age and sex, and estimates of 
per cent ever-widowed. 
Males Females 
Age Currently Estimated Currently 
widowed ever- widowed 
widowed 
20-24 0 0 0 
25-29 0 1 1 
30-34 0 2 2 
35-39 0 3 3 
40-44 1 4 6 
45-49 1 6 11 
Currently widowed. Calculated from Vietnam (1991: Table 3.1). 












6.3. The social significance of co-residence in northern Vietnam 
The social and economic significance of co-residence depends mainly on the 
strength of the association between co-residence and practices such as income-pooling 
and the provision of emotional support. The strength of the association, and hence the 
social and economic significance of co-residence, varies between societies (Y anagisako 
1979: 162-6; McDonald 1992: 17-18). Casual observation in northern Vietnam suggests 
that households are far from isolated. One of the few sources of detailed statistical data on 
households and families in northern Vietnam is the Vietnam Life History Survey 
(Hirschman and Vu 1994 ), covering 401 households and 921 respondents spread 
equally across a village and an urban area in northern Vietnam and another village and 
urban area in southern Vietnam. The survey found that in the northern village and city 
over 50 per cent of men who were living near their own parents but not in the same 
household visited their parents every day, while 30 to 40 per cent of women did the same 
(Hirschman and Vu 1994: 18-19, Table 4).1 Parents and children who maintained this 
amount of face-to-face contact would be able to sustain significant social economic 
relationships, despite not co-residing. 
In rural Bangladesh, co-resident households do appear to be the main unit of 
budgeting and mutual assistance (Cain 1982: 171-3). In China, Vietnam's closest 
neighbour geographically and culturally, the main unit is the jia, which, according to 
Greenhalgh (1982, 1985, 1989), is defined by kinship and not at all by co-residence. I 
have heard ordinary Vietnamese people use the term ho gia dinh in ways which suggest it 
denotes a unit similar to the Chinese jia. The issue is confused in the Vietnamese social 
science literature by the fact that Vietnamese social scientists use ho gia dinh to translate 
the English word 'household'. Alongside any future survey research, a detailed 
ethnographic investigation of households and the household formation system, in the 
style of Greenhalgh (1982), or Caldwell, Reddy and Caldwell (1984), is badly needed. 
The present discussion is carried out in the absence of detailed evidence on how co-
residence is important. It does assume, however, that co-residence has some importance. 
lTue English version of the question given in Hirschman and Vu Manh Loi {1994: 16) does not 
explicitly refer to the respondents' own parents rather than their parents-in-law. However, the survey 
code book {Institute of Sociology 1993: 170), gives the original questionnaire in Vietnamese, which 
clearly indicates that biological or foster parents are meant. 
. ' . ~ 
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6.4. Are the statistics on household type consistent with the 
conventional account of northern Vietnam's household formation 
rules? 
A number of researchers are currently using responses to the 'relation to household 
head' questions from the 1989 Census, the 1993 Vietnam Living Standards Survey, and 
the 1994 Intercensal Demographic Survey to investigate household structure in Vietnam. 
At present, however, the only published figures on household structure come from small-
scale surveys conducted by Vietnamese and foreign researchers between 1979 and the 
early 1990s. Table 6.8 presents results from 12 such surveys. I have had access to the 
original tabulations for the villages of Dong Co, Dong Duong, and Tam Son; the 
remaining statistics were collected from articles or books. All of the areas surveyed were 
rural except for Hai Duong and Can Tho, which were the northern and southern cities 
included in the Vietnam Life History Survey. At the time of the 1989 Census!> Hai Duong 
had a population of 50 000 and Can Tho had a population of 210 000 (Vietnam 1991: 
Table 1.7). 
Of the various sources, only Hirschman and Vu ( 1994: 5) spell out the definition of 
household used in their survey. Their definition, 'one or more people who live together in 
a house or housing unit and who usually share some common expenses and often have 
meals together', accords with normal social scientific usage. Hirschman and Vu did not 
require that members be related, but note that in most households all members were in 
fact related. Other researchers have also found households containing non-relatives to be 
rare (Dang Nguyen Anh 1989: 28). Most of the remaining surveys were carried out by 
the Institute of Sociology in Hanoi. The definitions which researchers at the Institute of 
Sociology told me they had used were essentially the same as the one used by Hirschman 
and Vu. The category 'complex households' refers to households which were reported as 
having three or more generations or two or more couples; 'simple households' refers to 
households with only one or two generations. A typology with only two types is not ideal 
for analysing a household formation system, but this is as much detail as the data 
support. 
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TABLE 6.8 Statistics on household structure in northern and southern Vietnam, with 
international comparisons 
Per cent of households 
'Simple' 'Complex' Total 
households households 
Northern Vietnam 
Cat Que, 1990 64 33 97a 
Dong Co, 1983 90 10 100 
Dong Duong. 1983 93 7 100 
Hai Duong. 1991 b 78 22 100 
Hai Trung, 1990 88 12 100 
Hai Van, 1979 75 25 100 
Lo Giang, 1989 >80 
75 25 100 
Tien Tien, 1991 87 13 100 
Trung Xa, 1990 78 22 100 
Southern Vietnam 
Can Tho, 1991 b 52 48 100 
Long Hoa, 1991 65 35 100 
Other places 
China, 1982 81 19 100 
Thailand 74 25 100 
Australia, 1991 98 2 100 
























Cat Que. Le Ngoc Van (1991: 66-7). Dong Co, Dong.Duong, Tam Son. Institute of Sociology Surveys. Hai 
Duong, Tien Tien, Can Tlw, Long Hoa. Hirschman and Vu (l 994: Table l ). Hai Trung, Trung Xa. Luu Thi 
Kim Oanh (1991: 53). Hai Van. Houtart and Lemercinier (1984: 102). Lo Giang. Phi Van Ba (1991: 133). 
China. Zeng Yi (1986: Table 2). Thailand.Thailand (l 990: Table 28). Australia Shu et al. (1994: 8). 
The distribution of household types varies markedly between the survey sites 
represented in Table 6.8. Some of this difference may be artefactual, resulting from 
variation in the implementation of surveys, such as in the treatment of temporary 
migrants. Some of it may also reflect local variation in household formation rules. 
However, a great deal of the difference may simply be due to chance. Computer 
simulation has shown that when sample sizes are small, as is the case in Table 6.8, small 
differences in fertility and mortality rates can produce large differences in distributions of 
household types. The standard methods for calculating expected levels of random 
variation cannot be applied. These methods assume that the observations are statistically 
independent, whereas in small samples the structure of each household is statistically 
dependent on the structure of other households (Wachter, Hammel, and Laslett 1978: 54). 
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Within the limits of the data, is the finding that only a minority of Vietnamese 
households are complex consistent with the hypothesis that northern Vietnam has a stem 
household system? China and Thailand, which are well documented as having stem 
household systems, have roughly the same proportions of complex households as 
northern Vietnam. There are examples of populations with stem household systems 
which contain smaller proportions of complex households than most of the northern 
Vietnamese samples. For instance, one study of an eighteenth century Austrian region 
with a stem household system found that only about 12 per cent of households were stem 
households at any one time (Netting 1981: 217). It appears, then, that the reported 
proportions are consistent with the hypothesis that northern Vietnam has a stem 
household system. 
An important reason why populations which express a preference for complex 
households often contain mainly simple households is the constraint imposed by 
demography. The ability of families to assemble their members into the preferred types 
of households is contingent on the demographic processes of marriage, mortality, 
fertility, and migration. A stem household requires at least one surviving parent, a 
surviving married son, and preferably a wife and children, all of whom live in the same 
locality. At a societal level it is possible, in principle, to calculate an expected distribution 
of household types, given sufficient information about the society's household formation 
rules and its demographic conditions. The existence of variation means that the amount of 
information required, and the complexity of the calculations, are daunting. 
If in one population all parents have exactly one son surviving to adulthood, and in 
a second population all parents have exactly three sons surviving to adulthood, and both 
populations follow household formation rules like those of northern Vietnam, then the 
first population would almost certainly contain a greater proportion of stem households 
than the second, due to the smaller number of surplus sons. If, however, childbearing and 
mortality in the two populations are subject to variation, so that parents have a range of 
different numbers of sons surviving to adulthood, with mean numbers of one and three, 
then the situation is complicated immensely. As discussed in Section 5.2, something like 
40 per cent of parents in the first, slow-growing, population are likely to not have a son 
surviving to adulthood, while only a few per cent of parents in the second,, fast-growing 
population are likely to not have a son surviving to adulthood. The proportion of stem 
households in the first population then depends crucially on the distribution among 
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families of surviving sons and the rules governing co-residence for parents without adult 
sons. The complexity of the calculations and the level of detail needed in the specification 
of household formation rules and demographic conditions is greatly increased. Complex 
rules can be dealt with using computer micro-simulation; as Caldwell, Reddy and 
Caldwell (1984: 217) and McDonald (1992: 19) point out, the challenge of gathering 
sufficiently detailed information on the household formation system has less often been 
faced. It certainly has not been faced in northern Vietnam. Long-term data on parity are 
also lacking. No attempt will be made in this chapter to infer changes in household 
structure from changes in demographic rates. 
Even among families who meet the demographic prerequisites for establishing the 
preferred types of households, other factors may intervene to prevent their establishment, 
or to encourage the formation of other types. One such factor is personal disagreements 
between parents and children. Another is government policy. 
6.5. Government policy and household structure 
By 1960, about 85 per cent of rural people in northern Vietnam had been organized 
into agricultural co-operatives (Vickerman 1986: Appendix Table 3). These co-operatives 
usually provided small plots of residential land to newly-married couples. Co-operatives 
also set aside some of their agricultural land to divide among households for private 
production. This land was known as 'five per cent land' because, according to 
regulations, only five per cent of co-operative land should have been distributed in this 
way. In many cases, however, far more than five per cent was taken. Private sale of food 
from the intensively-cultivated 'five per cent' land and from tiny private gardens and 
ponds brought in over half of most rural households' incomes (Nguyen Luc, Tran Hoang 
Kim, Nguyen Sinh Cuc, et al. 1990: 30; Kerkvliet and Selden 1995: 18). Many 
Vietnamese authors state that after collectivization rural families partitioned themselves to 
maximize the amount of five per cent land they received (Vietnam 1991a: 24; Nguyen 
Thi Khoa 1992: 67; Phi Van Ba 1992: 6; Tuong Lai 1992: 25). 
There are, however, a number of problems with the idea that collectivization 
induced a widespread family partitioning. The main evidence of partitioning offered by 
Vietnamese authors is the relatively low proportions of households which are complex 
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households. As has been discussed above, these proportion~ are not necessarily low 
enough to represent any major deviation from a stem household system. Moreover, an 
incentive to partition only exists if the amount of land received is not dependent on 
household size. The amounts received do, however, appear to have been dependent on 
household size, not only during the collective period, but also during colonial times and 
after decollectivization, when communities have also administered communal land (Jones 
1982: 797; Cao Van Bien 1990: 60). 
The Vietnamese authors who state that the distribution of five per cent land by 
agricultural co-operatives induced household partitioning do not specify what size units 
were being partitioned or created. Stem households can be partitioned into two nuclear 
households, but nuclear households cannot be partitioned without splitting married 
couples. For large-scale partitioning to have occurred, there must either have been a large 
reserve of households containing two or more married sons before collectivization, or 
aged parents must have lived in separate households from their children after 
collectivization. 
Urban areas suffered from a dire shortage of housing during the collective era. 
Vietnamese planners, like planners in other communist countries, preferred to invest state 
. resources in urban industries rather than in housing for urban workers (Thrift and Forbes 
1985: 289; Kornai 1992: 171-2). American bombing worsened the problem. Researchers 
have found that in China, severe housing shortages led to more complex households than 
the members themselves desired (Davis 1993). According to official figures, mean 
floorspace per person in urban areas of China was 4.4 square metres in 1982 and 6.6 
square metres in 1989 China 1993: Table 8-33). 1 Thrift and Forbes (1986: 126) quote a 
Vietnamese newspaper as stating in 1982 that mean floorspace in urban Vietnam was 2.5 
square metres (Thrift and Forbes 1986: 126). Thrift and Forbes do not say where the 
newspaper derived this figure. It appears implausibly low, since, according to the 1989 
Housing Survey (Vietnam 1990b: Table A.18), the national mean in 1989 was 7.4 square 
metres. The Housing Survey also reported that mean floorspace in Hanoi was 5.8 square 
metres and in Haiphong was 5.6 square metres. Whatever the actual housing availability 
in earlier periods, it is likely that the housing shortages during the collective era prevented 
11 am indebted to to Zhu Yu for providing this reference. 
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the partitioning of complex households in northern Vietnam, just as they had done in 
China. 
6.6. Household size 
6.6.1. Statistics on household size 
Statistics on household size from the 1960, 1979, and 1989 Censuses are presented 
in Table 6.9. All three Censuses distinguished between 'private households' (ho gia dinh) 
and 'collective households' (ho tap the) such as army barracks; the results shown in 
Table 6.9 are for 'private households' only. The 1960 Census was conducted in northern 
Vietnam alone, or what was then known as the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. In the 
1960 census report (Vietnam 1962: Table 9), separate totals for collective and private 
households and for urban and rural areas are only given at the level of the district (the 
level below the province), though some districts also have gaps. I derived the results 
shown in Table 6.9 by extrapolating from the 15 provinces for which the district-level 
data were complete, and for which calculations could be made (the total number of 
provinces was 32). The most serious omission in the data was the failure to distinguish 
between the urban and rural parts of Hai Phong Municipality. I assumed that the 
proportion of people living in urban areas in Haiphong Municipality in 1960 was the 
same as the proportion living in urban areas in 1979, or 30 per cent (Vietnam 1983: 
Table 2). This assumption implies an urban population for Haiphong in 1960 of 130 000. 
The reports from the 1979 and 1989 Censuses do not give separate results for northern 
and southern Vietnam. I calculated the results shown in Table 6.9 by taking a mean of 
provincial results, weighted by the number of households in each province. 1 
The definition of a private household given in the 1989 Completed Census Results 
(Vietnam 1991: 5) is as follows: 'a household in which its [sic] members has marital or 
ITue official report on the 1979 Census (Vietnam 1983: Table 2) gives mean household sizes for 
that year to only one decimal place, whereas the report on the 1989 Census (Vietnam 1991a: 
Appendix Table 3.1) gives mean household sizes for 1979 to three decimal places. To calculate a 
mean it is preferable to use the more detailed data from the 1989 Census report, but unfortunately 
various columns of the relevant table are not consistent, apparently because of typographical errors. 
In most cases these errors could be corrected by swapping entries so that the columns were 
consistent with each other and with the 1979 Census report. When this was not possible, I used the 
1979 Census report figures. The adjusted values for mean household size in 1979 which I used are as 
follows: Hai Phongt 4.564; Cao Bang 5.563, Ha Tuyent 5.8; Lang Son, 5.9; Lai Chau 6.446; Hoang 
Lien Son, 5.851. I did not use the figure for Ho Chi Minh City in the calculations, but it is likely to 
be 5.5. rather than 4.523 as reported. 
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adopted relationship and shared a common budget and facilities'. This accords with 
conventional social science definitions of the household. The reports from the 1979 and 
TABLE 6.9 Household size in Vietnam, with international comparisons. 
Northern Vietnam 








N. Vietnam 1979 4.7 
N. Vietnam 1960 4.5 
Urban 4.7 
Rural 4.5 
Xom Cho c.1940 
0 Thon c.1940 
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N. Vietnam 1989, S. Vietnam 1989. From 1989 Census. Calculated from Vietnam (1991: Tables 1.3A, 1.3B). N. 
Vietnam 1979, S. Vietnam 1979. From 1979 Census. Calculated from Vietnam (l991a: Appendix Table 3.1) and 
Vietnam (1983: Table 2). N. Vietnam 1960. From 1960 Census. Calculated from Vietnam (1962: Table 9.1) Xom 
Cho, OThon. From two village surveys cited by Hy Van Luong (1989: 748). China 1982, 1964. From 1982, 1964 
Censuses. Cited by Zeng Yi (1986: Table 1). Rural China 1929-31. Survey in over 100 locations in 16 
provinces, cited by Hajnal (1982: Table 5). Thailand 1990. From 1990 Census. Thailand (1990: Table 2). 
Australia 1991. Shu, Khoo. Struik, and McKenzie (1995: 7). 
1960 Censuses do not provide definitions. Table 6.9 also shows survey results for two 
villages in colonial northern Vietnam. These results are cited by Luong (1989: 748), who 
states that they are the only surviving statistics on household size or structure from the 
colonial period. 
Both the 1979 Census Report (Vietnam 1983: Table 2) and the appendix to the 
1989 Census Report (Vietnam 1991a: Appendix Table 3.1) state that the population of 
Vietnam at the time of the 1979 Census was 52.7 million, while the total number of 
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households was 9.98 million and mean household size was 5.0. Tables 3.1and3.2 of the 
1989 Census Report give figures for 1979 of 50.4 million, 9.67 million, and 5.2. Table 
6.2 uses the figures presented in the 1979 Census Report. 
6.6.2. The determinants of household size 
Plotting the mean household size of northern Vietnamese provinces against their 
fertility rates, as is done in Figure 6.1, shows that the two measures are strongly 
correlated. However, the correlation is most apparent among the provinces not dominated 
by the Kinh ethnic group. Although the cut-off point in Figure 6.1 is set at 75 per cent, 
most of the provinces with less than 7 5 per cent Kinh have much less than 50 per cent 
Kinh. The non-Kinh have different household formation systems from the Kinh, so 
some of the difference in household size may be due to differences in the household 
formation system as well as to differences in fertility. Among the provinces dominated 
by the Kinh, provincial-level household size appears to have only a weak relationship to 
provincial-level fertility. 
FIGURE 6.1 Mean household size in 1989 by total fertility rate in 1984-9. Northern 
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Sources: Vietnam (1991: Table 1.3); Vietnam (199la: Appendix Table 9.1). 
Across all Vietnam the urban TFR in 1989 of 2.2 was little more than half that of 
the rural TFR of 4.3, and was lower than any of the provincial TFRs shown in Figure 6.1 
(Vietnam 199la: Table 9.3). This low fertility may explain why in 1989 mean household 
size in urban areas was less than mean household size in rural areas in northern Vietnam. 
This explanation is partly supported by the fact that mean household size in urban areas 
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was greater than mean household size in rural areas in 1960, before substantial 
differences in fertility had appeared. A problem with this explanation, however, is that 
low fertility has not led to smaller households in southern Vietnam. 
Mean household size appears to have remained roughly the same between the 1960 
Census and the 1989 Census. To the extent that anything can be inferred from two village 
surveys, the surveys conducted around 1940 provide grounds to believe that little change 
has occurred since the 1940s. The mean household sizes reported from these villages 
both fall within the range reported from northern Vietnamese villages in the 1980s and 
1990s in Table 6.8. According to Table 6.8, mean household size in China fell from just 
above 5 in 1929-31 to 4.3 in 1964. Zeng Yi (1986: 676) argues that this fall occurred 
because of a reduction in the number of joint households. It is tempting to conclude that 
no such fall occurred in northern Vietnam because joint households were not common 
even in the 1940s. However, the paucity of data makes this interpretation highly 
speculative. 
6. 7. Alternative measures of household size and structure 
6. 7.1. Cross-sectional and longitudinal measures 
The statistics on household structure given in Table 6.8 all refer to the distribution 
of household types in a population at one point in time. A complementary way of 
depicting households is to show people's or households' transitions between household 
types over time. For instance, a northern Vietnamese woman might grow up in a two-
generation household, then, with her husband, found a new household which contains 
one generation until the woman bears a child, and which contains two generations until a 
co-resident son marries and has children. 
The Vietnam Life History Survey provides perhaps the only longitudinal statistics 
on household formation in Vietnam. Because the cross-sectional statistics from this 
survey appear to be reasonably representative of Vietnam as a whole, the longitudinal 
statistics may be representative as well. The statistics were derived from the question 
'When you were growing up, did any of your grandparents or other relatives live with 
you (for at least six months before you were age 15)' (Institute of Sociology 1993: 126). 
The results are summarised in Table 6.10. If analysis is limited to respondents whose 
paternal or maternal relatives lived in the same village or neighbourhood, the proportions 
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are much higher than those shown in Table 6.10. In the northern village, 41 per cent of 
respondents whose paternal relatives came from that village had lived with paternal 
relatives; the equivalent figure for the northern city was 67 per cent. (These figures 
include respondents who had lived with paternal relatives alone and respondents who had 
lived with both paternal and maternal relatives). If demographic constraints such as the 
availability of surviving grandparents and the probability that a respondent's father was an 
eldest son were taken into account, these figures would probably be consistent with the 
hypothesis that northern Vietnam has a stem household system-but with an important 
qualification. Limiting the analysis to respondents with relatives in the same village or 
neighbourhood implies that the household formation rules do not have a sufficiently 
strong hold on people to prevent couples from migrating away from the husbands' 
parents, or to induce couples to migrate to the husbands' parents. 
As Hirschman and Vu (1994: 15) point out, the figures from the Vietnam Life 
History Survey are inconsistent with the idea that Vietnam has a household system in 
which the Confucian ideal of several generations under one roof and several married 
brothers living together are common. Co-residence by married siblings is uncommon in 
China as well (Zeng Yi 1986: 683). 
Aside from their value for studying the northern Vietnamese household formation 
system, the Vietnam Life History Survey results also provide insights into the life-cycle 
experience of Vietnamese. It appears that only a small minority of Vietnamese grow up 
in households containing members of their extended family. The significance of this for 
the socialization of Vietnamese children should not be overstated, however, given the 
high levels of contact between non-coresident kin noted above. 
TABLE 6.10 Per cent of respondents who had spent at least six months living with paternal 
or maternal relatives at some time before their fifteenth birthdays. Vietnam Life History 
Survey. 
Paternal Maternal Both Neither Total (Sample) 
Northern village 14 4 3 79 100 (220) 
Northern city 22 3 6 68 100 (219) 
Southern village 37 11 5 47 100 (241) 
Southern citx 16 13 6 65 100 ~238l 
Source: Hirschman and Vu (1994: Table 2). 
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6. 7.2. Household size from the household members' point of view 
As Table 6.11 shows, the proportion of households containing nine or more 
members in northern Vietnam in 1989 was only half as large as the proportion of the 
population living in such households. Conversely, the proportion of households 
containing one or two members was almost three times as large as the proportion of the 
population living in such households. These differences illustrate the importance of 
distinguishing between the attributes of households, as measured in the first row of Table 
6.11, and the attributes of members of households, as measured in the second row. The 
attributes of households are relevant to certain purposes, such as calculating how big new 
appartments should be, while the attributes of household members are relevant to other 
purposes, such as calculating how many people the average Vietnamese person co-
resides with. 
TABLE 6.11 Per cent of households of each size, and per cent of population living in 
households of each size. Northern Vietnam 1989. 
1-2 34 5-6 7-8 9+ Total 
Households 17 36 32 12 4 100 
Population living in households 6 29 38 19- 8 100 
Calculated from Vietnam (1991: Table 1.3) 
Analagous distinctions must be made when dealing with families and members of 
families, cities and members of cities, or any other groups of groups (Preston 1976: 106). 
Statisticians were already aware of this distinction in the late nineteenth century (Langford 
1982: 320). Just as it is possible to calculate mean group size to represent the distribution 
of group sizes, so it is possible to calculate mean experienced group size to represent the 
distribution of group sizes experienced by group members. If P; is the proportion of 
groups with i members, then p, mean group size, is equal to Lip; , and the proportion 
i 
of the population in a group with i members is equal to ip{lripi' or ipJp. Mean 
experienced group size is therefore equal to (1/p) Li2 P;. 
i 
Preston ( 197 6: 106) has shown that this last expression can be rearranged as 
p + (1/p)var(p), implying that mean experienced group size is equal to mean group size 
plus a term equal to the variance in group size divided by mean group size. In other 
words, the extent of the divergence between mean experienced group size and mean 
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group size is proportional to the variance in group size. When all groups are the same 
size, there is no difference between the two measures. 
Table 6.12 shows the results from applying Preston's formula to the 1989 Census 
data for northern Vietnam. According to Table 6.12, the average northern Vietnamese 
person lives in a household containing not 4.5 members but 5.5 members. 
TABLE 6.12 Mean household size as conventionally 
calculated, and mean household size as experienced by 
household members. Northern and southern Vietnam. Using 
data from 1989 Census. 
Mean Mean 
household size household size 
as experienced 
Difference 
Northern 4.5 5.5 1.0 
Vietnam 
Urban 4.1 4.8 0.7 
Rural 4.6 5.6 LO 
Southern 5.2 6.3 1.1 
Vietnam 
Urban 5.2 6.5 1.3 
Rural 5.2 6.2 1.0 
Calculated from Vietnam (1991: Tables 1.3, l.3A, 1.3B). 
Similar considerations apply to household structure. The proportion of a population 
living in complex households is usually larger than the proportion of all households 
which are complex households, since complex households tend to be larger than simple 
households. None of the sources of data on household structure used to construct Table 
6.8 gave separate mean sizes for different household types. However, as an illustration, if 
20 per cent of households are complex households with a mean size of five, and the 
remaining 80 per cent of households are simple households with a mean size of four, 
then 24 per cent of the population live in complex households, and 76 per cent of the 
population live in simple households. 
6.8. North-South differences 
None of the ten samples from northern Vietnam in Table 6.8 contained such high 
proportions of complex households as the two samples from southern Vietnam. Neither 
of the northern samples from the Vietnam Life History Survey shown in Table 6.10 had 
proportions of respondents who had lived with maternal or paternal relatives as large as 
138 
the southern samples (although the difference between the northern city and the southern 
city was only three per cent). The 1989 Census figures on household size as shown in 
Table 6.9 suggest that the North-South differences apparent in Tables 6.8 and 6.10 are 
more than just statistical flukes. Mean household size as reported in the Census is 
significantly greater in the South than the North. Part of the reason, and a significant 
difference in itself, is that rural households are larger than urban households in the North, 
while in the South urban households are larger than rural households. 
Before the 1980s, mortality and fertility rates appear to have been somewhat higher 
in southern Vietnam than in northern Vietnam. In the 1980s and 1990s, mortality rates 
appear to have converged, and fertility levels in the South appear to have fallen slightly 
below those of the North (Table 3.4, Figure 3.6). Neither the differences in demographic 
conditions nor the differences in household formation rules as they are presently 
understood seem sufficient to explain the differences in household size. 
The larger households in the South do not appear to have been induced by housing 
shortages. According to the 1989 Housing Survey (Vietnam 1990b: Table A 18), the 
average living space in Ho Chi Minh City was 7.9 square metres per person, while in 
Hanoi it was 3.8, and in Haiphong it was 5.6. The South has a much less harsh climate 
than the North, and rural housing there tends to be much less solid and much cheaper 
than in the North. Land is also more plentiful in the South. The puzzle of the North-South 
differences remains unsolved. Given the lack of systematic research underpinning the 
present understanding of northern and southern Vietnamese household formation rules, 
further investigation of these rules is perhaps the best way to seek a solution. 
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Chapter 7 Conclusion 
In 1995, northern Vietnam was part of an independent, unified nation, and was 
being praised in the worlds' financial pages; life expectancy at birth was well above 60 
years for both males and females; and the total fertility rate was between 3.0 and 3.5 and 
falling quickly. Twenty-five years earlier, northern Vietnam had been engaged in a 
devastating war of unification against the most powerful country in the world; joint life 
expectancy at birth had been between fifty and sixty years; and the total fertility rate had 
been between four and five. Twenty-five years earlier still, northern Vietnam had been 
occupied by colonial powers, and was in the midst of one of the worst famines of the 
twentieth century; the pre-famine joint life expectancy at birth had been around 30 years; 
and the pre-famine total fertility rate had been around six. This chapter briefly reviews 
some of the ways in which the political and economic changes influenced the 
demographic trends, and how these changes and trends together influences the 
demography of northern Vietnamese families. 
7.1. Warfare 
Besides the war against the French in 1946-54 and the war against the American-
backed South in 1965-75, northern Vietnam fought smaller wars against Pol Pot's 
Cambodia in 1978 and against China in 1979. The 1965-75 war was itself preceded by 
several years of escalating hostilities. For the first 35 years of the period 1945-1995 
northern Vietnam was almost constantly at war. 
The 1946-54 war and the 1965-75 war each killed hundreds of thousands of 
northern Vietnamese; the Chinese war killed tens of thousands, and the Cambodian war 
fewer. The death tolls from the wars were not, however, sufficient to undo the effects of 
the great fall in underlying mortality rates up to the 1960s. With fertility declining only 
slowly, the population continued to grow, even during the wars: average population 
growth over the whole period 1945-1995 was around two per cent a year. The mean 
number of surviving children to a woman at the end of her reproductive period increased 
by about one-third over the same period. 
Some of the decline in fertility during the 1960s and 1970s is probably attributable 
to the wars, through the extended absences or deaths of reproductive-age men. However, 
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war also helped prevent the northern Vietnamese state from using Chinese-style birth 
control programs to hasten fertility decline. War made the state reliant on the support of 
its citizens, and absorbed too much of its administrative resources. 
7 .2. Communism and reform 
From the 1950s to the 1970s, the northern Vietnamese government promoted an 
orthodox communist development strategy. The strategy proved to be so inefficient, and 
so difficult to implement, that by the 1980s the government gave up, and acquiesced to 
market reforms. 
Through bureaucratic administration of the economy between 1950s and the 1970s 
the northern Vietnamese government was able to direct investment funds towards 
favoured areas such as industry. The government was unable, however, to prevent the 
development of a huge 'outside economy' operating in parallel to the regulated economy; 
the state was also unable to induce rural people to accept the institutions of collectivized 
agriculture. Northern Vietnam's economy stagnated and became increasingly dependent 
on foreign aid, with wartime disruption worsening both problems. 
The northern Vietnamese health system was to a surprising extent able to overcome 
the constraints imposed by continuing poverty. By the 1960s the crude death rate had 
fallen to below 10 per thousand, or about one-third of colonial levels. Poverty did mean, 
however, that malnutrition remained endemic, and communities lacked resources to 
construct public health infrastructure such as sanitation systems. 
Although the war and the official development strategy prevented northern Vietnam 
from experiencing the economic boom of its Southeast Asian neighbours, certain 
elements of northern Vietnam's fertility transition during the 1960s and 1970s resembled 
theirs. In northern Vietnam, as in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore, parents 
seeking upward mobility for their families invested in education for their children; urban 
crowding made large families less desirable; and old-age support schemes for urban 
dwellers reduced the demand for children. 
Following the introduction of economic reforms in the 1980s, entrepreneurial 
activity mushroomed in most urban and rural areas. Between the late 1980s and the mid-
1990s, the economy grew at around eight per cent a year. 
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Economic growth will, in the long run, permit northern Vietnam to reduce 
mortality below the levels experienced under the pre-reform economy. Vietnamese 
people will be able to afford more curative care and better diets. More money will 
potentially be available for infrastructure. In the meantime, however, economic reform 
has brought its own problems, such as the growth of an unregulated pharmaceuticals 
market. 
With the expansion of entrepreneurial and consumption opportunities in urban and 
rural areas, the relative attractiveness of investment in children has been reduced. Peace 
and economic growth has, in addition, removed some of the barriers preventing the 
government from implementing birth control programs . Northern Vietnamese 
programs, like Chinese programs, can no longer take advantage of the institutions of a 
planned economy to enforce compliance. However, the northern Vietnamese 
government, like the Chinese government, appears to be using greater vigilance and 
increased funding to make up for the disappearance of the old mechanisms. 
7.3. One country, two socialisms 
Within the socialist system of the 1950s to the 1970s there were two sub-systems, 
one based in urban areas, the other in rural areas. 'Urban socialism' was organized on 
very different principles from 'rural socialism', and received a much larger share of the 
government's resources. Some elements of the urban-rural divide have persisted through 
the economic reforms of the 1980s and 1990s. 
Urban areas, which contained most industry and most of the state sector, had the 
top priority for government investment. Urban state-sector workers received guaranteed 
jobs, relatively generous social welfare benefits, and access to northern Vietnam's best 
educational and health facilities. In order to conserve as much as possible of its 
investment funds for the urban socialist system, the northern Vietnamese leadership left 
rural communities to manage as best they could, raising funds locally through agricultural 
co-operatives. Although the self-reliant character of rural communities made them less 
vulnerable to wartime disruption, it also made them less vulnerable to administrative 
pressure from the central government. Chinese rural communities, too, were relatively 
self-reliant and independent during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. The fact, however, that 
official collectivization regulations were implemented more thoroughly in China than in 
. - - ~ 
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northern Vietnam suggests that central government control over rural areas was tighter in 
China than in northern Vientam. 
Large differences in the northern Vietnamese state's treatment of urban and rural 
areas might have been expected to lead to large differences in urban and rural mortality 
rates. Rural mortality appears, however, to have fallen almost as quickly as urban 
mortality. Given the small size of the surpluses generated by rural socialism and 
available for rural health care, it appears that the rural health system used these resources 
extremely efficiently. Vietnamese social scientists argue, convincingly, that the 
effectiveness of rural health centres was due to the responsiveness of health centre staff to 
the needs of the local communities. This responsiveness appears to be attributable to the 
fact that health centre workers were generally recruited from the local community and 
paid by the local community. 
Differences in the incentives faced by urban and rural residents do appear to have 
lead to differences in their demand for children. Few rural communities could afford to 
provide anything more than subsidized rice or funeral rites to old people, leaving rural 
people much more dependent than urban people on old-age support from their children. 
The de facto independence of rural communities was probably compounded the 
government's reluctance to attempt a Chinese-style birth control program. 
Although the Vietnamese government reduced the number of state-sector 
employees by about 25 per cent and shifted some investment to agriculture during the 
economic reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, the bias towards urban areas remained. 
Decollectivization reduced the revenue-generating capacity of local communities and led 
to the virtual disappearance of rural socialism. 
Individuals now pay most of the costs of their own medical care, with higher levels 
of government than the village only partly compensating for the decline in community-
level funding. User fees appears to have reduced utilization rates by the poor. The effects 
on mortality rates are still uncertain. 
An urban-rural divide still exists in public provision of social services, helping to 
maintain urban-rural fertility differentials. The central government has preserved the pre-
reform old-age support scheme for state-sector workers and extended it to workers in 
large enterprises. Rural communities provide even less old-age support than before the 
reforms, so that rural people continue to be more reliant than urban people on having 
children to provide for them in old age. 
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The demise of rural socialism may have increased the central government's ability 
to force down rural fertility. Because higher levels of government now fund more of 
communities' social services such as schools or clinics, and contribute more towards the 
incomes of local cadres, their leverage over communities has increased. Higher levels of 
government may have become more effective at inducing local leaders to develop birth 
control programs. 
7.4. Effects on the demography of northern Vietnamese families 
Succession practices and co-residence patterns-the two aspects of the demography 
of northern Vietnamese families studied in the thesis-have been altered to differing 
extents by the political, economic, and demographic trends of post-1945 northern 
Vietnam. Although discussions of social change usually pay less attention to succession 
than co-residence, in northern Vietnam succession practices have been altered to a far 
greater degree than have co-residence patterns. 
To conform to northern Vietnamese patrilineal succession rules a family must have 
at least one surviving son at the time of the father's death. The lag between mortality 
decline and fertility decline in northern Vietnam has led to a rise in the proportion of 
families which fulfil this condition. The decline in fertility towards replacement levels 
means, however, that the proportion of families with at least one surviving son will 
eventually decline. 
The demography of co-residence is more complex. The proportion of families with 
the necessary members to form the culturally-prescribed stem households has increased, 
but at the same time, the proportion of families with second and third married sons, or 
other members who cannot be accommodated within stem households, has also 
increased. The net effect on the distribution of household sizes and structures is difficult 
to predict. Available statistics suggest little change has occurred. 
As part of its general strategy of expanding the rights of women, the northern 
Vietnamese state has promoted inheritance by daughters. During the 1960s and 1970s, 
collectivization and legal limits on wealth accumulation reduced the amount of property 
parents had available to bequeath, and official disfavour led to ancestor veneration being 
conducted less ostentatiously in some places. Vietnamese researchers have reported that 
people pay little attention to the government's inheritance policy, and the other policies 
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have now been rescinded. None of these policies are likely to have affected succession 
practices as much, however, as the demographic changes. 
Aside, perhaps, from statements requiring children to look after their aged parents, 
the northern Vietnamese government has never formulated an official policy on family 
co-residence. In urban areas, housing shortages caused by bombing and low government 
investment in housing helped prevent households from partitioning themselves. In rural 
areas, community provision of residential land helped ease a constraint on households 
partitioning themselves. Differences in housing availability do not, however, appear to 
have led to significant urban-rural differences in household size or structure. 
Succession practices have probably conformed more, rather than less, closely to the 
old culturally-prescribed model; co-residence patterns have probably not changed much at 
all. Change in the direction of tradition and the absence of change is not what might be 
expected of the demography of northern Vietnamese families, given the magnitude of the 
shifts in political and economic systems, and mortality and fertility rates, between 1945 
and 1995. Investigation of other aspects of the demography of northern Vietnamese 
families might uncover changes commensurate with the political, economic or 
demographic changes. It is, nevertheless, important to recognize that while much in the 
daily experience of northern Vietnamese people was utterly transformed after 1945, some 
things remained almost the same. 
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Appendix to Chapter 3 
APPENDIX TABLE 3.1 Survival functions and life expectancies at birth for selected years, 
before adjustment for crisis mortalit;I 
1900 1945 1970 2000 
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
- -
0 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
1 0.710 0.713 0.769 0.772 0.942 0.943 0.965 0.966 
5 0.622 0.609 0.692 0.679 0.917 0.912 0.949 0.946 
10 0.584 0.565 0.657 0.639 0.904 0.897 0.941 0.936 
15 0.559 0.541 0.633 0.616 0.894 0.887 0.935 0.930 
20 0.532 0.521 0.608 0.597 0.883 0.879 0.928 0.925 
25 0.499 0.497 0.575 0.574 0.869 0.868 0.918 0.918 
30 0.472 0.480 0.549 0.557 0.856 0.860 0.910 0.912 
35 0.444 0.480 0.521 0.557 0.842 0.860 0.900 0.912 
40 0.409 0.438 0.485 0.515 0.822 0.839 0.886 0.898 
45 0.365 0.406 0.439 0.482 0.793 0.820 0.866 0.885 
50 0.311 0.371 0.380 0.446 0.750 0.798 0.835 0.869 
55 0.261 0.325 0.324 0.396 0.702 0.762 0.799 0.844 
60 0.210 0.272 0.266 0.337 0.639 0.713 0.750 0.808 
65 0.152 0.218 0.196 0.275 0.545 0.650 0.669 0.758 
70 0.104 0.165 0.137 0.212 0.437 0.568 0.568 0.690 
75 0.061 0.108 0.081 0.141 0.301 0.445 0.422 0.576 
80 0.030 0.064 0.040 0.085 0.171 0.312 0.258 0.434 
85 0.013 0.030 0.018 0.040 0.083 0.171 0.133 0.259 
90 0.004 0.009 0.006 0.013 0.027 0.060 0.045 0.097 




APPENDIX TABLE 3.2 Survival functions and life expectancies at birth for selected years, 
after adjustment for crisis mortality 
1900 1945 1970 2000 
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
0 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
1 0.710 0.713 0.724 0.726 0.941 0.942 0.965 0.966 
5 0.622 0.609 0.397 0.390 0.912 0.907 0.949 0.946 
IO 0.584 0.565 0.269 0.262 0.895 0.888 0.941 0.936 
15 0.559 0.541 0.184 0.179 0.881 0.874 0.935 0.930 
20 0.532 0.521 0.125 0.123 0.830 0.865 0.928 0.925 
25 0.499 0.497 0.084 0.084 0.779 0.853 0.918 0.918 
30 0.472 0.480 0.057 0.058 0.733 0.844 0.910 0.912 
35 0.444 0.480 0.038 0.041 0.705 0.839 0.900 0.912 
40 0.409 0.438 0.025 0.027 0.673 0.814 0.886 0.898 
45 0.365 0.406 0.016 0.018 0.636 0.791 0.866 0.885 
50 0.311 0.371 0.010 0.012 0.598 0.762 0.835 0.869 
55 0.261 0.325 0.006 0.007 0.557 0.721 0.799 0.844 
60 0.210 0.272 0.003 0.004 0.504 0.668 0.750 0.808 
65 0.152 0.218 0.001 0.002 0.430 0.604 0.669 0.758 
70 0.104 0.165 0.000 0.001 0.345 0.524 0.568 0.690 
75 0.061 0.108 0.000 0.000 0.238 0.408 0.422 0.576 
80 0.030 0.064 0.000 0.000 0.135 0.284 0.258 0.434 
85 0.013 0.030 0.000 0.000 0.065 0.154 0.133 0.259 
90 0.004 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.021 0.053 0.045 0.097 
Life expectancy at 30:0 32.3 7.8 7.8 52.1 61.6 66.0 70.5 
birth, years 
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APPENDIX TABLE 3.3 Fertility estimates for Vietnam 1900-1993 
Crude birth rate Total fertility rate 
Northern Vietnam All Vietnam Northern Vietnam 
Gourou (1936: 196· 7) 
c. 1930 38 
Banister (1985: Table 5) 











1974 32, 34 
1975 31 
Vietnam (1990a: Tables 3.1, 3.2) 
1983-7 4.7 4.8 
1986-7 4.3 4.2 
1987 4.0 
Vietnam (1991a: Tables 9.3, 9.5) 
From 1979 Census 
1955-59 44 5.7 
1960-64 44 6.4 
1965-69 42 6.8 
1970-74 39 6.5 
1975-79 33 5.1 
From 1989 Census 
1965-69 36 5.9 
1970-74 35 5.9 
1975-79 33 5.3 
1980-84 34 4.7 
1985-89 31 4.0 
1988-89 3.8 
Vietnam (1994c: Table 1.2) 
From 1979 Census 
1965-69 38 41 5.1 5.6 
1970-74 37 39 4.9 5.3 
1975-79 33 34 4.2 4.4 
From 1989 Census 
1975-79 34 35 4.4 4.5 
1980-84 34 35 4.4 4.5 
1984-89 33 32 4.2 4.0 
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To construct this table, I made extensive use of the collection of fertility estimates for 1955-1989 presented by 
Feeney and Xenos (1992). 
Gourou ( 1936). The figure refers to selected villages in the Red River Delta described in Section 3.2 above. 
Gourou suggest that the figure is an underestimate. 
Banister ( 1985). Banister cites vital registration data from a number of sources. notably unpublished data from 
the Vietnamese Ministry of Health. 
Vietnam ( 1990a). Estimates from 1988 Demographic and Health Survey report, calculated from birth history 
data. 
Vietnam (199la). Estimates from five per cent sample report from 1989 Census. All but the 1988-9 estimate 
were obtained by applying the reverse survival method to age distribution data from the 1979 and 1989 
Censuses. The 1988-9 estimate was calculated from 1989 Census data on births in the previous 12 months. 
Vietnam ( 1994c). Estimates from the General Statistical Office monograph on population projections. All 
estimates were obtained by applying the reverse survival method to age distribution data from the 1979 and 
1989 Censuses. GSO statisticians calculated the estimates of the crude birth rate first, and derived the 
estimates of the total fertility rate from these, using the relationship between total fertility rates and crude birth 
rates found in the provincial results from the 1989 Census. I obtained the figures for northern Vietnam and fix 
all Vietnam shown in Table 3.3 by taldng a population-weighted mean of the provincial and regional results 
presented in Vietnam (1994: Tables 1.1, 1.2). 
Vietnam (1995). Estimates from 1994 Intercensal Demographic Survey report. The regional results were 
presented in the form of total duration-specific marital fertility rates rather than total fertility rates. To obtain 
the figure of 3.4 _for northern Vietnam I first multiplied all the regional TDMFRs by the ratio of the national 
TFR to the national TDMFR. which provided estimates of the regional TFRs. I then took a population-weighted 
mean of the regional TFRs. This procedure is not particularly satisfactory, so that the figure of 3.4 can only be 
considered a rough estimate. 
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APPENDIX TABLE 3.4 Comparison of values for children ever born, children surviving, 
and proportion of children dead from the 1989 Census, the 1994 Intercensal Demographic 
Survey, and the reconstruction 
Age Children ever born Children surviving Proportion dead 
1989 Census - all Vietnam 
Census Reconstr. Census Reconstr. Census Reconstr. 
15-20 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.07 0.20 0.05 
20-24 0.63 0.68 0.62 0.64 0.02 0.06 
25-29 l.67 1.91 l.64 l.77 0.02 0.07 
30-34 2.77 3.03 2.61 2.77 0.06 0.09 
35-39 3.64 3.82 3.40 3.41 0.07 0.11 
40-44 4.36 4.34 4.01 3.73 0.08 0.14 
45-49 4.94 4.79 4.48 3.83 0.09 0.20 
1989 Census - northern Vietnam 
Census Reconstr. Census Reconstr. Census Reconstr. 
20-24 0.67 0.68 0.64 0.64 0.05 0.06 
25-29 1.75 l.91 l.66 l.77 0.05 
30-34 2.76 3.03 2.61 2.77 0.05 0.09 
1994 Intercensal Demographic Survey· all Vietnam 
Census Reconstr. Census Reconstr. Census Reconstr. 
15-20 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.25 0.05 
20-24 0.64 0.60 0.60 0.57 0.06 0.05 
25-29 1.66 1.79 1.56 1.68 0.06 0.06 
30-34 2.57 2.86 2.46 2.64 0.04 0.08 
35-39 3.49 3.63 3.09 3.29 0.11 0.09 
40-44 4.12 4.12 3.73 3.64 0.09 0.12 
45-49 4.62 4.48 4.12 3.80 0.11 0.15 
Sources: Calculated from Vietnam (1994c: Appendix Table 2.1). Vietnam (1995: Table 3.8) 
APPENDIX TABLE 3.5 
Distribution of age-specific fertility 
rates used to approximate parity· 
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